Critical Vulnerability in Verizon Mobile API Compromising User Email Accounts
randywestergren.com
randywestergren.com
In any case, we've all had "oh shit!" moments before. I'd love to think this would be a wake up call about quality control, but Verizon is just so freakin' big, that I can't imagine the number of vendors that have contributed to the amount of code Verizon is running at any given time. I can't imagine the chore of vetting it all at delivery time, let alone having to go back now, realizing how bad that bug was and assuming other sloppiness likely exists.
Not doing authentication on some things isn't a "oh shit" moment, it's a "we're doing all of this very wrong" moment.
Then again it's all over HTTP so that was off to a bad start.
Security is not a game, and it's not an afterthought. But some days it seems I am the only person who feels that way. I still don't shop at Target or Home Depot. They need to feel the impact of their business decisions, instead of putting the cost of security onto their customers or the customer's bank.
After seeing how they acted after their security breaches, I left for DigitalOcean. I've also recommended DO over Linode to other people for that reason.
I should note it wasn't the fact they had a security incident, that happens. It was the way they 'communicated' it.
The question now becomes, for how long was this vulnerability known and exploited secretly?
(I was a bit disappointed that it took so long to find that team -- only found them through unrelated news stories asking the public to report any signs of infrastructure sabotage during a labor negotiation breakdown.)
They ultimately weren't able to help me, and I had to resort to other more drastic means to reach the right people.
It's really difficult and nerve-racking to have to deal with this type of run-around under the threat of possible prosecution.
So I don't imagine they care too much about HTTPS for their own services either.