This machine catches stingrays: Pwnie Express demos cellular threat detector | Hacker News Reader

This machine catches stingrays: Pwnie Express demos cellular threat detector

arstechnica.com

95 pointsgregcohn9 comments

Here is the matrix of "odd events" that you need to be able to detect in a GSM network:

https://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/mobile-network-assessm...

(scroll down to table)

So while these very high level alerts from Pwnie are nice, I want to see what is really happening. Have I gotten any silent SMS or silent calls ? What network am I on and what cellID am I on ? Do I have an encrypted connection ?

I'm fairly certain that Pwnie does not have a baseband that they control and so there is a lot they (and we) cannot do, but there are things that can be done, and that outdated table of suspicious events can probably be expanded (and updated for LTE).

Comments ?

I was at their booth today at RSA and they confirmed that these cellular functions are not available on the PWN Phone, which makes me suspicious that the cell modem they are using is not a USB modem, but rather a minipci module that goes into their box. Would like to know what modem they chose...

A silent sms is like a ping. It generates a delivery receipt but doesn't display in the inbox. But what do you mean by silent call?

A silent call is when the phone is connected to a base station and forced into transmitting, you don't notice your phone is doing it.

That's useful. It should be possible to do almost as well with a suitably programmed phone, if you can get to the RF control level. What's needed is something that gives to the app level the same kind of info that's available for nearby WiFi stations. Then anyone could write analysis apps.

"Cell tower pinning", so that your phone remembers the cell towers in an area and reports new ones, would be useful. When a new one pops up, that's an interesting event. That capability would be useful for other purposes, such as finding and reporting coverage holes.

Like this?

* https://secupwn.github.io/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector/

* https://github.com/SecUpwN/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector

It's actually not that easy to get those events or debug info. There is one class of intel chipset that you can get it from, though:

https://github.com/2b-as/xgoldmon

I kind of wish we would just use a more secure cellular protocol to begin with. And I know that's a lot to ask for, but can't we just have nice things?

Not when the people who design the things are being paid to make them not-nice.

Encrypted content over the cellular protocol seems more plausible than a secure protocol, given that a) it's a feature that phones can roam across networks and b) the way these "exploits" work is for LE to emulate an endpoint in a system whose principles actively collaborate with LE (to some degree under force of law).

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