Amex sends USB trojan keyboards in ads | Hacker News Reader

Amex sends USB trojan keyboards in ads

catless.ncl.ac.uk

22 pointsbillpg15 comments

Just because the device says it's a keyboard without "looking" like one, doesn't mean it's suspect. Lots of input devices chose to use the human interface device (HID) USB class, since it's often simpler and has the (huge) benefit of not requiring custom drivers.

A barcode scanner, for instance, can be designed so that it just sends the digits contained in the code when you scan, and thus magically work in applications that just have regular text entry boxes in their UI.

The Yubikey (http://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey/) is another example, where a security-conscious company have chosen the keyboard HID method of delivering encryption keys to host computers.

>> Just because the device says it's a keyboard without "looking" like one, doesn't mean it's suspect.

You forgot the part about its fake USB DEV/PROD ID (masquerading as an Apple keyboard) and the part about trying to send local data to some "masked" URL.

"While we now look for incoming malware on the TCP/IP connections, clearly we need to similarly monitor the other ports as well; you can do just as much damage (or more) with a insider keyboard attack, given some social engineering. Is the power line next?"

The power line has already been used, but not in the incoming direction.

It was successfully used many years ago to smuggle information out of a highly secured place by modulating the power usage of a drive array, this was enough to allow a sensor coil placed around one of the wires powering the installation to pick up the bits.

Slow as hell, and probably quite noisy but it did work.

I wished I could dig up a citation for it, it was quite an impressive hack, and they never did figure out who did it.

There was a presentation about these kind of hacks at Defcon: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc-17-presentations/...

It mentions this idea of modulating power usage, and a few other clever ones, though I didn't see a reference to it being used in the past.

The hack I'm referring to was somewhere in the 70's or 80's, I heard about it in the 80's (86 or so).

I'm sure it's been done plenty of times though, not just recently. The nasty thing about it is that such a leak can be in place for a long time before it is discovered.

here is a wikipedia article about it:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_analysis

Which states that it was introduced in '98, but I'm quite sure of when I heard about it because I remember who told me (a systems programmer for a bank that I worked for in those years).

There was another presentation at Defcon about attacking USB drivers with rogue devices. Basically, they programmed a USB-enabled microcontroller to present a malformed ID string and could use it to inject and run arbitrary code.

http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc-17-presentations/d...

EDIT: sorry, that PDF is less informative than the talk was. He had a bunch of demonstration material that's not included here, apparently.

We've used a couple of these (http://www.amazon.com/NETGEAR-XE102-Wall-Plugged-Ethernet-Br...) in the past to get information out of a secure area (during a pen test).

We got the idea from the same hack you mention; though as with yourself my boss cant recall any other details apart from remembering it sounded really cool at the time :D

Modulation of LEDs on network gear was used too.

This isn't particularly more dangerous than the autorun crap most OSes will happily do when you put in a CD. I don't know who could have possibly thought that was a good idea.

Well, it's certainly more cross-platform, and a CD can't pretend to be a keyboard.

Cross-platform I'll grant, though most of the malicious things you'd do with a keyboard are not cross-platform.

A CD most certainly can pretend to be a keyboard, though. Autoplay is arbitrary code execution, and arbitrary code execution can do anything.

In Win95/98 an autorun CD would defeat a password-locked screensaver. We had loads of fun with that...

I don't really understand how an USB device can control the computer.

Think about how you control your computer with your keyboard and mouse.

"Hello. I'm a keyboard."

"User pressed Logo + R."

"User typed 'http://example.com/trojan.exe.

"User hit enter."

In the mean time I've read the article describing the attack and now I understand what's going on. Though, thank you for the short explanation.

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