TSA Response to XKCD “Bag Check” Cartoon | Hacker News Reader

TSA Response to XKCD “Bag Check” Cartoon

tsa.gov

80 pointsMikeCapone113 comments

Funny. (you probably know this but) The cartoon isn't about if batteries are more dangerous than water bottles or even a jab on the TSA policies about grading the danger of stuff, it's about how nerds will dig their own graves because it's on our nature to point flaws, to improve a system/process, and how detached from the way relationships work (specially these of power, like employer/employee) we can be. In other words, how reason and logic tramples everything else.

At least this is how the cartoon resonated with me.

But hey, we all look at our own bellies.

We may all be thanking Randall in the near future for being unable to use laptops while flying.

Our only hope is that someone uses the TSA to blow up an aeroplane - the resulting paradox should cause them all to vanish in a puff of logic :-)

Direct link to Randall's comment: http://www.tsa.gov/blog/2009/10/response-to-bag-check-cartoo...

Randall's comment is simultaneously correct and misleading on a particular point. A laptop battery may have quite a bit of energy density, but that's not entirely relevant, as he points out in the next sentence. The speed at which the energy is released is far, far more important.

I provided that remark just so I could repeat this awesome factoid: a stick of butter has more energy than a stick of dynamite.

Bring potassium chlorate (an oxidizer), and a strong jar with you and you could probably make the butter explode (although not detonate).

With a little work you could turn the butter into a fuel-air bomb. A flour bomb would probably be even easier.

A laptop battery may have quite a bit of energy density, but that's not entirely relevant, as he points out in the next sentence. The speed at which the energy is released is far, far more important.

Remember all those news stories a few years back about Dell laptops bursting violently into flames?

Assuming you could sneak a supercap onto a plane (roughly 30Wh/kg), using the maximum of your carry-on-weight and not exceeding it (usually ~10kg), you can easily have an energy potential equivalent to ~1/2 a stick of dynamite. How much you'll get out in the form of explosive force is debatable, but is certainly to be an order of magnitude above a battery as the discharge rates are several orders of magnitude faster.

However, the expected explosive force of home made liquid explosives is only on the scale of a stick of dynamite, it's certainly less obvious though.

Both explosions randomly placed are unlikely to down a plane, and are likely to be better used breaking into the cockpit than actually downing the plane.

I believe almost a 1/3 KWh high voltage power source could be of much more use than in its explosive force for an organised terrorist attack. However, most anti-terrorism procedures aren't designed to prevent organised terrorists, they're designed to prevent the many more morons with access to explosives.

His asks if the TSA ever tests if confiscated liquids are actually explosives. This is a brilliant question! If there is no cost to trying to sneak in liquid explosives (unlike, say, a gun), terrorists can easily try again and again until they succeed, and the ban really is very pointless.

You think a 1/10000 chance of arrest is going to deter a suicide bomber?

Let's make the math a little more favorable. If the TSA caught 99% of liquids people try to bring through and then randomly tested 5% of them, the terrorist faces a 1% chance of success in each attempt, and a 4.95% chance of arrest. Assuming they repeat upon the most likely (liquids confiscate and not tested) outcome, they face an overall 16.81% probability of eventually getting the liquids through, and a 83.19% probability of arrest. Now, a 16.81% failure rate ain't great (and my assumptions are probably favorable), but that's why we need a layered security system.

On the other hand, if the TSA tests 0% of the liquids, the probability of eventual success jumps to 100%...

To test 5% of confiscated liquids, the TSA would have to detain tens of thousands of passengers.

Good thing for me I wasn't arguing that the TSA was actually testing the liquids and thus not wasting everyone's time!

Edit: on the other hand, I'm not sure it's so infeasible... If 5% of passengers have liquids, and 5% of those get checked, that still seems like a smaller fraction of people than those that get extra security already. Simply having agents open the bottles and smell them (this actually happened to me in china!) would be somewhat effective...

and the response to Randall: http://www.tsa.gov/blog/2009/10/response-to-bag-check-cartoo...

