For TransAsia, the point is that a computer wouldn't have needed to land. It still had engine power and could have moved the plane to a stable situation.
The problem is that the TransAsia-type pilots and situations far outnumber the Sullenberger's.
One thing that most people don't realize is that if Capt. Sully had lost one engine, and turned hard into the dead engine to return to LaGuardia, chances are he would have crashed. He made the right call to confirm (dual) engine failure.
Its also well known that a controlled crash landing is better than trying to stretch the glidepath, and loosing control.
I suspect that "automated" airliners will be programmed with crash landing areas for the 0.00001% its actually needed. There was a mishap when a F/A-18D crashed on final, both engines out, and its theorized that if the pilot had flown the pattern higher the jet would crashed away from the houses. A lot of factors lead to the crash, and 4 people in the houses died.
Of course, flying dead-stick instrument approach with low clouds is almost unheard of.
> The problem is that the TransAsia-type pilots and situations far outnumber the Sullenberger's. That is a huge problem. A lot of training programs are very scripted, regimented, and do not encourage pilots to make decisions like intentionally putting a jet into the water.
NASA trained the shuttle crews for unrecoverable situations (that don't result in an emergency landing) so the crew would still keep functioning and hopefully bailout.
I don't see why this is an argument for full automation.