Obama Sides with Cameron in Encryption Fight
blogs.wsj.com
blogs.wsj.com
1. (2011) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/post/patriot-...
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controversial_invocations_of_th...
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northe...
(Nor's the BBC for that matter run by the Government - it merely has requirements to be for the public benefit, to represent the UK, and a variety of other things, by law, and in return it gets money from the TV license.)
The OP may have been thinking of the Welsh 'equivalent' of Channel 4, S4C, which is funded from the license fee and advertising.
The term government is preferable because the term 'state' is vague to people outside the UK. Being a government run service does not mean the BBC is required to follow the ideology on the current party in power.
You're right about channel four though.
Actually... it's consumption of live TV broadcasts specifically (you can consume news, radio, and BBC iPlayer catchup without paying a penny), and it covers all live TV - even if you only watch, say, Channel Five online, and never access any BBC content, you have to pay the fee.
The government doesn't have direct operational control. The BBC executive is appointed by the BBC Trust. Trustees are appointed by the monarch in accordance with the recommendations of the government. So, beyond the selection of the trustees, the BBC is independent of government.
They violate the rules and nothing happens.
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/23/nsa-officers-someti... "Such admissions can arise, for example, when an employee takes a polygraph tests as part of a renewal of a security clearance."
I also want more internal checks than "hoping the bad actors can't fool polygraph examiners".
As I recall, the strongest argument in the late 1990s was that there was no possible way to design a weakness in crypto for government that bad guys couldn't also exploit--and at much greater scale. "This bill will make it easier for someone to steal your identity" type stuff.
I'll happily donate a constant percentage of my company income to fight whatever useless laws come out of this. It'll be fought immediately if they try to legislate backdoors or any equivalent tinkering.
Last time we had a big legal fight about strong encryption, we got a supreme court ruling that source code implementing strong encryption was free speech, didn't we? Wonder how counterproductive the governments own actions will be this time.
If you can penetrate that with evidence of a terrorist plot, 1) you can penetrate that without evidence of a terrorist plot, and 2) probably so can others.
Both of these make us less safe.
"Of course, they'll want to subvert private communications. They're patriots."
The world needs a hell of a lot less patriotism right about now.
a) Obama is just being polite given that "Call me Dave" is in town and has an election to fight so he can't been seen as being soft on terrorism. He knows that its highly likely that Cameron will be out of a job in six months time so is just stringing him along.
OR:
b) The fix is in, a tame lawmaker will drop a bill that they just happened to have prepared that was sitting in their drawer for a rainy day. Given the Republican's have never met a national security bill that they didn't like expect it to pass through the house and senate with the usual added pork and pardons for the NSA/CIA to make sure nobody goes to jail for recent revelations (Democrats being too chicken to filibuster).
If we don't see a huge outcry from the tech industry pointing out what an insanely bad idea this is on Tuesday then I fear for the future.
Have we forgotten that republicans were on the right side of crypto war 1 and the first patriot act (aka joe biden's omnibus antiterrorism act)?
(Not that I think they will be on the right side for round 2, just pointing out the inaccuracy...)
But look at what just happened with civil forfeiture; pressure on the administration came from Republicans and Democrats alike. Republicans like to feel privacy from the government too. It just needs to be framed correctly; "imagine if someone like Lois Lerner had a backdoor to every conservative group's email server," or something like that.
And there are other routes they could take with legislation besides global key escrow. They could pass a law that mandates stiff penalties for people who decline to provide their encryption password in the face of a warrant.
But as per the 4th, if the government can't say what they want from the encrypted volume then they are on a fishing trip and you can tell them to get lost. There was a recent ruling that confirmed this (again being appealed).
What is up in the air is whether or not you can be compelled to provide your password to decrypt the volume. Expect the Supremes to have weigh in on this one in the coming years.
