Excoin exchange's Bitcoins stolen, will be shutting down
exco.in
exco.in
If there's a $10 bill missing, it will noticed within hours. Where it went will probably be figured out the same day. If someone is stealing, management will usually find out who, how much, and when.
The Bitcoin crowd has a much simpler problem. They're all online, they don't have a staff of people handling money, and they don't have as many special cases as a supermarket does. (Travelers checks, returns, check cashing, etc - Bitcoin exchanges don't have to deal with that.) Most Bitcoin exchanges are doing a few transactions a minute. Bigger supermarkets do more than that. Yet the Bitcoin crowd consistently botches it.
The Bitcoin crowd needs to get some people who have passed Internal Financial Controls 101 at a 2-year business college.[1] This isn't rocket science.
[1] http://www.georgiacenter.uga.edu/courses/governmental-traini...
We can't keep arguing against regulation while allowing this to happen by not self regulating.
To quote somebody who has forgotten more about cryptography and digital currencies than probably the entire population of Bitcoin startup founders put together will ever know, many Bitcoin founders take "offense at the very notion that there might be something to be learned from several millenniums of financial services best practices."[1]
What's really interesting for me is that VCs seem happy to invest in such startups. It's one thing when a small, bootstrapped exchange/wallet provider gets hacked. It'll be a different story when a major, VC-backed one gets done.
1: http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/2014-Febru...
"World's stupidest bitcoin exchange admins, or some of the ballsiest? Inside job?"
That's always the question, isn't it?
1. Open an exchange. 2. Collect real money in exchange for fake money. 3. "Get hacked" losing all the fake money and keeping all the real money.
sounds extremely suspicious.
In retrospect, it was a horrible decision not to research these transactions in depth as they happened, but the Excoin team was fighting a "bigger" fire at the time with the DDoS.
If the answer is no (and I suspect it is), then incentives are aligned so that putting extra effort into security is something an exchange operator should definitely not do.
All of this is also assuming (on faith) that the business model is actually running an exchange, as opposed to a hack-blaming racket.
It's not just about losing the bitcoin, people running these exchanges may be personally liable.
The law is still very murky here, and there are plenty of ways to deflect responsibility.
I'm not saying any of this is right, I'm suggesting that the way our culture and infrastructure is laid out, running a shoddy (perhaps conspiratorial) business might actually be the optimal path -- and that's where we need a solution.
When you're transacting in something of value (whether that be money, digital currency, or pokemon cards) for your users, you better be sure to take it seriously.
I lost money to Mt. Gox, but filing a lawsuit won't get anyone anywhere. Want to see a sad pdf? https://www.mtgox.com/img/pdf/20150202_tibanne.pdf
Sad for the customers. Not for Karpeles, the owner of Mt. Gox. He's still a millionaire and still free, and might even have the customers' bitcoins. No one will probably find out.
I know you're talking about Bitcoin startups founded in the US or EU, but the same applies: If the startup goes bankrupt, the customers won't get anything back. There's nothing to get back except empty coffers.
We have courts and bankruptcy laws for a reason.
You're now a millionaire, and no one can ever take that way from you. No court matters. As long as the price of bitcoin doesn't go down by more than 10x, you'll still be very wealthy. And no one can prove a thing.
This is business as usual in the bitcoin world. Bitcoin has made it very easy to separate people from their money, and courts have no power to do anything about it.
Would you go to prison for a few years to be a millionaire? There is no shortage of people willing to risk this.
As you can see from the rest of the thread, people are willing to believe almost any cover story, no matter how implausible. Even that an exchange could be DDoSed by search engines.
That's true, but who's going to make that happen?
In traditional society, there are laws about who can be a bank and how carefully you need to treat people's money (and often government programs to reimburse customers when good-faith banking efforts fail). Quite a fraction of Bitcoin users are in Bitcoin because, to first order, they want to move away from that model.
So the free market needs to not let their money be handled by people who believe that, and it's not yet clear they care. Probably they will, in a few years.
