This is not in the spirit of 2FA.
This is not in the spirit of 2FA.
If you're questioning yourself whether authy is trustworthy because they require you to provide a phone number for a 2FA-TOTP-Method that does technically not require it at all(!) and thus could pose a potential security degredation, check the FAQ about account recovery/passwords here: https://support.authy.com/hc/en-us/articles/115001950787-Bac...
Quote: * The Backups password is never sent nor stored in our servers for your security * Like the Backups password, the App Protection PIN (and optional biometric data) is never stored in our servers * Like the Backups password and App Protection PIN, the Master Password is never stored in our servers
the question still is if you trust those promises - but as authy is backed by twilio (thus lots of 2FA-SMS are already processed by them) the chances are good those guys know what they do and do it responsibly
I also understand why some people don't like clouds backups. The good news is that backups are off by default and optional. If you don't need them, you can keep them disabled.
https://twitter.com/authy/status/498244613766139904
@benmcginnes Yes we are RFC 6238 TOTP compatible.
Same algorithm as GAuth but 7 digits, 256 bit keys and 10 seconds window.
So why do you still need my phone number? There's no network connection or SMS required to generate those TOTP codes. I'm not buying the story that you need to text me or call me unless you're storing the seed/token centrally and sending it to users upon request which I strongly disagree with. That should only be stored on the user's device.If they don't have a phone number they can't do all that transparently, which is bad when you are aiming your service at a broad audience.
I'm not really interested in defending it, I probably don't like the idea of depending on a third party any more than feld does, I was just pointing out that there are simpler explanations for what they are doing than I'm not buying the story that you need to text me or call me unless you're storing the seed/token centrally and sending it to users upon request which I strongly disagree with.
Another one is that if they actually implemented TOTP like that their business would take a lot of damage when it was revealed publicly (because what's the point of paying for a broken implementation?).
This stuff is no more complicated than storing password hashes. Having a nice client app is good, but Google Authenticator is good enough. So instead of using authy and relying on a third party, why not get something like [4] and be done with it?
[1] https://github.com/nathforge/pyotp
[2] https://github.com/mdp/rotp
A couple of months ago I managed to break the screen of my tablet with 20-30 services I use 2FA (Google Authenticator). I had to spend about 50 bucks just to get a new screen and repair it.
For some of these services I had the token saved on my keepass, but I always felt a little dirty doing that. If there was a way to keep backups of Google Authenticator data, I'd take it in a heartbeat.
You could also add a U2F token and store that away.
I think Google's (or Microsoft's because I think they use a similar SMS-based 2FA) method could be easily manipulated by intelligence agencies for example with access to the carriers' networks. The Google Authenticator app is now completely useless for Gmail as well, since they made it to fallback to SMS-based 2FA if you forgot your password (ugh - why Google? WHY?!).
I am not very familiar with Authy, but I have built pin-code 2FA solutions using Twilio. Based on your comments, I am not sure the point of Authy if it is easy to build 2FA except TOTP using yesterday's Twilio.