Both this and the above link are giving 404 errors? I think the TSA is censoring the comment posts. Typical.

You can search for "Randall" on the page to find Randall's comment and TSA's response.

1. Remove tinfoil hat

2. Use ctrl+f

Don't be silly. Everyone knows you need a fully body suit of aluminum.

Good grief, could they miss the point any further?

"The batteries may be more dangerous than a bottle of water, but they are not more dangerous than a water bottle filled with liquid explosives."

The relevant question is whether the batteries are enough to cause an explosion that could bring down a plane; not whether batteries are more dangerous than water.

I feel like TSA must know they're running a security theater operation, and this post was to defuse (no pun intended) any public concern about laptop batteries so they don't have to go and ban them too...

They for sure know.

What would you do if you were charged with preventing someone from smuggling a weapon onto an airplane, while at the same not not inconveniencing people, and also while being denied, as illegal, the only tool that actually works (profiling)?

They are being given an impossible job. Not hard. Impossible. They don't have a choice except to do security theater.

I would install metal detectors, x-ray luggage, randomly search people and bags as often as my resources reasonably allowed, use bomb-sniffing dogs, and use law enforcement and intelligence agencies to try to prevent terrorist groups from showing up at the airport in the first place. I would train my security personnel to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior while recognizing that most acts of terrorism in the United States have been committed by white males, and that terrorism is a statistical outlier in every demographic.

That's just me. You're right, though, institutionally mandated racism would probably be way more effective.

And I'll bring a flour bomb on board, and your detectors will never find it. Or I could replace half the batteries on my laptop with a bomb, then seal it so the dog can't smell it, and the searcher will never realize it's there.

You are far overestimating how good detectors and searching is. They are already doing all your suggestions, so I guess you are happy with them.

Profiling is effective. Israel does it. If you are a family traveling with kids, they just ask you some questions. Alone? They check more. Arab an alone? Be prepared for a full search. Arab, but with a family? Not as much of a search.

Yes it sucks for the Arabs, no question about it. But it works. And it would never fly in the US. There are many things that work, but have enough drawbacks they will never be used.

You can say profiling has too many drawbacks, and I'll agree with you. But don't say it's not effective.

You are far overestimating how good detectors and searching is.

No, I'm not, which is why I'm doing all the other stuff, too.

They are already doing all your suggestions, so I guess you are happy with them.

Yeah, actually, I think a lot of what the TSA does is completely reasonable and, when executed properly, effective. The fact that some policies are stupid theater does not mean all are.

Profiling is effective. Israel does it.

The United States isn't Israel, we have extremists of all colors and creeds, and terrorist acts here by any one group are rare enough that particular instances can't really be taken as indicators of who will be exclusively trying to do it in the future.

There is such an easy way to get around the "well, it might be a liquid bomb" problem...

Have people drink from any water bottles they're taking on board.

If someone managed to make a liquid that's simultaneously explosive and non-toxic enough to be ingested, we have bigger problems, namely ingested bombs. Heck, I can just imagine some terrorist swallowing a condom full of explosives, then lighting the detonator wires hanging from his butt.

Maybe then they would have to ban assholes on planes.

This isn't a good option either. It would be possible to have a bottle that was lined in such a way as to have drinking water and an explosive in the same container. Or, perhaps the explosive is denser than water and non-polar... if this is the case, you could add enough water to make it drinkable, and still have the explosive available.

You could also have a hidden bladder of fluid inside most anything. That'd make much more sense than trying to hide fluid in a portion of a fluid container.

And, indeed, that's just what I said to the security goon before he dragged me into this interview room officer. I really don't understand the problem!

Hence the asshole comment. You can always find a way to smuggle a bomb onto a plane. Limiting case: swallow a condom full of plastic explosives and shit it out in the restroom, the same way drug mules carry cocaine or heroin. There's no real way to stop this short of X-raying every traveler.

The questions the TSA should be asking are:

1.) What is the likelihood that a potential terrorist will use this means of smuggling weapons on board?

2.) How effectively can our screening procedures catch weapons, given that they exist?

