Nukes ready to fly
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Pakistan/India is the most worrisome combination in that graph.
why, you chose to include 'India' is kind of interesting. may you please elaborate ?
afaik, India (and China) are, still, following the NFU (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_first_use) policy.
Probably not the happiest of developments but an all-out war is unlikely between nuclear powers.
Also, India has whooped Pakistan's ass every time they have been at war, both before and after nuclear weapons, so Pakistan has a much smaller incentive to trigger an all-out war. India isn't interested in capturing Pakistan and tilt its own demographic balance.
Neither India or Pakistan would jeopardise the very existence of the other nation, because rather than just lie down and die they'd get a farewell message from the other side.
(Note, I'm not saying they'd be wrong or right to retaliate, I'm simply sharing your parent's point of view that it's a worrisome combination).
If you look at the countries that have the pledge its none of the earlier adopters (Nato or former Soviet states). This is important because it signifies that the pledge is more of a political statement to provide comfort to existing nuclear states at the time the pledge was made. India similarly changed its pledge to only apply against nuclear states more recently.
This is a serious point: the most serious "near misses" during the cold war were mostly caused by errors in early warning systems or procedures.
Given the instability of Pakistan there is a non-zero chance that a non-government-authorised launch could occur. What would India's response be to that?
However, I am more concerned about the accidental use of nuclear weapons because of current procedures and measures in place. See the excellent book "Command and Control"...
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/20/usaf-atomic-bom...
On the civilian side, the profit-motivated nature of nuclear engineering has resulted in a variety of serious industrial accidents, which have produced a widespread but erroneous perception that the technology is just too dangerous to have, when in fact it's merely too dangerous to have in the hands of people who care only about making money off it.
On the military side, conversely, the safeguards around nuclear weapons have, thus far at least, been exactly as effective as we need them to be, and nuclear warheads are as safe as anything can be that's inherently dangerous. That's not to say they are perfectly safe, but neither is anything else; all life is risk, and I'd much rather take the risk of having them, than of not having them and being at the mercy of someone who does.
(And military power reactors tend to be a lot safer than civilian ones as well, thanks to an engineering safety culture which I gather is best described as fanatical. Me, I'm in favor of purchasing all civilian-owned nuclear power reactors and placing them in the hands of an eighth federal uniformed service, the US Nucleonics Service, staffed with Navy-trained engineers and operated as a cost center of government. But I appreciate that makes me sort of weird.)
Your view is a bit US centric, there are lots of nuclear installations outside of the US. The US is probably the least of the problem in this particular respect.
As for US-centricity, well, that's where I live, and as cold as this no doubt will sound to a universalist, I really don't see another nation's accidental nuclear detonation as being my problem; contrary to popular belief, the mechanisms involved in commencing nuclear warfare are a little more nuanced than "oh, hey, a nuke went off somewhere on the planet? Empty the silos! Tell the subs to flush their tubes!"
It is interesting how nuclear war focuses the mind. In previous generations a cavalier attitude was often taken about war, often because nobody believes they will be on the losing side of a war. But with nuclear war there are no winners, only differing degrees of losing. In truth most war is the same, but it's difficult for most folks to see it that way.
If we had major wars, then the major wars would take the place of the proxy and chronic wars, through direct replacement. American general: "Yay, now we can kill Russians openly, instead of paying our unreliable clients to kill their unreliable clients!"
The problem isn't how we kill each other; we always find a a way. The problem is that we are killing each other.
A lot of people, yes. But far far fewer than died in the major wars that preceded them.
One huge problem is the historical fact of the number of American deaths from the invasion of mainland Japan. That being zero. And given past behavior, frankly losing only two cities means Japan came out ahead in the game too.
Looking at the mess we've made of Afghanistan and Iraq and Vietnam and everywhere else, you can imagine a guy calculating and "either this makes them back down completely, or we lose maybe just two cities... either way it'll be better than letting them invade for a generation..."
Moreover, the economic loss would be extreme, which serves as a further deterrent.
Also, it's a really sad infographic. I visited Hiroshima last year and it was heartbreaking (also a very beautiful city).
There are two main paths that any nuclear war could take: The first is all-out war, we're all screwed regardless of strategy. The second is a more limited tactical war where the aim is to try and take out the oppositions nuclear capability first and then focus on their military.
Unlike the USA, the UK has only a very small landmass to hide big ICBM sites and they will always be near some sort of major population centre. In a limited war scenario, it therefore makes sense to not have any fixed silos but to keep it all at sea and hidden. They may be able to nuke our submarine bases and catch the subs at rest, but we have a standing policy to always have at least one of the subs at sea at all times.