This will undoubtedly have the effect that some number of them will stop using services like this until their confidence is restored -- this has undoubtedly been the case with previous attacks as well. And it will prevent future customers who have heard about these types of attacks, or who hear less hype about bitcoin as a result of these types of attacks, from choosing to participate in exchanges until confidence is restored.
Unfortunately it takes time and it takes people getting hurt. And people do get fooled multiple times when there is "get rich quick" hype. But eventually they stop getting fooled or run out of money.
These adversaries will have more skill, more time, and more tenacity than you do.
Knowing this threat environment, what will you do differently from the dozens exchanges that have come before you and failed?
I have a friend who ported then maintained critical software at NASA about almost decade ago. He said that introducing source control was viewed as "a radical idea" at the time. Also, management seemed to go with superstition and "truthiness" as far as making decisions. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" was the management mantra.
(I would reveal the piece of software he was working on, but that would easily reveal his identity.)
Now hardware: The NASA hardware guys who showed up to the Houston hackerspace always really impressed me. (But what do I know? I'm a software guy.)
I was thinking more along the lines of "I don't like this code, let's refactor". That can be dangerous.
I'm a bit shocked that their tracking of their transactions was so easily broken as to prevent them from seeing that all the funds were being pulled by so few users.
Also, the part at the bottom where they basically post a wall of IPs and addresses seems like a weird way to move forward. Do they not plan on there being an official investigation?
How do you officially investigate someone stealing your monopoly money?
Where is the FDIC insurance? Exactly what are they suppose to tell the police? The FBI? ... oh thats right, nothing, because they are not a bank, and the only thing "stolen" was some ones and zeroes off a hard-drive.
Seriously though... where is the police report on this? Or any of the other hacked bitcoin exchanges for that matter?
The government investigates stolen "ones and zeros" all the time. The FDIC provides protection for users, but the lack of FDIC doesn't mean that no laws apply.
This is a slippery slope. How do you think the Federal Reserve pops money into existence before they go on a QE tear? The bits ("ones and zeroes") pop into existence in their account, and they start buying assets/mortgages/whatever.
Currency only has value because of the shared belief that is has value.
Are you implying that a bank would somehow be held accountable for breaking the law or ripping people off? Since when?
The rest of your comment is nonsnese.
You think the FBI is never interested in ones and zeros on a hard drive? How do you square that with the facts discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9044805
You think there's never any police reports or official investigation? How do you square that with the facts surrounding the collapse of Mt Gox? A recent headline announced that the police are closing in on the fraudsters: http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/01/02/bitcoin-fraud-mt-go...
Apparently police are quite capable of investigating the theft of "monopoly money", and understanding the issues involved.
http://chr13.com/2014/03/10/using-google-to-ddos-any-website...
These idiots can't tell Web crawler traffic from DDoS (though often there's little practical difference).
Yanex is Russia's Google.
In case the administrators of exco.in happen to be reading this -
You fools, what the hell are you doing leaving automated withdrawals turned on after you know you've been hacked? That'll just lose you even more money. The first thing you need to do is get the coins, databases and log files into secure offline storage. The second thing you need to do is get qualified professionals to investigate. Only after the investigation is complete can you safely return funds.
All logging and auditing data should be sent in real time to a write once medium, whether that's an S3 account with append (no overwrite/delete permissions) access, local DVD/Bluray, or even a dotmatrix printer if your volume is low enough.