3.) How much inconvenience does this cost passengers?

People had little problem with metal detectors and X-rays, because 1.) your clothes and carry on luggage are the natural hiding places for a bomb 2.) the machines will catch most of these instances and 3.) they're not a huge hassle for travelers. But by the time you get down to chucking water bottles because there might be a liquid explosive in them and it might be denser than water and it might be non-polar - really, what are the chances that a terrorist will use that means of smuggling? Compared to, say, overvolting a laptop battery?

For that matter, I think metal detectors may also be obsolete, now that it's fairly easy to make plastic/composite knives and guns.

"1.) What is the likelihood that a potential terrorist will use this means of smuggling weapons on board?"

Indeed, someone apparently did try just this in August of 2006 in the UK- http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/311_intl_acceptance.shtm

Actually, no, they didn't.

If we believe the official story 100%, then they merely plotted to do so, but never actually attempted it (they did, however, according to the official story, 'smuggle' non-volatile liquids on in a dummy run, without actually risking taking anything they'd be in serious trouble being caught with).

So, the best case scenario is that no-one 'did try just this'.

That's ignoring all the many holes with the case (that ended up requiring using a legal backdoor to convict them without a unanimous verdict.

"That's ignoring all the many holes with the case (that ended up requiring using a legal backdoor to convict them without a unanimous verdict."

Your choice of terminology here makes me a little uncomfortable.

You wouldn't even need to swallow it. Just strap it to your body, as it won't set off the detectors. You can assemble the detonator from parts in the rest room. X-rays are simply nowhere near 100% effective. Similarly, you can easily make knives or limited-use guns from non-metallic parts.

If they are willing to bomb the plane they are ridding then I don't think they are going to care about long term damage from drinking it. So worst case you eat something to slow the poison and then blow up to plain in an hour or so. Which brings up a separate but important point, you could probably smuggle a lot of explosive the way they move heroin. The blast would be muffled by the human body but... nm.

Actually the human body is quite good at muffling explosions and would require a substantial amount of explosives to cause large damage outside of ones body.

edit: Here's a Schneier post on such a bomber: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/ass_bomber.htm...

I don't think that's true for the more powerful high explosives, and even if it is, shit or puke it out in the bathroom and your problem is solved.

I don't really feel like eating my shaving cream, deodorant, or toothpaste, or drinking my shampoo. The water, on the other hand, is something I'm fine with just drinking before the checkpoint. As such, any solution that only solves the problem for things I'm willing to ingest only solves the lesser problem.

FTA: When you show us a bottle of liquid, we can’t tell if it’s a sports drink or liquid explosives without doing a time consuming test on it.

Right. Which is why all self-respecting terrorists won't bother to show you the dumb bottle in the first place. Am I the only one who has, on multiple occasions, checked my bags through the scanner to realize that I'm technically in violation of the "no liquids" rule because I'd forgotten something?

The rule is ridiculous. Just live with it.

On one occasion I accidentally passed through security with with a Swiss Army knife in my backpack.

What's funny to me is that upon discovering so after getting to the gate I was much more worried about someone finding out I accidentally brought a pocket knife with me, rather than the possibility of someone else with nefarious intentions having also gotten past security with one.

Same thing happened to me; I had the Swiss Army knife in my backpack between a whole bunch of CDs. I wonder if the edges of the CDs somehow concealed the knife, or if the security person simply wasn't paying attention.

By the way, what's the likelihood of TWO people bringing a knife/bomb on board the same plane? Pretty small, huh? Hence, you should always bring your own bomb to fly safely! ;-)

In the past year, I've accidentally left liquids in my bag multiple times, and every single time the scanner has spotted them. Perhaps I'm just unlucky, but the technology seems to have gotten pretty good.

I've taken more than 3 ounces of contact lens solution through a dozen airports in the last few years and never had a problem. I think there's an unofficial policy to let them through unless there's some other reason to be suspicious.

Contact lens solution is on the list of exempt substances - you should be able to carry a full-size bottle with you, separate from your 3-1-1 bag.

