The author mentions "perverse" incentives in Congress, but what he doesn't mention (because it's a very politically difficult subject) is the perverse incentives afforded military officers. When you have a system in which it's so common as to be expected that the officers who influence your purchasing will in a couple years retire into a job with the private contractor from whom you're purchasing, you have a recipe for bias. Even from really standup people who don't recognize their own vulnerability to influence. It's just such a common thing to work in the private sector for the same office as you did when you were enlisted that nobody blinks an eye. Because it's often really good to still have those people around.

But at the same time, I think that's a pretty untenable situation. The military needs to do something to balance the career mobility of their officers with the ethical hazards of the current system. Without some rules to prevent the scenarios that have the most potential for abuse, the situation is not unlike the flow of Congress members into lobbying. Except we don't elect military officers.

It's a tough balance. Part of the promise of the military's recruiting is that you'll advance your career. They should fulfill that promise. At the same time, they need to make sure that the ways in which they fulfill that promise don't incentivize poor judgment on behalf of the public interest.