Basically all this is an end run around what's left of the 4th and 5th amendments. Probable cause means that law enforcement actually has do its job and build reasonable case rather than just deciding you are a bad person, looking to see which laws you've broken based on your data shadow, and then throwing the book at you in hope you'll settle for a plea.
It's interesting though -- or scary, even -- that this would mean forgetting the password to an encrypted volume could land you in jail. You don't have the means to prove you're innocent (by providing the password and revealing the data), and because of this you're thrown in jail.
It doesn't seem fair to me. Basically, the authorities are saying "we claim you have illegal encrypted data on that disk". If you cannot prove to us that you don't, you're going to jail. The outcome of this is that even a suspicion can land you in jail. It's on you to prove you're innocent, not on the authorities to prove you're guilty.
edit: oh, one starts to write a comment, attends the phone, and your idea is already submitted :/.
For one, fiction is not evidence. Using it as such is poor reasoning.
For another, I've seen a reaction of "that's just fiction, it wouldn't actually happen" distracting from the important points.
Note that I didn't say that I think the book is harmful, but the focus on it.
But this is not always the case - for the younger generations who are not familiar with the issue, 1984 is a very important piece of literature. For those of us who have suffered decades of ignominy over the crimes of our governments, sure: fatigue is the issue. But, we must never be willing to put our freedoms aside, for a little relief from repression. Always be aware, and always fight back!
So yes, reading 1984 is beneficial. Only reading 1984 is not.
"Only reading 1984 is not" helpful? I definitely do not agree. Reading at least one of these works at least provides the opportunity to consider its relevance. Reading none of them trivially throws out that potential benefit.
You can also consider Chesterton's The Man who Would Be Thursday, referenced in that review as well.
“We expect companies to be able to help with this,” he
said. “That doesn’t mean that you always have to write bad
cryptography.”
Yes, actually, that's exactly what it means. What in the world is this author doing giving the NSA the last word? What's really sick is that it sounds reasonable, like he's exposing a false dichotomy. But is it so hard to see that it's actually a real choice?The first option is to use provably broken cryptography, like 512-bit export grade RSA, that the government can just bust whenever they feel like it. Of course, so can pretty much anyone else, so this offers almost no protection.
The second option is to use secure cryptography, like 2048-bit RSA, that is thought to be difficult to bust in any reasonable timeframe. However, the government can compel you to hand over your private key, and they can then use that to decrypt whatever they want. An attacker could also steal the key and do the same thing.
The third option, which is what companies have begun to realize is the only method with actual security from criminals AND the government, is to transmit data without using a private key that they control. A good example is iMessage's use of device keys for parties of a conversation, without the use of a central key that lives on Apple's servers. They cannot be compelled to turn over the master key, and no one can steal the key either. If they have done their job correctly, there is no way to compromise the data that doesn't include obtaining someone's phone. This third option is what the ex-NSA lawyer doesn't even want to include in the conversation, even though it is what everyone is up in arms about right now.
It's also worth stating that this does not offer some new revelation in privacy. If I had sent you a letter in 1885, someone would have to actually GET the letter to read it and know what I told you. A system like iMessage functions in the same way: to know what I wrote you, you have to obtain one of our phones. The NSA is just sad that they can no longer pluck the message from the air.
One final note: there are so many methods of communication on the Internet, and more launch every month, that I can't imagine how they could all be monitored. Terrorists could be communicating with voice chat on Everquest 2. They could be arranging plants in their Farmville gardens to spell out coded messages. It's an arms race, and I don't want my freedoms compromised by governments trying to win it.
I'm not intimately familiar with the security of iMessage, but Apple controls the key server, as far as I understand. Can't law enforcement just compel Apple to make their key server respond with a public key owned by the NSA, instead of the public key of whichever device wants to receive the secret information?
I think it's pretty tough to make something elegant and simple without centralization, but hopefully it will happen some day.