Like with all TSA stuff, however, it's somewhat at the discretion of the security officer on the spot.

Ah, thanks for the info. That's just further proof that it's security theater: if they can't tell the difference between water and liquid explosives, how do they know that what's in the bottle is actually contact solution?

I once flew both legs of a return flight with a foot long knife in my bag. I had put it in there while moving and forgotten all about it. Didn't empty the bag at my destination and never found out.

When I emptied my bags after coming home, I had one of biggest "oh shit, phew!" moments of my life, accompanied by visions of Guantanamo.

As great as XKCD is, seeing the TSA respond to this cartoon is just as bad as CNN fact-checking the SNL sketch.

As someone with more than a casual familiarity with man-portable explosives (some R&D work on remote land mine detection), nobody with any modicum of sense would EVER confuse a bottle of drinking water with a bottle of liquid explosive. The latter have a very low vapor pressure, very different viscosity, and give off very distinctive odors. The most commonly obtained ones are also NOT transparent.

That misses the point. The rules that are set allows for quick screening without extensive training. If they were to screen based on appearance and smell they'd need to study each bottle (what if the contents are hidden?) and/or open them to smell. The time the extra screening would take would cause far more of an uproar with people than having to abandon their liquids now.

I'm sure they know they could allow most liquids on safely if they gave staff some extra training and put people through enough extra screening. But would the end result be convenient enough? Probably not.

I believe it was Scott Adams who suggested that one woman should take one for the team and build a bomb into her bra. Once the TSA realizes that they would have to require each woman to remove her bra while passing through airport security, the whole thing would unravel pretty quickly.

Yeah, or we'll all have to arrive two hours early and get strip-searched if we want to get on a plane. Think it couldn't happen? I wouldn't bet against it.

You're already getting strip searched before you board planes; they're just using millimeter wave scans to do it. People really need to start calling these things what they are: electronic strip search machines.

"People really need to start calling these things what they are: electronic strip search machines."

That will never happen. Given the choice between two methods of searches, both of which have equal safety outcomes, people prefer the strip search over the non-invasive one.

Jeffrey Rosen wrote an entire book about this phenomenon; the book is The Naked Crowd. You can read the story, which is on page 1 of the book, via the Amazon sample:

http://www.amazon.com/Naked-Crowd-Reclaiming-Security-Freedo...

Read it. Response: the same sample of people would support repealing the 4th Amendment, because "people who have nothing to hide have nothing to be afraid of" (logic used by the people the author talked to). Meanwhile, their mothers are being imaged naked when they fly out to see their grandkids. No, I don't think everyone is OK with this. I think people don't yet fully comprehend what the machines do.

Making it electronic completely defuses the embarrassment aspect of it though.

I believe you would be hard-pressed to rouse a lot of righteous indignation over magnetometers.

I'm sorry. What? The fact that there's a potential digital image of my strip search defuses the embarassment aspect of it? The reason there's no righteous indignation over them is that normal people don't actually know what the devices are doing.

The fact that there's a potential digital image of my strip search defuses the embarassment aspect of it?

Uhh, yes. Embarrassment is an irrational, emotional response to a situation. When there is no "situation" - you're no longer in physical proximity to someone with authority over you, who is demanding you do something you don't want to do - there's no embarrassment. I can understand if you object based on principle, but I doubt you're actually embarrassed by it.

No, my objection based on my assumption that regardless of whether they store images today, 10 years from now when we've socialized the idea of electronic strip searches, we will end up storing them, and some douchebag minimum wage TSA dead-ender is going to circulate them on the Internet.

There's principles here too, but I don't need to evoke them.

Then I'm going to differentiate between actually being embarrassed and rationally anticipating potential future embarrassment. And I think that's indistinguishable from objecting on principle.

I think the suicide bomber they mention in this article did that ... sort of.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10...

I am certainly afraid that this incident will have an impact on the security searches we'll be subjected to at the airport.