I guess you could argue in favour of air launched missiles from the back of a carrier, but then you go to all the expense of maintaining multiple launch systems, etc. Even the current Trident system is frequently criticised for its cost, so that's another reason to keep it limited and simple.
The rationale for the Trident fleet was for "second strike purposes": in the event of nuclear war, the UK is small enough to be completely obliterated. The sub fleet provides a single submarine at all times capable of retaliating in this event.
This leads to the letters: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort . In the event of surfacing to the horrible silence of not being able to contact HQ and the BBC having ceased transmission, open the letters and follow orders.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Skyshield
[Fantastic planes the Vulcans - saw one doing aerobatics as a kid above the wee village I lived in - what an absolutely incredible noise]
We wouldn't have any one left to command, you would.
I'm looking for the source, but I read an article with a few former captains and they pretty much unanimously said that they wouldn't launch and would seek sanctuary in the nearest friendly harbour instead. Because what would be the point, the UK would essentially be gone, and all they would be doing would be adding to the misery. Can you imagine what that knowledge would have done if it had been known in Soviet circles, for instance?
We may as well launch, because the captains won't retaliate. Scary stuff.
Edit: this is an excellent discussion about these letters on Radio 4: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0210spf
"So Mr submarine captain candidate, will you really launch missiles should the worst happen?"
There also is no evidence that the Soviet Union ever intended to use nuclear weapons as an offensive measure, whereas the US toyed with the thought on multiple occasions (Cuba crisis, Korean war).
Pretty much all their nuclear arsenal was deployed in a way that ensured excellent retaliation potential (mobile ICBM launchers etc.), their nuclear subs etc.
"[...]the process by which a Trident submarine commander would determine if the British government continues to function includes, amongst other checks, establishing whether BBC Radio 4 continues broadcasting.[4]
Submarines on patrol were reported to have briefly gone on nuclear alert in 2004 when Radio 4 mysteriously went off the air for 15 minutes.[5]"
Wow.
I suspect the UK's reliance on SLBM's is due to the size of the UK which makes finding sites for launch facilities difficult, and would expose their civilian population to too much risk from counter-force strikes (they were going to get nuked a lot already to knock out their airfields and harbors).
The other countries just don't have suitable nuclear submarines.
Also, I assume the UK have no plane-delivered warheads simply because they lack an aircraft carrier, making those quite useless.
That's one part of the reason the UK doesn't have air-launched nuclear weapons. But really they fell out of favour ever since Gary Powers was shot down; ballistic missiles are inherently a lot harder to intercept than planes. I suspect the reason other countries still have them is mostly residual, and a reflection of the fact that those are the countries that still fly heavy strategic bombers. If you already have your B-52 (or Russian equivalent) fleet carrying heavy bombs and air-launched cruise missiles, it costs relatively little to maintain the capability to put nuclear warheads on those missiles. AFAIK the UK simply doesn't fly a heavy bomber any more - only the Tornado.
Land-based silos make sense for countries with large areas of empty, relatively unpopulated land, which the UK isn't. France doesn't have any either. I suspect India only uses land-based weapons because it can't maintain a sufficiently reliable submarine fleet.
ICBMs are impossible to intercept once they're past the initial launch stage but they are very easy to detect which kicks off a retaliation. A cruise missile with "modern" stealth design would be an incredibly threatening weapon as you'd only need ~100 or so to cripple the retaliation capability of another nuclear power.
You would? Such a thing wouldn't work against nations that maintain a constant submarine patrol, and perhaps not against land-based silos either (which were designed to withstand such attacks, no?) Heck, ISTR some of the Russian weapons were rail-mounted and designed to be hidden in mountain tunnels most of the time.
Retirement of UK air-delivered Sunshine was based entirely on cost grounds, regardless of loss of flexibility.
Nuclear handling processes, storage, maintenance are all very expensive. The decision was made to concentrate these costs in the Trident force where they are partially shared with the USA. All the associated knowledge and skills have been lost from the Royal Air Force and will not return.
Every now and again the Ministry of Defence issues a 'report' on how SLBMs are the most cost-effective solution for the UK, willfully ignoring their complete non-usability.
I guess the missiles are expensive and single-use whereas a bomber might carry enough bombs to make them affordable for tactical "battlefield" use, but that's a terrible idea strategically; a scenario where two sides were both sufficiently committed to a war to drop hundreds of nuclear warheads and restrained enough to not escalate to attacking each other's cities is immensely implausible.