I can only think of one area that the state leaves alone, religion, it has its finger in every other pie. What are you actually suggesting, that companies should voluntarily be backdooring software and handing over keys to the government? Or are you suggesting that they should be monitoring all their customers and informing on them, in the attempt to preserve privacy?
From a pure "the government will expand regardless and pay no heed to anything the populace does or says" standpoint, there's not much point in discussing any action of any sort. But backing off that just a little, if the popular mindset at least helps determine how that bureaucracy expands then privately limiting terrorism might help push the growth along less harmful avenues.
What form that should take is certainly subject to further discussion - I think we agree that companies adding backdoors, monitoring and informing is a bad approach and I don't think it's what the parent meant to suggest.
Why duplicate effort? It isn't as if competition in the effort would improve state service, as it is impossible to compete against the state - it really doesn't like it.
> ... privately limiting terrorism might help ...
You do know that terrorism is an incredibly rare event, right? I am confident that any sort of effort, either by the state or by private initiative, would be a tremendous misallocation of resources. That leaves the effort firmly in the state's hands - where operating in the red is the norm. Private individuals can't continuously operate in the red because they'd eventually starve.
> What form that should take is certainly subject to further discussion...
Yeah, I'd love to hear some ideas that aren't insane - but I won't be holding my breath.
I think a multi-pronged approach is necessary. First, continuing to spread the word that the first-order effects are not so severe - you're helping, there. Second, trying to capture any over-reaction in a non-privileged sphere (and trying to multi-purpose it - medical first-response built in case of terrorism also helps with heart attacks and pandemic). Third, reducing instances of terrorism to be over-reacted to, insofar as it's reasonable.
People will respond more positively to the second point if it credibly has some impact on the third.
I think the best we can hope for is free, high quality, approachable instruction in propositional logic. Now we only need to get people interested in PL... maybe sponsored product placement of SWI Prolog on daytime TV? :)
Beyond that, one doesn't need to fear the first-order effects of terrorism in order to support such a program. Fearing damage done by undirected (or maliciously directed) overreaction to terrorism is plenty.
"This also would only ever be a private effort, as it would completely undermine the goals of the state."
I'm not convinced the state is quite that monolithic, but I think this is likely better as a private effort anyway.
I think the idea behind '1984', the book, (before I understood what terrorism was) only seemed a flippant idea propositioned as the plot of a fictional book. Surely no human being would ever consciously choose to govern the world (or their nation) in such a way, and even so they would likely be cut off early in the process if they tried.
Now with more life experience and knowledge of the current state of the world, I can only reason that '1984' makes complete and total sense once the concept of "terrorism" is understood to be the catalyst of such a movement.
Here are some basic scenarios:
1) Terrorism scares citizens and thus, as a knee-jerk reaction, wish to empower their government with omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent powers. The kinds of powers that any subsequent (corrupt) government could easily take advantage of.
2) Terrorism scares citizens, and as such citizens decide to be proactive to collaborate with their government to help prevent terrorists from causing harm to their nation and to make them as effective as they can possibly be, while at the same time working to preserve basic human rights such as the right to privacy.
3) Terrorism scares citizens. Knowing that entrusting their government with the kinds of powers they would need in order to act against terrorism would be overreaching, as such citizens decide their government should have no such powers and decide not to give their government God-like powers, while also deciding not to collaborate and blaming all failures on their government, and so citizens continue to live in a world of constant alertness and fear worrying that their next trip to the city could be their last...
Just like the Goldilocks fairy tale, I think the world is not looking for a solution that is "too hot" or "too cold". Rather we're all looking for the solution that is "just right". The specific solution I can't say I have the answer, but with continuous iteration and improvement I'm certain smart people can come to a sane (but more than likely imperfect) solution that does not violate any single group and their goals / objectives / rights. And at the same time does not necessarily handicap future generations with rules and regulations that are almost insurmountable should they find themselves ruled by a corrupt / power-hungry government.