I did a little research and discovered that there actually has been a successful terrorist attack on a plane using mostly liquid explosives, Korean Air Flight 858:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Flight_858

Two explosives were used: C4 and about twice as much PLX (a binary liquid explosive) as C4, totaling about 1kg of explosives. The bomb was powerful enough to take down the plane and cause the deaths of all 115 passengers. I suspect C4 was used as a component in order to ensure that the PLX was detonated, because it appears to be a tricky explosive to set off with just a blasting cap.

Regardless, the critique that is being leveled against the TSA is not that such an attack could be successful, but rather that the methods being used to thwart such an attack are wholly ineffectual, with the side effect of causing a great deal of inconvenience, wasting a massive amount of effort, and providing a distraction from more robust methods of solving the security problem.

What a disingenuous defense of a policy enacted in response to a completely infeasible terrorist plan.

The funny part is that people generally know security theater like this has jack-all to do with actual security or safety. We just obediently continue to take off our shoes, surrender our nail-clippers, and buy our drinks at the stores in the airport.

"Completely infeasible terrorist plan" is exactly the wrong argument to make. (a) you don't actually know it was infeasible, which costs you credibility right out of the gate, and (b) you're tacitly accepting that every "feasible" terrorist plan deserves explicit countermeasures.

Another reason why this discussing annoys me; people always insist on having it on the TSA's terms. Why? They'll win this argument every time. They have more facts and their facts are scarier than yours.

Infeasible, as in their explosives would not have detonated. Don't lecture me about "credibility", educate yourself about the facts of the case.

But yes, I'm sure the TSA and its supporters can devise ever-so-many facts about how we have to be protected from water-bottle bombs that fortunately don't require any more special disposal than tossing in a garbage can.

I'm curious about your opinion on this: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7536167.stm

I'll let you know when I'm on a computer that can watch that.

What's your opinion of explosives experts who found the actual plot and chemicals to be used completely ridiculous?

I see this claimed a lot, but never with any actual links. Care to linkify me? (not agreeing/disagreeing)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plo... has some links in the cites.

No. Not going to educate myself about the facts of the case. Why? Because that would be retarded. There are millions of ways for terrorists to bring down a plane, and arguing about this specific one way is exactly what people like the TSA want you to do.

But I'm glad you've convinced yourself that they're wrong about this one way. I'm a convicted TSA skeptic, and you haven't even convinced me, but I'm sure it's fun to be right.

"Not going to educate myself about the facts of the case. Why? Because that would be retarded."

Then don't bleat about what I do and do not know or ramble on about "credibility".

"I'm a convicted TSA skeptic, and you haven't even convinced me"

Yes, you've shown your deep skepticism here, but what made you think I was trying to convince you of anything? I merely pointed out something perfectly true, and you appointed yourself my terribly lazy fact-checker and rhetoric editor.

I'm not going to try to "convince" someone who makes false statements or implications any more than I'm going to have a meeting of the minds with the guy quoting Republican talking points on torture.

"exactly the wrong argument to make"

Incidentally, what is the right argument to make in your mind? You say it's "retarded" to talk facts and that you're annoyed that anyone's even talking about this issue in the first place, so what's the tptacek-approved rhetoric, here?

That the explicit goal of terrorism is to coerce us into punishing ourselves with inane security measures, which allows 1-2 people to wreak billions of dollars of damage on society? That it doesn't matter if there's some combination of innocuous-looking liquids that will detonate an airliner?

Yes, there's an argument that changes minds by the millions. All the people who are willing to do damn near anything in the name of "security", because "you can't be too safe", will understand that it doesn't really matter whether a danger exists.

Apparently (from upthread), most Americans would be fine with overt strip searches at the airport, because they have nothing to hide and they'd rather be safe. So if you're conceding this argument, I have a hard time seeing where your argument about the chemistry of specific liquid explosives will get you.

Look, all I'm saying is that the both the (lame) comic and the discussion here are missing the point of the actual problem. It's not that 6 ounces of clear fluids could or couldn't be more dangerous than batteries. It's the orgnanizational dynamics that allow debates like this to shape policy.

Seriously, tell me you honestly believe that a highly publicized argument about the safety of laptop batteries on airplanes wouldn't simply get laptop batteries banned at this point.

