How to pick startup ideas
defmacro.org
defmacro.org
That's the type of statement that I question - there are plenty of examples of companies creating products in saturated markets where they were not the first mover. In fact, sometime being a first mover can be a disadvantage as you must, as a startup, spend huge amounts of time and money educating the market.
Now, the author's approach of "look at the trend, get in front of it" is great - but it's pretty rare that someone can do that. In startups, I've usually seen that luck plays a bigger role in it than anyone wants to admit - that is, you start a company, and you happen onto the right market wave at the right time.
Definitely bookmarking it!
There is an "exceptions" section closer to the end of the post that discuss this, though it probably should have been longer.
The biggest issue with exceptions like this is that first-time founders often jump into a saturated market and think "we can do better -- look at all the counterexamples", but they end up losing the overwhelming majority of the time. You can jump into a saturated market, but you need a hypothesis as to why you're going to win (a distribution edge that existing competitors don't have, a new trend that existing competitors can't capitalize on, etc.) Especially in the latter case, one could make an argument that you will have discovered a new trend/market, though at that point it's a matter of definitions.
I'd be curious to find data to back up that assertion - I've personally seen way more people/companies fail trying to skate to where the puck is going to be vs. just going after businesses where there are already existing solutions. But again, this is anecdotal data.
The best example I have of this is Google. Search was done and owned by a handful of players - they innovated and won. But to your point about definitions - did they win on that, or win on creating Adwords (which they were also not the first mover on)?
Perhaps it comes down to this: entering a market where there are low switching costs means that you can enter late with a significantly better product - but it has to be 4x better (that's my rule). Meaning the product has to be 4x better than the existing solution.
If, however, you're entering a market with high switching costs, then the benefit probably has to be great than 4x - maybe 8x. As an example - look at all the people trying to get people to switch off of Salesforce.com. I don't know anyone that likes this product - but no one can switch because the costs are too high across the board - organizationally, data-wise, software - while the resulting CRM might be marginally better. That means that startups going after that can get traction with people who don't have a CRM, but not with existing CRM customers - and thus bang their head against the wall/fail.
The article puts that neatly in proper perspective. And that changes the personal self-actualization path calculus for me considerably. Targeting "building a rocket ship" as a goal doesn't make you any more likely to actually build a rocket ship than just starting a company in wherever you find your passion. Where you find your passion is, just due to the way humans are, more likely to be rocket-ship-worthy than any idea borne out of any rational brainstorming process aimed at producing one.
That's confirmation bias. There are tons more people than you know of in the right-place-right-time, but couldn't/wouldn't act on it. You still have to build the start up and be persistent at it, have the right vision, do the right adjustments when competition comes around. These are also features shared by the Microsoft / Google / Apples out there.
In the usual case, picking a product that turns out to have high demand is the biggest area where luck matters.
There are two kinds of high-demand products: the things that everyone wants but no one knows how to do, and things that no one knows they want but everyone knows how to do.
Fractal image compression is a good example of the former.
Almost everything else is a good example of the latter: smart phones, Facebook, Twitter.
There are some things that are both: the Model T ("If I'd asked my customers what I wanted they would have said a faster horse") and so on.
If you choose one of the former, the odds are you'll fail because if no one else can do it, you probably won't either.
If you choose one of the latter, the odds are you'll fail because if no one knows they want it, it's probably a stupid idea--which is often a smart idea whose time has not yet come.
This is not to say you shouldn't go for it! "The odds are you'll fail" is a simple statement of fact with regard to starting a business, but only for certain values of "fail". You'll learn a huge amount, grow in ways you never knew were possible, and have the adventure of a lifetime. Just be really, really careful about not getting wedged financially, and especially make sure you don't let friends or family members over-invest.
I still find an inexplicable number of startups apparently unaware of the critical importance of market-building and networking.
A poor product marketed well will always outcompete a better product marketed badly - or not at all - as long as it has acceptably basic functionality and isn't completely unfit for purpose.
There are so many examples of this in tech it's baffling that it doesn't seem to be considered more often.