Host ASN CIDR
104.131.204.15 62567 104.131.192.0/19
104.131.213.10 62567 104.131.192.0/19
104.154.38.52 15169 104.154.0.0/15
107.170.150.138 62567 107.170.128.0/19
130.211.185.192 15169 130.211.0.0/16
146.148.40.57 15169 146.148.0.0/17
172.245.55.112 55286 172.245.48.0/21
184.172.15.235 36351 184.172.0.0/18
50.97.173.18 36351 50.97.128.0/18
5.255.253.51 13238 5.255.253.0/24
66.249.69.136 15169 66.249.69.0/24
66.249.69.88 15169 66.249.69.0/24
66.249.75.104 15169 66.249.75.0/24
66.249.75.184 15169 66.249.75.0/24
66.249.75.216 15169 66.249.75.0/24
66.249.75.88 15169 66.249.75.0/24
66.249.79.111 15169 66.249.79.0/24
66.249.79.119 15169 66.249.79.0/24
66.249.79.127 15169 66.249.79.0/24
66.249.79.135 15169 66.249.79.0/24
66.249.79.4 15169 66.249.79.0/24
Distinct ASNs: 14 15169 GOOGLE
3 62567 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN-NY2
2 36351 SOFTLAYER
1 13238 Yandex
1 55286 SERVER-MANIA
So ... yeah, these jokers got themselved "DoS'd" by a couple of search engines and couldn't even figure that out.But they might want to look at Digital Ocean, SoftLayer, and ServerMania.
Or figure out where the traffic was actually coming from.
It would be interesting to see how much they get targetted in comparison to startups that can at most spill some personal user info and cc numbers.
http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2loray/a_new_bitcoi...
Even the way they handled this breach is amateur hour. From the post, it doesn't look like they've involved any authorities or sought out legal counsel to protect themselves.
Imagine if your citibank or chase account doing this. People would be in an uproar.
[0]http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/12/gold-for-cash...
Startup companies with no serious experience in information security, or finance, or financial information security are making large web applications that store and trade digital currency. That currency, if taken, cannot be recovered in any way unless law enforcement physically raids the perpetrator, just as if they stole physical cash.
There are millions of unscrupulous fraudsters and black hats out there who realize they can effectively rob banks over the Internet, sometimes as easily as walking in through the side door and walking out with all their assets without anyone ever knowing they were there until they're long gone. Bitcoin banks and exchanges are the absolute most valuable target for cybercrime, due to the incredibly high potential for reward (6, 7, or 8 figures from one heist is not uncommon), the irrevocability of the currency, and the low chance of being found or caught.
It's a bank robber's perfect fantasy. It does take a lot of time to liquidate the treasure chest, but it's still pretty trivial to do securely.
You hit the nail on the head ... the BitCoin exchanges were created because someone saw it as the "next big thing" (tm). I'm not sure I'd trust the Winkelvoss' BTC fund any more than the start-up exchanges until their code is audited by a cryptoanalyst and their audit systems are sophisticated enough to throw a dead-man's switch.
Coinbase is the only company I trust in this space right now. They take security very seriously and have received several professional audits.
There is one possible tangential relationship, however. As I've been researching the transactions, early indications point to a portion of the stolen BTC and NBT from Excoin being placed on BTER prior to BTER's announcement. If this is the case, the parties responsble for the Excoin theft may have inadvertently deposited their coins into an exchange that was subsequently pillaged...
(Disclosure: I'm a member of the Nu development team, so Excoin's and BTER's exchange problems affect our community)
Caching trade info sound like a bad idea. Atomic and transactional operations directly to the ledger so integrity is easier to achieve sounds like the way to go. A caching layer gives basically speed at the cost of simplicity, not sure if I'd like that when running a btc exchange. Am i wrong?
Of course we don't know the exact nature of those "caching issues" so my comment is highly especulative regarding the nature of that cache.
The amount of money at stake is probably not he same, but the anonymity of Bitcoin makes up for attractiveness as a target.
AFAIK most smaller banks use third party software/services. Maybe there is a need for a bitcoin exchange software provider that takes care of the critical parts and you build your interface/business on top.
They may not have been good at security but I still have to admire someone who is willing to take responsibility for their mistakes. Where's Mark Karpeles?
As I said, amateur hour.
- Code that is written for bitcoin banking is fairly new comparing the real banks' code which contains lots of vulnerabilities.
- These guys hold huge amount of money from other people which becomes very tempting so that some insiders decide to take it and make it look like they are hacked
- Law enforcements are not as high as comparing to stealing dollars to bitcoins which makes hackers to focus on bitcoin.