"So if you're conceding this argument"

That would require me to have been actually arguing that argument.

People want security. They will not abandon the desire for security, they will not recontextualize the role of security in their society to your liking. Your only hope is choke down the overweening mania of the security apparatus during periods the public isn't actively panicking.

You point out where security is dumb, inconvenient, and - here's the big point - not making them safer. You prod them out of the cognitive dissonance that keeps them accepting what they already suspect are useless security measures because some authority told them to. You have a hard road ahead of you, but then life is pain.

The next time you're in a security line, turn to the person behind you and say, "Here's a thought for you. Aren't you glad that the shoe bomber didn't hide the explosives in his underwear?"

Guaranteed laugh. Try it. You can say it to the screeners as well, and they'll laugh as well. And it perfectly highlights the absurdity of the security theater we suffer through. Some guy tries to blow up a plane with explosives in his shoes, FAILS, and we all have to take our shoes off now.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_theater if you haven't heard the phrase security theater before. Not only does the term describe the TSA perfectly, it was actually invented to describe the TSA.

I think your comment is funny, but it's probably also the fastest way to get yourself a private strip-search if you say it in earshot of a TSA employee!

You would think that, but in my experience they laugh harder than anyone else. They know the policy is stupid, they just aren't supposed to admit it.

However I'd avoid saying it to them when they are busy or distracted, because then they can't enjoy the humor.

I'd avoid using the terms "bombs" or "explosives" anywhere within earshot of airport security. Maybe if you use "Richard Reid", most of the TSA employees probably don't know who that is.

2 things.

Firstly; I think XKCD was just being amusing....

Secondly: bullcrap. You can make a bang big enough to kill a plane with laptop batteries - the fact you can make a bigger bang with liquids is surely irrelevant. And also it's perfectly possible to change the contents of a battery - no? So put something more explosive in it....

Batteries are very easy to remove.

The reason liquids were banned is because of the evidence someone came up with the suggest there were liquid bombs being planned (and I think one failed attempt) - not a bad response at all! It's the same reason a lot of airports (especially UK ones) ask you to remove your shoes and Xray them.

At the end of the day they can only respond to the perceived or suspected risks - if you really put your mind too it it shouldnt actually be too hard to smuggle a bomb on a plane.

EDIT: by which I mean it is more a case of making people feel safe (by inconveniencing them, basic psycology) as well as causing more inconvenience for a small number of possible potential attacks. The actual security effect is fairly minimal - simply for practical reasons pointed out a billion times over.

But can you make a bang big enough to break into the cabin and crash the plane into, say, a large building in a major metropolitan city?

If the plane flies near said metropolitan area at the right angle then, technically, the rest is just maths and timing. :)

EDIT: damn I thought I was being genuinely amusing :(

Tangentially, it strikes me that a lot of people, including the TSA flack, miss the actual point of the comic. It's not that there are reasonable arguments against TSA policies. It's that trying to argue the policies with the TSA is futile and probably counter-productive.

This can be further generalized. Trying to argue a policy with a bottom rung employee at any organization is ultimately counter-productive.

Unfortunately while people are arguing about the security checks / rules, I see another danger. Looking at the length of current security queues, it's not a problem to find a place where ~200-400 people surround you (guesstimate; assuming one of the "quite large, but not enough to get a new terminal" airports). My prediction is that the next attack will not be a guy bringing down the plane, but simply a guy waiting until he gets halfway through the queue with any bomb he wants (noone will check him before, right?) I wonder how will they solve that one...

Haven't we had these sorts of attacks already in the various hotspots in the world? Both Israel and Iraq come to mind as examples of where attacks have been perpetrated against the checkpoints themselves, and the guards and people waiting there.

You can get a large amount of almost any liquid onto a plane in your carry-on so long as the label is somewhat official-looking and identifies the contents as being medical supplies. Get one of those contact lens caddies and pack it with a 12oz bottle of ReNu and see what happens at the TSA checkpoint. They'll likely just set it aside. If not, you're only out $5 or something. That ReNu bottle could be full of nitroglycerin or kerosene and they'd never know.