And I think the article is just plain wrong about innovation, because in fact there's a constant stream of possible new innovations. The stream comes in waves, but anyone who isn't thinking about what's going to be possible soon isn't paying attention.
'If it was possible someone else would have done it by now' is a Dilbert argument, not one based on evidence.
What doesn't exist is a constant stream of opportunities with instant Apple/Google/FB/MS earning potential.
But these corps got big in many steps, which included choices about products and services, marketing and ecosystem building, customer lock-in, brand management, investor relations, management culture, and worker culture.
They didn't just make a thing and instantly kill the rest of the market because it was just that awesome.
So, right-place-right-time-right-preparation? Boils down the same way, just with an added dimension.
The market selects for increasingly subtler and harder-to-attain qualifications, and while you could conceivably stay on top of what the market is looking for through careful reading of history in the short and long term, time spent doing this is time not spent preparing for actually starting an enterprise. The people who do succeed seem to only read history after the fact.
Ultimately, that means shifting from a 'risk calculating' mindset to an 'exposure mindset.' Instead of 'what are my chances of success', 'am I cool with potentially spending years of my life on this problem regardless of outcome'? The exposure perspective is the basis for 'antifragility' and honestly makes life quite a bit easier and more satisfying to live.
In marketing, they have a concept of the "four Ps" - product price place (distribution) promotion; all of these can be fertile ground to set yourself apart from the competition.
The first mover has an advantage, but it's not overwhelming. IBM didn't come out with the first personal computer - Apple and Commodore did. Microsoft didn't have the first operating system for x86 machines - Digital Research did. AOL once dominated social networking. Facebook moved into a quite mature space - Myspace, Geocities, and several others were big companies when Facebook started.
Luck does indeed play a big part. If Gary Kildall, the author of CP/M, had been in the office the day IBM was looking for an OS for their new PC, the history of personal computing could have been very different.
You're right. But of those companies that just "use" high tech for their services start to put efforts in R&D to stay on top later in their game.
No, I don't think so. The author is Slava from RethinkDB. His company is definitely not "appcrap" (as you put it), and I think his same line of reasoning applies equally well to "real technology" companies (like RethinkDB), it just takes place on a longer time horizon. If you extend his metaphors to include the time to competitively create "real technology" they apply equally well.
As much as we all like to think we're exceptional, we aren't.
I just heard of them from a friend who will be joining and I was skeptical at first. Their model seems to be to attach/install peripherals to a non- self-driving car and turn it into a self driving car. That way they can compete on a level with Google (optimistically) but don't need to manufacture vehicles.
IBM wasn't a startup -- it had massive distribution resources. When you have access to an enormous distribution channel and massive marketing budgets, the rules are obviously different.
> Microsoft didn't have the first operating system for x86 machines - Digital Research did.
Yes, but Microsoft piggybacked off of IBM's distribution channel. That's extremely rare, and 99.99% of startups can't swing that sort of deal.
> AOL once dominated social networking. Facebook moved into a quite mature space - Myspace, Geocities, and several others were big companies when Facebook started.
AOL, MySpace, and Geocities effectively committed suicide. It's nice when that happens, but you can't count on it.
There are no guarantees, it's all a balance of probabilities. The point isn't that the first mover always wins, it's that if you aren't the first mover the balance of probabilities is against you.
Can you further explain this?
http://staffweb.ncnu.edu.tw/clhung/MOT/Mohr02.ppt (slide 19 and on)
First movers have an advantage when they can raise entry barriers (economies of scale, network effects, switching costs).
However, fast followers or late movers have some important advantages, and if the early movers don't have significant barriers they can pull the rug from under them if they have a superior product or better business model.
If I had to summarize and riff off of the ideas here, I'd phrase it as "Be very careful about where you're getting your information from." If you got your startup idea because you heard about something from a news article, you are way too late. If you got it from an Internet forum, there's a chance that you might be on to something, but it depends on how niche the forum is and how close to the bleeding ege. If you got it from a problem that you or a friend personally had and you know how to solve it right now, you may be on to something, but you have to carefully consider how many other people are like your friend and whether that's going to grow in the future. If you're in a niche community yourself and that community is growing rapidly, there are probably lots of things you can explore that might be fruitful startup ideas.