Not really sure and i am really not an expert on bitcoin systems, i just wonder.
Banks do get hacked, and there's probably more going on than we hear about, but even so it seems banks are better at keeping money/secrets safe than Bitcoin exchanges, and probably better than the top-tier internet sites too (Google, Facebook, PayPal, Apple, Amazon).
I imagine that there are only a handful of digital currency exchanges that can boast about teams with deep experience in cryptography, block chain technologies, and extensive financial software security expertise.
That isn't the case with bitcoin.
For the majority of digital currency exchanges that I've used, deposits may be sent to unique address to associate it with your user record, but the funds are then typically moved into a pool to facilitate trading. I don't know off-hand of any exchanges that atomically isolate user funds and utilize the block chain to handle internal transaction reconsiliation. There's an off-shoot of block chain tech that is attempting to do atomic, cross-chain trading using the block chain, but it's still very new and experimental[1].
> Additionally bank accounts are federally insured.
Up to a certain amount. The standard insurance amount is $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each account ownership category.[2]
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It's just much more difficult to actually extract money from them. With Bitcoin, all you need to do is copy 32 bytes (the length of the ECDSA private key) over and over and suddenly you're a millionaire. It was a little more complicated in this scenario, since the attacker exploited an application flaw and appears not to have gained access to any private keys, but they still gained permanent control of the coins in a simple manner.
"during the DDOS two separate trades spiraled out of control either due to a bug or an exploit and transferred a very large number of small Bitcoin transactions to Ambiorx's account."
Note "either due to a bug or an exploit". Then:
"Ambiorx used the fraudulently obtained Bitcoins..."
If the cause was a bug in your own code, that's not fraudulent is it? Isn't that the exchange's fault? That line seems to assume exploitation, when they already said it was possible it was a bug.
The bank will notice it, revoke the funds and then at best you will end up with a pile of debt and at worse will be charged with some financial fraud or another.
It's time that exchanges will develop the ability to reverse bitcoin transactions by extending the chain or by building their own transaction protocol on top of the current BTC chain. It's also about time that these establishments will get some private insurance if they want to play around as they were some private banks for oligarchs which are not tied directly to the central bank or insured by it.
With how BTC transactions work in general, and how exchanges seem to operate these days im amazed that people still use them.
Something pretty similar to this happened here in NZ in recent years. A couple who ran a BP franchise had applied to a bank for a $100k line of credit. They were accidentally given $10m instead. They decided to rapidly transfer the money offshore, where they then fled. The woman eventually returned voluntarily, the man was extradited. He received jail, she a home detention sentence and reparation.
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/2428243/Couple-missing...
Sentencing: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objecti...
This makes little sense to me.
Isn't physical access security like OpSec 101?
But yeah, they're probably using The Cloud, because that's web scale.
2. Realize its not going anywhere
3. Close citing a hack
4. Profit! go laughing all the way to the bank with the "stolen" ahem ahem bitcoins
As a bitcoiner who uses bitcoin daily its sad seeing this happen
1) Collect underpants 2) ... 3) Profit
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/d/dd/Gnomes_plan.pn...
It's why I built CoinTouch, which finds friends of friends that trade Bitcoins (FB / G+). Post buy/sell orders, priced at a spread to market rates:
It seems to have happened over a 5 day period. So a back of the packet calculation: 60 x 230 * 5 = $69,000
Of course that doesn't tell us anything about if people had larger amounts stored, just that the hot wallet should have contained around that amount before they needed to refill it.
So to get the money back, you would have to get the private key for the address where it all ended up. Our have the owners of the majority of mining power commit fraud on your behalf, that could work too.
The blockchain is the only record of who owns what money, and transactions on it can't be reverted. Therefore, the attacker stole money by causing a transaction that shouldn't have happened.
Bitcoin is an agreement by the worldwide blockchain that you personally control the fate of anywhere from 0 to 21 million bitcoins. You can hoard them, send them to someone else, or throw away your access to them. But you can control no more than 21 million coins, because there will never be more than 21 million bitcoins. See http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/161/how-many-bitc...