Actually, most of the time they do a trace chemical wipe of the container if you bring saline or other liquid meds through the security line.

The response is more than a little weak. Confiscating people's shampoo and water does nothing to improve the safety of air travel. That's the point Randall Munroe is making and it's still quite valid.

It's trivially easy to smuggle enough liquids on board an airplane to bypass the TSA's "security" measures. Simply claim it is saline solution or use something like a "beer belly".

Similarly, the TSA's ban of knives on planes is equally toothless. Many fliers (myself included) can attest to having accidentally brought pocket knives on planes without security screening having noticed them. And even a moderately dedicated attacker would find it easy to acquire a ceramic knife capable of passing through a metal detector.

It's a kabuki dance, it's security theater, it increases security not one bit, but makes it more difficult to fly.

I just left this comment on the TSA blog: "To translate:

"Our policy is irrational, but we're sticking to it anyway in the interests of security theater." "

The TSA has a blog where they reference Ars Technica and XKCD? I am forced to acknowledge that they are slightly more enlightened than I thought.

Having said that, the arguments in that post are bullshit (as evidenced by several comments before this one)

"TSA has a blog"

In this day and age that makes them about as enlightened as saying "the TSA uses electricity". They are just doing it because everyone else is doing it there's no credit for original independent thought here.

That would be a harder claim to make if you had quoted the whole of ajju's sentence. I think what's interesting here is not that they have a blog, but how the blog is run. They respond to a webcomic, they enable comments, they respond to comments, they write in a human tone, etc.

Sure, most organizations have blogs, but for most they are a write-only place to put press releases.

I think paulgb has covered what I wanted to say. There are "blogs" and there are blogs. Enabling comments and responding to webcomics shows a willingness to engage the public which I would never have expected from the TSA (based on my past perceptions).

Give me a laptop battery, my belt, and some duct tape, and we'll be talking about an definition a little further down in the dictionary entry for the term "battery."

Does anyone other than me wonder why TSA is using Blogger for their official blog rather than WordPress?

Anyway....

The lady doth protest too much, methinks.

Jesus. Can we move on, yet? George Carlin nailed this topic over 10 years ago. xkcdsucks (nb: usually funnier than the comic!) nailed this cartoon: jokes about airport security are so overdone that there's actually signs at the airport warning you not to make jokes about airport security.

Yes, the "3-1-1 restrictions" are completely retarded. Yes, people are mostly liquid. Yes, batteries are dangerous. Hollering about that here isn't going to help you, because the TSA people live in an entirely different universe than you do. To them, the 3-1-1 rule is perfectly rational. It's a reaction to an actual threat they had. To abandon the restriction, they have to accept responsibility for the next time liquid explosives are used to destroy a plane. They are never. going. to. do. that. It would be irrational --- from their perspective --- for them to do so.

This TSA response isn't disingenuous. It's exactly what any thinking person expects them to say. So what are we discussing here?

jokes about airport security are so overdone that there's actually signs at the airport warning you not to make jokes about airport security.

That's not why those signs are there. They're there because it removes the "I was just joking!" defense.

Someone piss in your Wheaties?

You know that recently a terrorist tried to use a bomb in his intestine to assassinate a Saudi-Arabian prince (http://www.nypost.com/p/news/international/qaeda_ass_assin_h...). (I know, not the greatest source).

As soon as one of those is discovered at an airport, according to your reasoning about the TSA's rationales, they would have to and should cavity search every passenger.

The real questions underlying a topic like this are:

Why do the people have so little say in their own security?

Why do people accept being separated, rudely interrogated, strip-searched, subjected to (unconstitutionally) secret laws and regulations, etc.?

Why are expert opinions completely ignored?

Just because it's "rational" for the TSA/US Government to cover their asses doesn't mean people shouldn't make a fuss about it. Democracy and liberty vitally depend on people making a (meaningful) fuss.

