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Comment by paulgerhardt | Hacker News Reader

Think about what you know about computer access models (usernames, passwords, OAuth tokens, etc.)

If you were to design a new access system today from scratch, would you set it up so that A) you give everyone the same 2 character password B) you don't give anyone a username and C) anyone can give anyone else admin credentials with no authentication?

Probably not, but this is the way regular house keys work. Lockitron represents a step in fixing that. Keys worked fine in the 20th century when matter was difficult to work with. This won't be the case for the 21st century.

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In addition to the problems with your concept of the security model of locks that other commenters have addressed, I'd like to point out that while requiring unique per-person authentication tokens aids in per-user access revocation, it also leaks information, meaning that whoever can view the access logs can effectively track your comings and goings (or at least your comings) through that door. Keys which simply authenticate "I am in the group of people who are allowed to access this" are generally preferable to ones that say, "I am John Smith, check that name against the list of people allowed to access this."

Also, keep in mind that Lockitron is obviously shooting for the consumer market, where concerns about sharing keys are basically non-existent. Commercial users who actually have to frequently deal with key revocations have been using RFID and other per-user access management technologies for ages.

Concerns about sharing keys in the consumer market are pretty common. You might hand out spare keys to a cleaner, pet sitter, neighbor who's watching the house while you're away, etc. and it's not necessarily comfortable knowing that they potentially have access to your house forever afterwards, if they decided to copy the key. The problem is largely ignored just because it's inconvenient to solve. Give people a realistic option for logging access and revoking keys and lots will go for it.

Unless you put huge bars over your windows and have a reinforced door frame/door/lock, it takes all of 30 seconds to break your way into a home anyway. Deadbolts are false security, even if electronic.

>Deadbolts are false security

False security? In what way? False as in they don't do anything? Or false in that they give you a false sense of security?

Deadbolts prevent the most casual of crime and crime of opportunity. Which I would argue is probably the most prevalent type of crime.

And a system where A) you give everyone the same 2 character password B) you don't give anyone a username and C) anyone can give anyone else admin credentials with no authentication?

works just fine there.

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