Social conformity despite individual preferences for distinctiveness
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
What actually gets published tends to be filtered by its political content. In particular, results with a liberal bias tend to be promoted.
[1] In classical economics, the reverse holds. It's very hard to show that any mechanism is possible under the assumptions of classical economics. Hence the huge number of negative results: (a) Coase theorem, (b) the Modigliani-Miller Theorem (irrelevance of capital structure) and (c) Ricardian equivalence. All these results basically say that if you try to do X (where X is (a) change people's actions that have externalities by assigning property rights, (b) change the value of a firm by changing its capital structure, and (c) change people's actions by government spending), the free market will completely undo your actions and leave the situation unchanged.
The paper (and most game theory based papers) also assumes that people are perfectly rational and have perfect knowledge. The only difference is that instead of actions being restricted to the free market, and payoffs being consumption, game theory allows an arbitrary environment (chosen by the paper author) to provide the actions and payoffs.