Problem: Reduce terrorism to zero while maximizing individual freedom. So we'd have to define "terrorism" and "freedom". That is going to be pretty difficult, as the the goal posts on terrorism have shifted from what was once an activity that fell within the spectrum of warfare, and therefor outside the realm on nonstate actors, to where it is at today - criminal activity that upsets people. I have no doubt that the goal posts will continue to shift. Freedom is even more difficult to define, as many feel they are entitled to freedoms that necessitate the reduction of other's freedoms: freedom from hunger, sickness, etc. So you aren't likely to find consensus on a definition for that.
It isn't a difficult problem, it is an impossible problem, because it isn't even possible to define the terms. That is, unless you accept the idea of universal preference, then it becomes pretty simple - as you'd be able to fix both variables. But then this conversation would be completely pointless, as universal preference invalidates the supposed justifications for the existence of government :)
The only reasonable action is to do nothing. The costs outweigh the gains by a tremendous margin.
I actually wouldn't say that... Consider how we've munged together religion and laws relating to Marriage.
Obviously we don't deal with 2 by breaching anonymity - that is destructive to our ends. But that doesn't stop us spreading the meme.
Ya know - "either you're with us or you're with the terrorists." [0]
[0] http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/200...
He's right that they're patriots, but he's wrong about the problem they're trying to solve. They're fighting different terrorists. Terrorists hiding in government.
It's sad to see homeless or drunk people in the street, but that's the worst I see.
I think eating healthy, exercising, having friends and a job does much more for our "safety" than ridiculous laws and surveillance.
I don't understand why people fear so much. Is it not possible to just refuse to fear? Be conscious about the effects it has. Talk about it. Why not just be brave and ignore the nonsense? Living with fear is no good life. We can't choose what happens in the world, but we can choose what we feel about it. We will die if we have to die. So what? It's not the end of the world.
edit: I remember seeing the tv in Finland. They play hours of crime-related series every day. What can you think of the world if you just see murders all day?
Have I missed something important? Is there a case, or even evidence of one, wherein encryption was a factor in a plot coming to fruition? If there had been, I would have expected the Obama, Cameron, et al., to trot it out.
Are we legislating this just in case? Strong encryption is already out there. I suppose if we make it illegal, the terrorists will just have to make do with weak encryption. But why don't we just make terrorism illegal, then?
Remember that Julius Caesar famously sought to make pen and paper illegal because he saw such low barriers to fast potentially secret communication a threat to Rome's security.
I know of no case reasonably called terrorism where encryption played a role in thwarting intelligence efforts.
> I suppose if we make it illegal, the terrorists will just have to make do with weak encryption.
When encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption.
Now, regarding:
> the use of encryption among the financial elite to conspire to defraud speculation markets or manipulate stock prices
Is anyone going to attempt to argue that encryption facilitates more fraud than it prevents?
> When encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption.
Right. I find it hard to believe that Obama and Cameron are going to take away our encryption and somehow convince our adversaries to abide by those rules.
Oh he knows. Lip service to the public about terrorism is just that.
> Is anyone going to attempt to argue that encryption facilitates more fraud than it prevents?
No idea.
Keeping things on topic financial fraud, insider trading, etc is an example where strong encryption does complicate the state's ability to enforce and investigate illegal activity. The purpose here is to draw from a well of motivation other than oft cited but never seen use of encryption in 'terrorism'.
The government's fear is that ubiquitous access to these tools will deprecate the executive branch. All tools from nuclear enrichment to hammers to animal husbandry have noble and malicious potential. Encryption is no different. The executive branch's job is to allow the noble purposes and to discourage, prevent, investigate and indict the malicious.
From the perspective of the executive, encryption presents a serious hurtle to the pursuit of the malicious.
Yet disagreements between the public and the executive about the the scope and breath of executive practices along with the US incarceration rate, of legal exceptionality of the rich and powerful, and general unease with current power structure coupled with traditional mythical US values means that the public would like guarantees about their ability to communicate without being searched.