I'm trying to figure out what you're saying. It seems like if your arguments apply to Bitcoin, then they would also apply to any other kind of good with limited supply, such as gold. Why would anyone be outraged when gold is stolen? Because people believe gold has value. The reason gold is valuable is due to its scarcity, not because gold is inherently valuable. People rarely use gold for its unique conductivity properties, whereas they usually use it for its scarcity. Same with Bitcoin.
So if your arguments apply to Bitcoin and gold, then what is being said? I'm curious to know your position on this. Not because I'm trying to defend or prove anything, but because your ideas tend to be interesting.
I think maybe people here are just talking past each other, so maybe it would help to articulate in detail?
Anyone with a copy of the private key of a wallet can transfer all the bitcoins from that wallet to a different wallet, i.e. a wallet that only they control.
The analogy is imperfect sure. Copying a movie doesn't keep you from selling that movie to someone else. But the only thing that keeps you from double-speding a bitcoin is the external confirmation process. Bitcoins aren't inherently scarce--the protocol makes them that way, just like copyright makes digital works artificially scarce.
I have never claimed that anyone can steal bits. I said that people can steal bitcoins. Bitcoins are not just bits, any more than the USD in my bank account is just bits. If you take money from my bank account without my permission, I hope we can agree that you have stolen money from me. The same applies to bitcoins for precisely the same reasons.
> The analogy is imperfect sure. Copying a movie doesn't keep you from selling that movie to someone else.
But that's exactly the problem. Larceny (and theft, more generally) is traditionally defined as the taking of someone's property with the intention of depriving them of that property.
> But the only thing that keeps you from double-speding a bitcoin is the external confirmation process. Bitcoins aren't inherently scarce--the protocol makes them that way, just like copyright makes digital works artificially scarce.
I'm not sure what your point is here. Bitcoins are not inherently scarce, because they don't inherently exist. Someone had to invent and implement the Bitcoin network, obviously. We are (hopefully) agreeing on the definition of the word "bitcoin," and thus we would agree for instance that 10 years ago no bitcoins existed. You can't have a bitcoin unless the Bitcoin network exists, and thus in that sense bitcoins are inherently scarce. The same can be said of USD, or financial assets like stocks and bonds, but I would guess that we agree those can be stolen.
Nobody has veified (or posssibly can verify) the damage of a "stolen' movie. For all we know piracy promotes purchase.
Either way, you can't "steal" information by copying it, but therein lies the difference in how the word might apply here but not in copyright discussions.
"Stealing" happens when the ownership of the money gets transferred to a third party without consent of the lawful owner.
This is what happens when bitcoins get stolen. They get transferred to somebody else and the global blockchain takes note of this. Yes you still have "your bits" but they are now worthless because nobody will accept them anymore.
> Bitcoins are just sequences of ones and zeros.
Not exactly, and that is what makes them interesting. The ones and zeros are part of what is essentially a digital 'tally stick' [1] where the account has a set of them and there is this globally shared data structure which has a matching set of them.There is some secret data the user has which allows them to "unlock" their ones and zeros and rewrite them so that they can rewrite them to say "these are not my ones and zeros". And that transaction is combined with another one of the form "these ARE my ones and zeros", and after a minimum number of copies of the global list has that information the transaction can be said to be complete.
If the user were to attempt to reassert their ownership of the ones and zeros (they have all of the original data still) the global list which everyone else can see shows that have given up those ones and zeros in the past. And there is nothing the user can do to change the global list at that point. Its like the master tally stick was swapped out in the vault and their half no longer matches any part of it.
I know there are a lot of BTC champions here, but as a former investor, the writing is on the wall: BTC is dead.
The coin will die, the concept will live on.
Which was Bitcoin's true power anyway.
Before we had this, banks were robbed all the time..just like the Bitcoin exchanges. The only reason the government hasn't completely regulated it yet, is because the average person it's investing in it.