The SLBMs do the job of providing a UK nuclear deterrent, which if you're talking about having nuclear weapons at all is presumably something you consider valuable. We have full second-strike capability. And we have it cheaper than any other nation with the same. What is it you think we're missing?
• Zero is the number of times that nuclear weapons have been used in conflict. Five great powers possess them, and all of them have waged wars. Yet no nuclear device has been set off in anger. It’s not just that the great powers avoided the mutual suicide of an all-out nuclear war. They also avoided using the smaller, “tactical” nuclear weapons, many of them comparable to conventional explosives, on the battlefield or in the bombing of enemy facilities. And the United States refrained from using its nuclear arsenal in the late 1940s when it held a nuclear monopoly and did not have to worry about mutually assured destruction. I’ve been quantifying violence throughout this book using proportions. If one were to calculate the amount of destruction that nations have actually perpetrated as a proportion of how much they could perpetrate, given the destructive capacity available to them, the post-war decades would be many orders of magnitudes more peaceable than any time in history.
Amazing.
Two is the number of times that nuclear weapons have been used in conflict.
My understanding of the sequence of events was that WWII had already ended when the US dropped those two bombs, although the conflict with Japan continued in the Pacific theatre.
It seemed to make a whole lot more sense when I read that paragraph in the context of the book, so I'll concede that Pinker's definition of 'zero nukes used in conflict' is debatable.
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nwarplan.asp (2001)
There is some logic to this, if you want to have the ability to do a retaliatory strike then you need to have your targets selected beforehand and in that case you might as well program that target into the missile ahead of time to save some time.
If you live in a big city in Russia, Western Europe, China, North America or Australia there is likely a warhead with your number on it sitting around somewhere.
> If one were to calculate the amount of destruction that nations have actually perpetrated as a proportion of how much they could perpetrate [...]
is an extremely ridiculous metric!
The infographic emphasises Pinker's point: The world has actually got a whole lot less violent over the past few decades, despite our ability to cause a lot more death and destruction, we choose not to.
Another quote from Pinker, in the same book:
"Also distorting our sense of danger is our moral psychology. No one has ever recruited activists to a cause by announcing that things are getting better, and bearers of good news are often advised to keep their mouths shut lest they lull people into complacency. Also, a large swath of our intellectual culture is loath to admit that there could be anything good about civilization, modernity, and Western society."
I have spent a lot of this chapter on the statistics of war. But now we are ready for the most interesting statistic since 1945: zero. Zero is the number that applies to an astonishing collection of categories of war during the two-thirds of a century that has elapsed since the end of the deadliest war of all time. I’ll begin with the most momentous...
So the "zero" figure means "since 1945."
You seem to forget that wars are expensive, very expensive. The US was already running bankrupt before the end of WW2, nobody in any sane state of mind wants an all out war unless they can avoid to do so.
Germans were starving to death in 1946; Brits were still rationing meat and food in 1954, and cheese for decades to come.
Wars are not in general good for the economy: they result in the destruction of capital and of labour.
As you said it did not suffer any damage to its industry and took over from Britain, France and Japan as the imperial power in the Middle East and Asia.
There have been plenty of conventional land wars in the following years with US involvement, the difference was that while WWII was fought to establish large American spheres of influence, the following wars were fought been to maintain the American empire.
It is pretty hard to quantify, but I'm confident that people in power thought that the net benefit of maintaining hegemony in South East Asia (Korean/Vietnam war) and the Middle East (financing Israel, the Iraq wars), outweighed the cost.
[The wildly different yields apparently coming from unboosted primary, boosted primary and full "multi-stage" - presumably the latter being achieved by removing the secondary].
Only some of them, guessed at roughly half on each boat.
A partial replacement for tactical WE177.
>"Most recently, in December 2014, the Notebook did an exhaustive review of Israel's nuclear arsenal and concluded that claims it has 200 to 400 warheads are probably exaggerated and that the country's stockpile is more likely in the range of roughly 80 nuclear warheads (Kristensen and Norris, 2014b). Getting the size and composition right is important because it hints at Israeli intentions, and can therefore have a significant effect on threat perceptions in the Middle East and the potential nuclear aspirations of other countries in the region"
An interesting aspect: behind all those nukes, are plans of how to deploy them with maximum destructive power over an enemy, within minutes.
If you live in western city, then it is probably targeted to receive a couple of nukes.