The US public wants its cake and to eat it too. Secure and private communication for the masses that can not be intercepted. But it wants the executive branch to be able to enforce the law and to investigate broadly.
The executive branch has made many proposals to this middle ground: the clipper chip and key escrow, proliferation of weak cryptography and the use of third party doctrine as a buffer zone mechanism all represent compromises the executive branch has made.
What it comes down to is that the US public does not trust the executive branch not to abuse a middle ground - it points to historical and current examples of extralegal abuse - and in general feels that its government represents their interests but only after compromises with other 'more important' interests (international and domestic elite).
That is to say that the current state of "front door" encryption is a compromise made by the executive but one that the public does not trust.
Yet the public still wants law enforcement to be able to investigate insider trading.
So the government is in a bind. The government is justified to the people by its ability to enforce the laws of the land - if it can't, even for technical reasons - it will have difficulty seeming justified. The government's solution is to invoke the boogieman. 'Terrorists' will get you if we don't compromise. 'Pedophiles' will get your kids if we don't compromise.
But no, it's not about terrorism - it's that the government does not know how it will be able to stand up to proper strong cryptography in the case of true and perceived malicious use.
Freedom is like a dove, yadda yadda.
Encryption is like osteoporosis.
> Right. I find it hard to believe that Obama and Cameron are going to take away our encryption and someone convince our adversaries to abide by those rules.
Entirely. Historically this has been achieved by subversion of cryptographic methods, consumer products and standards and misinformation about security margins. It has made legitimate strong cryptography hard to come by but not specifically illegal. It is likely to become more and more difficult to perform this sort of influence now that the cat is out of the bag.
Typically the only terrorist plots you'll hear about publicly are the ones that have to be public--either because of a public warning (even then, typically extremely vague), or because the break-up happened in a public way.
1) Based on what I've read from experts and what I know, if a national security agency targets your data, they will get it. Even government systems containing state secrets, protected by other state security agencies, have proven to be vulnerable. Banks are penetrated; even RSA's crown jewels were stolen, IIRC.
2) Even if 'content' data is encrypted, metadata almost certainly is not. Security agencies can identify which data belongs to their target and collect it, even if encrypted. Also, IIRC, recent leaks indicated that the NSA automatically collects much encrypted traffic, including Tor and maybe VPN traffic.
3) Metadata, as most people here probably don't need to be reminded, is as valuable as content. Again, regardless of what encryption you use your metadata probably is vulnerable and security agencies can easily collect it and utilize it.
4) Therefore, it seems that encryption only prevents low-cost search of bulk-collected content. It doesn't provide any security for metadata (usually), encrypted content still can be collected, and unencrypted content probably is vulnerable if you are a high-value target.
Yes, it's the kind of problem you get when a patriot whistleblower exposes rampant corruption and unlawful behavior at the NSA; behavior that, above and beyond civil liberties, hurts American commercial interests, and then you do nothing about it.
> He said he believes Silicon Valley companies also want to solve the problem. “They’re patriots.”
He's right about them being patriots. He might be wrong about what patriotism means in this case.
I'm hopeful the next president will be just as conscientious about the intricacies of important issues and how it's important not to act on controversial things without strong public support.
My initial reaction, though strongly opposed to what he's saying is: "Joke is on us". The fear I think is having a U.S. president who will not consider public opinion and go about making his / her decisions in a bubble.
We have adversaries. Our adversaries are plotting something objectively bad - to blow up things and kill innocent people. They are plotting and coordinating these bad things via communications with one another. Historically, we have been able to intercept those communications, read them, and interrupt our adversaries from the bad things they are plotting.
If our adversaries' communications are completely impossible to intercept, we have lost one of the most valuable tools in our ability to prevent them from doing bad things. How are we supposed to prevent them from doing these bad things?
Again - please don't attack me - just looking for a smart answer here.
