It would be relly nice if there was some common container format you could mount natively on these operating systems without the need for 3rd party software. I think I remember reading about LUKS supporting TrueCrypt's container format - but that, of course, only works on Linux. And frankly, I don't see Apple and Microsoft either supporting the TrueCrypt container format natively or getting together to define a new one.
Plus, BitLocker is not available on Vista Business and Windows 7 Pro. So if you don't want to use Windows 8, again, you are kind of screwed.
[1] At least it was/is the only software that I know of which allows you to do that. If there are alternatives, I would very much like to hear about them!
Just use PGP, probably the gpg [0] software. You can set it up so that each machine knows the others' public keys, or you can take a shortcut and copy the same private key to all your machines. Encrypt and decrypt as you like. This is "hacker" advice, however; gpg is not a consumer-oriented tool. You'll have to read some documentation and keep your wits about you. But that was true of TC as well, wasn't it?
Just to be clear, I appreciate your suggestion, and in many cases it is entirely sufficient.
But for me, right now, TrueCrypt hits kind of a sweet spot in terms of portablity, convenience and security.
If there's a replacement for this use case I'd really like to know about it.
Ditto:
If you're using FDE for your system disk, it is desirable to know that in the event of the OS becoming unbootable that you can open it using any old OS. Especially in the case of laptops, where you won't have any guarantees about what other machines are available.
As I said - it's a whole lot better than nothing. The "insecure" thing is mainly to remind myself that it isn't the be-all and end-all.
"LUKS" stands for "linux unified key setup" and it is an "on-disk format" and its reference implementation is found in cryptsetup[1]
LUKS on-disk format is supported in windows through doxbox[2]
cryptsetup also supports TrueCrypt,the on-disk format.
people usually say "LUKS" when they mean cryptsetup as it makes no difference to them but i think its important to know the difference.
[1] https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification
Why fund an audit then? Why beat this particular dead horse?
Can you imagine being that open source developer, putting hours of your (incredibly valuable, if you're a talented crypto dev) time into a project that gets relentlessly shit on, later raising more money to hunt through backdoors than you've ever seen for it?
How would you that make you feel? How would you feel when you thought about working on the code? When you thought about fixing bugs reported by people who were paid to look for them by people who openly distrust you?
That isn't a rhetorical question. I'd like you to imagine the situation the Truecrypt devs were in, try to empathize with them, and tell us about it.
I'm not trying to say Truecrypt should never have been audited, or that open-source projects in general should never be audited. But I do think this particular case was badly handled, and I don't think that's such a horrible thing to say. Things are mishandled all the time. We can always learn from our mistakes. Let's learn from this experience and make the next cross-platform crypto tool better for everyone.
I'm really having a hard time seeing the problem here.
Now can you answer my question?
* As far as I can tell, the audit project began without the consent of the Truecrypt developers. You can argue that this is necessary for some security reason, but it is also a rude gesture to an open-source project.
* The crowdfunding drive contained no provisions for handling the results of the audit such as developer resources, etc.. The existing developers were assumed to be both capable and motivated to drop whatever they were spending their free time working on to fix things that auditors found.
* The atmosphere around the audit push from the beginning seemed very negative. There was a distinct "Truecrypt is super sketchy" vibe in the HN comments, etc., surrounding it initially. I think that this was a good thing for the audit, which meant helping the audit directly hurt the Truecrypt brand. This dovetails with...
* Singling out Truecrypt as the target of an extensive, expensive audit seems somewhat absurd. There are several projects that could have benefited much more from an audit that weren't audited, such as OpenSSL, Linux's RNG, OpenVPN, any other TLS implementation, Tor, maybe TextSecure (though I don't know if TextSecure had enough of a userbase at the time to justify it, it certainly does now). Why were these projects not audited? I think it's because the Truecrypt devs tried to be anonymous, and low-profile, whereas these other projects are all backed by people with faces who are much harder to throw something at than Truecrypt was.
istruecryptauditedyet.com is a real page now, but what was it before? A giant NO on the screen? Is there an 'istextsecureauditedyet.com' even though TS uses novel protocols and crypto? Why not?
So, I think:
* The fundraiser should have supported Truecrypt while raising money for an audit
* The fundraiser should have incorporated costs to fix anything found as a result of an audit, with money going back to Truecrypt if nothing substantial was found
* The audit push should have been conducted with the consent, or better yet, solicitation, from Truecrypt developers
* The audit should have been conducted in a more respectful way, emphasizing the positive gain from auditing specifically Truecrypt rather than the negative aspects of Truecrypt's existing development style
In general, open source is a massive donation of time and effort and should be treated like the gift that it is instead of being taken for granted. I think that people took Truecrypt for granted and that's probably a part of the reason why its developer quit, because that is a very common reason for open-source developers to quit and I find it impossible to believe that it was not at all a factor in their quitting.
If you would truly feel happy if your project was shit on, donations effectively stolen from you, and a ton of work dumped on you that you did not ask for, but now must immediately address lest you be attacked for "ignoring the results of the audit," you are a special type of human to say the least.
Also, file encryption / decryption fails massively for some things. What I want is something that implements a filesystem. As otherwise things with many files get... annoying. Not to mention less secure.
If there's a better way to do this then let me know.
You can also use GnuPG or openssl to encrypt a file or a disk image.
Lately I took a look at actual filesystems for cross-platform use. I didn't find a great one, but depending on which OS you want to burden with an extra driver, pretty good ones include exFAT, NTFS, and UDF specifically version 2.01. Like you, I am curious whether better answers are available.
It works well as a TrueCrypt replacement for me personally, but has a couple of warts. Secure rm is slow on cleanup, and the user needs to be careful about the hidden files it uses to keep track of volume metadata.
That's not Windows-compatible, as far as I know.
Still interesting though.
Also, (as far as I know) all public evidence for your assertion is a purported email from one of the devs to Matt Green. He might just have been polite in that mail...
I'm amused by the idea that the actual words of the TC developers are less credible than whatever random thoughts are bubbling around a message board. But, HN, what are you gonna do.
https://www.fundfill.com/fund/TrueCryptAudited
There's no hint that the audit is for historic purposes.
As for your second paragraph, I already said that the TC developer might just have been polite in that mail. Technical people are often not able to stand up for themselves, especially if it comes to money.