No you wouldn't, it would only increase the sea level by about 65m. You'd indiscriminately kill a lot of people (including your own) making it a useless weapon. There would be hefty amounts of survivors (billions), again making it useless if you were going for all-out genocide.
The ruined climate might do something to kill off the human race, though.
Before a crisis, the capital of the worldwide financial system and a major world trade port is kinda important. After a crisis ends both the financial system and world trade, its little more than a source of refugees.
If you want to wargame it out, look at the effects on agriculture. The US would be pretty much unaffected, sure we'd lose Florida and N.O. but we'll still have wheat and corn in the midwest, uninterrupted. Rice cultivation and historical hydraulic empires like egypt might have a little more trouble. Of course it depends how slowly it happens. The total solar energy striking the poles, even if it magically 100% perfectly went into ice melting, would take a heck of a long time. Its not going to be like tossing an ice cube into a campfire, no 65 meter tidal wave of water would result.
The capital effects would be interesting. So... your nuclear plant is 40M ASL today, and after the melt it'll be 25M below sea level. Well, at least it'll have plenty of cooling in an accident.
The Netherlands will probably disappear too.
Pretty useless weapon for strategic purposes though. Only some sort of cartoon dictator would even bother trying that
This is what would remain: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/09/rising-seas/if-ice...
However there are only 14 Ohio SSBNs. And the rotation is 2.5 months on patrol (figure maybe 2 months effective?) and 1 month in port. I imagine a giant crane lowering supplies into the sub might block launched missiles... I don't think they have the compressed air online to launch while in port, although maybe... So more realistically, assuming no long term refits the navy has maybe 7 or so in position ready to launch. So WRT the infographic, maybe 168 ready to launch.
However. Everything from here on is classified so I'm speculating. There are tactical conditions where trying to launch will merely get yourself sunk before launching. So you've got a ASW destroyer and helos overhead pounding the sea with active sonar because we're having a nuclear war here. Speaking of nuclear war, during a nuclear war being on board a deployed SSBN is probably somewhat hazardous duty, so "we" probably don't have 14 floating SSBNs for very long. Also peculiar range issues and launch geometry issues, if theoretically we're at war with China, a launch trajectory passing directly over Moscow is going to totally freak out the Russians at the worst imaginable time. Also from a strategic standpoint using up your entire force in one attack is really dumb. Also there are weather related issues, if you're in high seas you might have launch issues. Sure you can pop a missile out the tube but if it starts its launch in the air sideways thats a mission failure. So I think in actual warfare maybe only 2 subs get to launch, at best. Suddenly we're down to 48 missiles in the air from the 288 infographic. Best case. Good argument for one. Or 24 missiles.
Again more classified BS. The best NASA and the russians can do under ideal conditions is launch maybe half of the time on time without a failure. Of course they put a lot of money into being reliable, but... I feel 50% successful launches might be semi-realistic? I mean, every attack sub and ASW helicopter is going to be all over you the instant the first missile launches, the odds of surviving until the 24th missile launches seem low, which is why we don't deploy subs will 500 tubes because tubes 200-500 will never survive to fire... If some 50 cent integrated circuit fails or some valve, its non trivial to fix the missile while underway and you might not have the spare parts. I stand by about 50% estimate.
The MIRV thing means at re-entry you can attack nearby targets, so the equivalent of Saint Paul and Minneapolis are both in big trouble, but for trajectory and aerospace reasons its hard to hit Seattle and DC at the same time. So you can pack multiple warheads on a missile, but you really only get maybe 30 targets outta 24 missiles. Why do you think we spread our missile launch fields all over the upper midwest instead of putting them all in one county in Texas?
Finally we know from semi-public test results that not every test goes perfectly, so I have a gut feeling that in a real nuclear war no holds barred, high radiation environment, 25 or so hits is reasonable. Hopefully thats enough to discourage any belligerent from starting a war they'd lose.
You can see the motivation to not decrease stocks by 10x or 100x because that takes the odds of 25 hits down to 2.5 hits or 0.25 hits. Decrease the number of nukes by 100x and we'll kill dozens of millions within one generation in WW3, guaranteed, not much changes in human nature. Compared to dozens of millions of human lives, building a couple hundred ICBMs is really cheap insurance!
In a first strike scenario overwhelming force is absolutely the way to go. You're trying to completely eliminate the ability to retaliate. It's not a scenario where "holding back a reserve" makes sense.
ICBMs are routine, proven technology; the fair comparison is with commercial satellite launches, not with interplanetary probes. And those have a success rate a whole lot higher than 50%.