Well, we might not be able to. Such is the price of liberty. Personally, I think the thousands that died in the trade centers do not justify the massive loss of civil liberties, and it's STILL not clear we would have been able to do anything about it.
Bad guys are going to use encryption no matter what. Citizens should not be restricted from using it themselves just because it makes it easier on the federal government.
My thoughts based on it:
1) It's a tough sell to Average Joe. Average Joe wants it both ways - he wants Liberty AND to be protected from bad guys. Obama etc. were effectively hired to protect Average Joe from the bad guys. If Obama were to say "Sorry guys, we can't protect you in the name of Liberty", he's going to be eviscerated.
2) Agreed completely that banning encryption is foolish. I think what they really want is NSA-style backdoors - "encryption for everyone except us." And of course I see the concern with that.
If Average Joe "wants Liberty AND to be protected from bad guys" then he doesn't have both if he doesn't have Liberty.
The only way you can have Liberty and Security is if you don't sacrifice one for the other. The need for the sacrifice is the lie. There is no reason you can't have both, because sacrificing liberty is not necessary for security.
In reality the opposite is the case. "Those who give up essential liberty for a little temporary safety deserve neither and lose both." Liberty and privacy are essential components of security. You're not secure if the bad guys can compromise your entire infrastructure just by infiltrating the police or police computers (to say nothing of the security risk from corrupt government officials). Creating intentional security vulnerabilities in order to facilitate government spying does not bring about a security improvement. It's based on the premise is that we need to reduce security in order to be secure, which is preposterous and untrue.
If the Average Joe doesn't like it, well, then it's the President job to explain the relationship between encryption and rights like free speech, presumed innocence, and security from search without a warrant. Not to go looking for ways to abrogate those rights to satisfy the Average Joe.
"What if there were cameras in your house that recorded everything you did & said, but the government promised you the footage would only be reviewed in the case that they suspect you committed a crime. How would you feel about that?"
I've gotten a lot of mileage from this metaphor myself. The response is usually silence while they internally question their worldview or something. Never gotten a counter argument, nor anyone replying with "I'd be okay with that". Would be interested if HN could poke a hole in this so I can patch it. :)
"Oh, I think it will be a great idea. The government will see how good of a citizen I am and how much I learn on my own, and perhaps, if I'm lucky, they'll give me a job so that I can stop cooking the rats in my walls."
"I've got no problem with that. I have nothing to hide."
(I have a friend who says _exactly_ that.) But at that point you really can't keep the argument/discussion going, because you're dealing with someone who clearly says one thing and would act differently. I'm sure if the camera crew arrived and started drilling in his house he'd change his tune, but what can you do short of that. The problem with debating with a lot of people, sadly.
So it's good as a throwaway metaphor for illustrating that concept, but it's not great for arguing against surveillance, because Internet traffic is not the same thing as getting dressed every morning. Most people get a lot less worked up about email and web surfing than being naked.
Timothy McVeigh didn't use encryption.
9/11 Hijackers didn't use encryption.
7/7 Bombers didn't use encryption.
Boston Bombers didn't use encryption.
Can you see where this is going ?
The gunman in Canada who tried to shoot up Parliament openly posted his plans and talked to jihadi sympathizer accounts on Twitter in the open. He was also on watch lists and had his passport pulled for trying to go to Syria.
One of the Boston bombers was on a watch list, and Russian officials sent warnings about him.
Seems nobody is watching the people on watch lists
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/books/review/agent-storm-m... (second paragraph before the end)
FTR, I don't believe we should compromise everyone for these cases. Clearly traditional HUMINT is still viable.
"Encrypted Web Traffic More Than Doubles After NSA Revelations". http://www.wired.com/2014/05/sandvine-report/
The question also doesn't address the issue of how far is too far, imagine how many crimes would be discovered with nightly searches of everyone's homes. Should we begin searching everyone's homes warrantlessly? What is more detrimental to society, the criminals, or the police state?