I would encourage you to apply this nugget of gold to this post as well.
It is a mistake to dismiss an idea just because others are working on it. In fact, I would argue the opposite. It validates the idea and the market.
That's been so thoroughly debunked (try and think of a single successful startup that was First Mover with its business model). The First Mover spends all its time educating the market, the businesses who follow soon after can take advantage of that.
Really nice writing though :)
This assumes that the entire market knows about a solution the moment a first mover comes to market.
The reality is that building a brand to the point where every prospect you approach is comparing you to an incumbent takes years.
The first couple years of a new market opportunity, even with dozens of competitors, there are enough prospects in the market that you can be first to market with the people you reach and your competitors will be first to market with a different segment of the market.
That being said, it is ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL for every company to differentiate themselves in a way that they can't be compared to a competitor.
There are some nuggets of wisdom sprinkled throughout this post, but It is clearly built on one subjective individuals perception of things that are beyond our control to really grasp. (i.e. the surface is successful because of a massive ad budget. I would argue the surface is a new category by itself.)
But anybody can spend more money to tell more people about their product. This is not a competitive differentiator; if you do it, and the company who got to market first does it, they'll win simply through Gambler's Ruin, since they start from a bigger base.
It doesn't. The first mover will start getting customers before you do, and as they do their ability to reach customers will grow exponentially. You might start reaching a segment of the market they aren't reaching, but they'll trivially be able to lock you out.
I do agree that the person who wins the perception of being first in peoples minds will win the branding battle...but I do not agree that the second place competitors won't build strong, viable companies.
In fact, there are many examples of big brands being overtaken by smart positioning.
Avis claimed, "we are number two so we try harder." to overtake hertz. Enterprise overtook avis by differentiating itself with a different distribution channel (central biz district instead of airports)
IF you aren't the first mover, you need to position yourself opposite the first mover and you will gain market share. This doesnt mean you shouldn't try. It means you should be smart about how people perceive your brand and your competitors.
If they're trying to build a brand, they suck at it.
(I guess that what they have managed to do is distinguish themselves from no-name budget operators...I wouldn't really consider going with a rental car I haven't heard of, even if it's mentioned in the press. But then, that's validating the original article's point, first-mover advantage is immensely important, and no amount of spending is changing that.)
I guess I should differentiate two types of brands. There are category defining brands (i.e. Kleenex, Xerox, Google) and there are recognizable brands.
The fact that you dont differentiate between avis, hertz, enterprise, and national, but exclude rent-a-wreck, which is almost always cheaper tells me that the commodity you are convinced you buy in price, is in fact driven by your perception of those brands.
Being first in peoples minds is the BEST way to build a brand, but it's not the only way. The fact that Enterprise overtook Hertz as number one, even though they were late to the game...and the fact that you don't buy from only one brand, tells me that being first mover is not the only way to win a market.
Although,to be fair, enterprise was a first mover in the "central business district" car rentals.
I guess my point is that every business has the opportunity to define themselves in their own category, regardless of market conditions. That is the job of your branding. To create the perception that you are first.
many of the companies you've never heard of made their money building an easier to use X in a saturated market.
If the dominant company in the industry has not made significant changes to their product in 10 years, then that's an obvious opportunity for a startup, even if the market is completely saturated.
at least in B2B i've found that many companies solve a problem for their customer demographic in year X, grow pretty big, and rake in the cash. They stay stagnant for X+5 to 10 years and they leave their customers frustrated without any real options.
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Another fallacy I hear from people thinking of ideas has to do with "solved problems"
A "solved problem" is just a problem with 1 solution. People are different, customers are different. Is there another way to solve the problem that obsoletes the previous solution?
ex: transportation; solved by "horse and buggy", and then obsoleted by cars and public transportation.
Horses (and the first cars) didn't solve the problem to travel 100km in under 1h. Which can be seen as a new problem itself.
