Well, about #2, people are defending the status quo (where any governemnt anywhere on the world can compromisse a site's key) by arguing that with DNSSEC there'll always be one government able to compromisse any site's key. Calling that a falacious argument is too charitable, it's an outright lie (and I wonder why that piece of propaganda is so pervasive).

About #3 the article simply points that there's nothing wrong with DNSSEC, unless you choose to use bad crypto algorithms. Guess what, any cryptosystem works the same way, TLS included.

About #6, yes, it's specious to criticize DNSSEC because browsers choosed to not support it (unless you are talking from the point of view of a site master wondering how you'll configure your host today - but even then, that's not a valid criticism of the algorithm, it's just reason to not deploy it now).

About #8, yes, that's not valid. DANE is the main end-to-end encryption algorithm that used DNSSEC, so one must either criticize DANE (if able) or shut-up.

Anyway, what a badly formated page. Points #1, 4, 5 and 7 are flaws. Point #7 is a big flaw, and don't hold your breath waiting for it to be solved. I'd say about point #9 is that DNSSEC is exactly a less broken CA system. I can't see where the author is going...