What are they doing to do, deploy unremoveable malware on every phone by default? Because as long as phones have CPUs and we can tell them what to do, they can employ unbreakable encryption. How are they supposed to get around that? Mandatory spyware?
What did police do before the telephone was commonplace? Criminals met and still meet in speakeasies and other safe locations to communicate without a phone, are we gonna install mics in every room as part of new building codes?
If phones do become irreversibly broken and monitored, guess what, criminals will stop using phones. Kevin Gates (rapper) has a song about drug dealing called... I Don't Talk On Phones, lol.
tl;dr: surveillance state monitoring all phones just means criminals will stop using phones to communicate so its only going to hurt "legitimate" privacy.
First let me clarify that I agree the notion of "banning encryption" is misguided and wrong. I'm looking at Obama's position (perhaps incorrectly) as "we need to be able to have backdoors", not "ban encryption".
I think the government's argument would be that yes, the most sophisticated adversaries will always find a way around monitoring. But I think they'd argue that 95% of adversaries are not the most sophisticated, so the position to is to make it as easy as possible to catch that 95%.
"If we're trying to monitor 100 bad guys and 95 of them are just using iMessage, then let's make it easy to read what the 95 of them are saying and deal with the other 5 with more sophisticated countermeasures, rather than having to use more sophisticated countermeasures for all 100 of them."
I absolutely see the whole argument here. I'm just trying to figure out what the right solution is.
They can't reliably have backdoors without banning crypto that lacks it.
If I install a keylogger on your computer, it doesnt matter what encryption you're using, I can just type in your password. That kind of backdoor.
Go for the weakest link in the chain.
- legal. It's against the law; there are strong 1st and 4th arguments against surveillance, and 5th and 6th amendment arguments as well. Some people have even tried to argue that if encryption is a munition the 2nd amendment applies. The "we could stop bad people" argument applies especially to the 4th.
Similar legal protections exist in Europe, although not generally as strong.
- practical: either a system is secure or it isn't. Handing it over to anyone increases the risk of compromise. Bans on effective encryption are self-defeating.
- collateral damage: US intelligence agencies have a track record of killing innocent people themselves (e.g. drone strikes), supporting murderous governments (CIA in south america), funding terrorism and failing to prosecute the guilty (Iran-contra), use of intelligence for domestic immoral politics (Watergate, FBI vs MLK). Handing over data about your e.g. Chilean users to the CIA may result in them being murdered.
- international hypocrisy: saying that mass surveillance is OK says it's OK for other governments too. Do you support Chinese interception against their adversaries? Are you happy to turn over your entire email history on entering a country?
- finally, I'm going to question how much it does help. The Paris terrorists were known to the police, as was the killer of Lee Rigby. Intercept evidence is generally not used in trials. Nobody is presenting a cache of encrypted emails found on a computer used by the Parisian terrorists and saying "if we'd decrypted this we could have prevented it".
What will happen is that non-governmental organizations will find these keys and get the same ability. What will happen is that the government will overreach, as they have done before time and time again.
This isn't about stopping terrorism, this is about keeping the current ability to spy on US Citizens. The internet was the single greatest intelligence boon in history and the government is concerned about loosing spying capacity.
Unsophisticated terrorists would gain little protections from at-rest and over-the-wire encryption. It's really quite easy to screw up and be found in the dragnet. Sophisticated actors would be using additional software anyway. You know, the kind that already exists.
The libraries are free and public. The algorithms publicly published. You can't put the cat back in the bag.
The government is trying to legislate particular usages of math. They are literally saying that Apple and Google shouldn't be using certain sequences of numbers. This isn't an exaggeration or hyperbole since everything is encodable in numbers and obviously some communication is illegal.
This is literally illegal equations, and it is so very far down a slippery slope that every citizen should be concerned.
To answer your question, the government will still not be able to decrypt many communications, even with this backdoor. These technologies protect casual users from data theft, but putting in backdoors makes everybody less safe.