You seriously think that reasonable arguments like this are going to get the TSA to stop supporting policies that cost them nothing but mitigate massive possible career risks for themselves? Because I think it would be irrational for this administration to step back even an inch from where security is now. They'd simply get blamed for anything that happened within the next 10 years.

"They'd simply get blamed for anything that happened within the next 10 years."

The administration would get blamed anyway by virtue of being in charge. They've been willing to announce stopping the use of torture (with many in their opposition howling that this will cost American lives), so it's clearly not impossible for them to change policy just because security is the claimed justification for it.

Nobody cares about what the TSA itself supports. The TSA does what it's told to do. The idea is to get enough people annoyed about what the FAA has the TSA do to encourage change in policy. This may or may not be doable, but that's politics for you.

EDIT: emphasis added for the benefit of some poor readers.

They've been willing to announce stopping the use of torture

Good grief.

3 people were waterboarded. The former administration refused to rule in or out any sort of interrogation technique.

They hardly "stopped the use of torture". Made a political statement, sure. Announced what the limits were, sure. But they didn't stop anything of the sort.

I completely agree with your description of the problem, it's an organizational dilemma, and not much can be done about it.

At the same time, reasonable people need to speak up about and work on important issues, because it affects the opportunity cost of those in power. If there is zero (perceived) opposition, it becomes cheaper to create more restrictions.

Thanks. I know (from, you know, rereading) that I sound unhinged.

But can I just suggest that this problem is completely intractable? Given the fact that we've accepted the costs of not having cellphones on planes, or listening to our iPods when the plane is landing, or bringing 6 ounces of fluid onto a flight --- given the fact that society and the economy is still functioning given these meaningless and onerous restrictions --- there is simply nothing in it for the government to removing the restrictions.

I don't know who downvoted you, I voted you back up. I tend to share your pessimism (or its close correlate realism) about this particular situation. Pick your battles so to speak.

As an example of what I was trying to express, in the last German national election, 2% of Germans voted for the Pirate Party, which was running essentially as an interest group for personal freedom and privacy.

The previous grand coalition government had used the specter of child pornography to legislate secret Australia-style black-lists. People stood up by signing a petition against this and risked being labeled "pro-child porn".

The newly formed (more liberal) coalition abandoned this project during their negotiations, with the Chancelor expressly pointing out the surprising 2% success of the Pirate Party.

This is a case where stupidity was being undone, because of civic engagement.

As I said, pick your battles and don't become a cynic. (Not trying to imply you are, just generally speaking). Cheers. :)

Side note: I appreciate a good rant once in a while, so I don't take any issue with your original post.

We're discussing the fact that the TSA left the safety of their lair to try to debunk an online comic by a well-known figure in techy circles. This is a remarkable event.

Hence, we are remarking.

The TSA has been blogging for many months now. They don't have a "lair". We just don't like what they have to say.

to quote you: because the TSA people live in an entirely different universe than you do

okay, so they left their universe and entered ours.

You know, I would've thought it evident by now that it's not exactly what any thinking person expects them to say. It's sort of evident from the existence of so many:

- articles, such as: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/18/60minutes/main4675...

- blog posts, such as: http://msinfluentials.com/blogs/jesper/archive/2008/12/24/ki...

- web comics, such as the xkcd one

I don't really understand what you're trying to accomplish here, but whatever it is, you're not helping your case by stating that xkcdsucks is funnier than xkcd. Yes, the humor in xkcd might be extremely nerdy at times, but at least it's not hateful trollery.

xkcdsucks is hateful trollery?

(Oh. Sorry. Didn't notice your nick. ;)

You know, it could be my fault. I assumed you were talking about http://www.xkcdsucks.com/

If you were talking about that, I rest my case.

On the other hand, maybe you were talking about http://xkcdsucks.blogspot.com/

The author of that is at least trying to say something. As a matter of fact, he's saying a lot, without contributing much.

As for the nick: brilliant deduction ;)

I'm talking about xkcdsucks.blogspot.com. It is f'ing hilarious. Try starting here:

http://xkcdsucks.blogspot.com/2008/10/frequently-asked-irrit...

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