The problem is block-level crypto. It has nothing to do with whether it's layered on top of a hardware disk drive.
What you're not getting is that TrueCrypt offered a particular interface experience and cross-platform compatibility that doesn't exist elsewhere.
"The term "full-disk/on-disk encryption" is often used to signify that everything on a disk is encrypted, including the programs that can encrypt bootable operating system partitions."
Are you going to tell Markus Gattol he's wrong? No? Good, let's move on.
What matters here is the security, and the adoption rate of TrueCrypt is/was through the roof, because of how it allowed folks to move encrypted volumes across various platforms without much hassle.
What you wrote seems to intimate there's no actual need or value in moving encrypted volumes across platforms, and that if folks actually want to do that they should just encrypt individually and at a FS level and do so using PGP, which has existed for years, and whose adoption rate and ease-of-use are both, compared to TrueCrypt, through the floor.
The fact is, people want to move encrypted volumes across platforms. It's not more secure than anything else, but it presents a workflow that might actually be more secure, due simply to it's ease of implementation.
You're right, security is all that matters here, and folks aren't going to be secure if it remains impossibly difficult to be secure.
Block-layer encryption, also known as "whole disk encryption", "on-disk encryption" or "full-disk encryption"
I think you're just trolling. Sorry, I didn't even finish reading your comment.
Amusingly (edit: given how you cited it), there is in fact cryptographic stuff wrong in that article.
The rest of my comment frankly wasn't for you, it's for the folks reading what you write and blindly accepting it. At least now they can see how petulant you can be when facing differing points of view.
I shouldn't have tilted. :(
Oh yeah? That it wasn't personally endorsed by you?
http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/modes.pdf
You'll know the part I'm referring to because it reads practically as a response to a chunk of Gattol's page; it's a problem shared by the Wikipedia coverage on full-disk encryption.
Being cagey about it (i) motivates you to actually read the paper and (ii) avoids what would inevitably be an extremely unproductive debate.
(This is a fantastic survey, by the way; if you're interested in crypto, bookmark it forever.)
My amusement about Gattol's page has nothing to do with Gattol; it's just the way his page got used in this thread by someone else, as a sort of rhetorical "fatality" move. I'm confident Gattol is much smarter than I am. I say that because Dimino also tried to take this thread to Gattol on Twitter, too. :)
Furthermore, this is devolving into a schoolyard, "I know but I'm not telling" situation. To put it another way, I don't think there is any significant error in the Gattol's page, nor is there any significant error on the wikipedia page on full-disk encryption.
I'm very glad to be shown to be incorrect on this point, but I doubt I would be, at least by you.
I'm interested in this area, both professionally and as a genuine curiosity, but every time I run into you it's a negative experience. I'd like that to stop happening.
But hey, I'm not ultimately the guy who wrote the article. I've poked both the author and Thomas on twitter -- maybe Thomas can help the author correct any inaccuracies. You, too, could help I'd imagine, if you would be more specific about the issues. I'm guessing the author wouldn't want his article to remain inaccurate if folks could point out the specific issues.