But, at least in the US, firearms aren't illegal. Using them in a crime is the illegal part. The biological act of moving your arm isn't illegal, but hitting somebody is.
The analog would be making it illegal to form a fist because you might use it to attack something.
It's not like knowledge about cryptography suddenly vanishes. And it's not like those computers aren't annoyingly programmable to do such evil deeds like encrypting data in a way that officials can't access it.
Given that, what's this all about? Governments could mandate key escrow (which is what I guess they're really aiming for) for any system under their control. So adversaries build their own, in Excel using VBA, if necessary.
There is no way to honor that demand by the US and UK governments unless computers become a _much_ different thing than what they're now.
I challenge this assertion. It has happened in some cases, but the claim that surveillance is an effective way to stop terrorism has failed to be backed up with many success stories.
> If our adversaries' communications are completely impossible to intercept, we have lost one of the most valuable tools in our ability to prevent them from doing bad things.
The most organized adversaries' communications are already impossible to intercept. They know they are under surveillance and are taking measures to counter that surveillance. The people that surveillance affects most are innocent people.
In a different perspective (and I'm going to speak in an American context because I'm American and the article is about the American president) there are some things that are worth the lives of Americans. Our nation was founded with a rebellion and many Americans died in that struggle. They died for freedom, to gain rights. American history is full of people dying to protect the rights of Americans.
And from another perspective, terrorism is a hugely overblown concern. More Americans die in car accidents every year than have died from terrorism in the entire history of the United States[1]. 33561 people died in car crashes in the US in 2012[w]: that's like the September 11 attacks happening almost once a month. The fact that we're spending $10.8 billion in a year on the NSA[3] to prevent a handful of deaths that it may not even prevent, and less than 10% of that ($815 million) on the NHTSA[4] shows that our priorities are not where they should be.
[1] http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_motor_vehicle_deaths_in...
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Agency
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety...
All they can end up doing is preventing the everyday users of the mass services from using encrypted transmission. So the innocent lose freedoms but the guilty carry on as normal.
But they'd rather have a database with the sum total of human thoughts and interactions.
Are we necessarily able to prevent these bad things from happening? Right now, we aren't able to entirely stop crime from happening. Why would we necessarily be able to stop these types of crimes from happening?
It's all a question of whether we want to give up certain freedoms in exchange for increased safety (or sense of safety).
It's not very complicated, it's just a balance of one thing (freedom) versus another (safety). Different people will value these two things differently, and I'm not sure I can make an argument that choosing safety over freedom is necessarily a "bad" choice.
That being said, I'm not in favor of the government banning private communication. But I understand that there are people who are, and their reasoning.
"The trouble with fighting for human freedom is that one spends most of one’s time defending scoundrels. For it is against scoundrels that oppressive laws are first aimed, and oppression must be stopped at the beginning if it is to be stopped at all." — HL Mencken
Though, personally the scene that springs to my mind is the one from "A Man for All Seasons":
William Roper: So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law!
Sir Thomas More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
William Roper: Yes, I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
Sir Thomas More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws, from coast to coast, Man's laws, not God's! And if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake!
Yes, but has anyone considered the means they might be using to do this? Why assume it's electronic? Check the wikipedia page for the Millennium Challenge, especially the section on 'Exercise action'.
If we leave a backdoor for the "patriots", then we can guarantee that foreign governments and criminals will find and use the same backdoor. All any restrictions on encryption will do is lead to more non-terrorism arrests.
And if the company is a US company, who would disagree with that?
This is the same argument Obama tried to use with Abbvie while trying to block their takeover of shire for tax purposes. He used the phrase "economic patriotism".
But in the end the government had to go with a more mundane solution and reward Abbvie 100% of contracts for their new hepatitis drug with Medicare rather than give split the cohtract with gilead.
My point - look for some large government contracts with apple and google in exchange for dropping encryption on their platforms.