We found a big point of a differentiation (http://rethinkdb.com/blog/realtime-web/), which, depending on one's definition, can be considered discovering a new market, and we'll be the first open-source scalable database in that market. The upcoming 2.0 release will reposition the company around realtime web/push database. A huge part of the reason why we chose this path is the lessons in the article.
Looking forward to more stuff from you guys. This is the best written article I've read in a long time on startup stuff.
Speaking of which, I really hope at one point you reconsider the driver model. Having official drivers for only a few not-so-awesomely-typed languages is a big turnoff.
Yes, very similar, but there are a few major differences -- open-source product, horizontally scalable, json data model, packaging/api designed for web developers from the ground up. When you add all of these up, the differences are quite dramatic.
> I really hope at one point you reconsider the driver model.
Yes -- after 2.0 is out, we'll start bringing the community drivers under the official umbrella.
The issue is that modern application need to work on mobiles and browsers, and be responsive. To be responsive you need to bring the part of the state that can be reached via the UI to the device. This suddenly makes your database distributed among your servers and your client devices.
The device may be a mobile phone or a laptop in an airplane, and it needs to work offline and on networks with high latency. This means you need to have an eventually consistent AP database across servers, browsers and mobiles.
Currently databases assume they live on servers and we hack our way with distributed state on the clients, but I hope this won't last.
- Eventually consistent systems are fundamentally more difficult
to program for average developers than immediately consistent
ones (and when a more convenient system is an option, it wins)
- Connectivity is improving and will continue to improve, so
immediately consistent systems will always be a strong option
It remains to be seen whether these hypotheses prove to be correct in practice. We'll find out soon.Looking forward to 2.0.
The reason is that there is no valuable product there one could ship. Putting an existing database on an SSD gives you all of the benefits and none of the drawbacks.
In many cases, analyzing your startup idea with such a complex framework will stop you at your tracks.
I prefer to follow the basic rules PG laid out (there are some overlaps) in his article on startup ideas.
The answer:
Well, let's take a step back and think about the sync problem and what the ideal solution for it would do:
There would be a folder. You'd put your stuff in it. It would sync.
They built that.
Why didn't anyone else build that? I have no idea.
"But," you may ask, "so much more you could do! What about task management, calendaring, customized dashboards, virtual white boarding. More than just folders and files!"
No, shut up. People don't use that crap. They just want a folder. A folder that syncs.
"But," you may say, "this is valuable data... certainly users will feel more comfortable tying their data to Windows Live, Apple's MobileMe, or a name they already know."
No, shut up. Not a single person on Earth wakes up in the morning worried about deriving more value from their Windows Live login. People already trust folders. And Dropbox looks just like a folder. One that syncs.
"But," you may say, "folders are so 1995. Why not leverage the full power of the web? With HTML5 you can drag and drop files, you can build intergalactic dashboards of statistics showing how much storage you are using, you can publish your files as RSS feeds and tweets, and you can add your company logo!"
No, shut up. Most of the world doesn't sit in front of their browser all day. If they do, it is Internet Explorer 6 at work that they are not allowed to upgrade. Browsers suck for these kinds of things. Their stuff is already in folders. They just want a folder. That syncs.
That is what it does.
You can obviously screw up a great market -- and that has been done, and not infrequently -- but assuming the team is baseline competent and the product is fundamentally acceptable, a great market will tend to equal success and a poor market will tend to equal failure. Market matters most.
And neither a stellar team nor a fantastic product will redeem a bad market.
The only truly new thing that I discovered was the "story" bit. I haven't heard that anywhere else before.
strong point, exactly what I have been thinking lately while trying to understand every single products Google acquires. I still think there are rooms for innovation.
We promoted it but it didn't get any up-take
(the site is using the opensource lobste.rs code from https://github.com/jcs/lobsters )
There is also a sub-reddit where people post this type of stuff (i'm unaffiliated with it)
I think it depends on many things, including the size of the market. I'm willing to bet there are many profitable niches which are served currently with only sub-optimal products. But to find these one needs domain knowledge od the niche, and I think these are served best by teams of adventurous established experts rather than teams without domaim knowledge.