OB: pedantry, an attacker who does one test with 256-bit ECC has a probability of success of ~2^-256. 128-bit security comes from a rho attack which starts off unlikely (2^-256) to be successful and becomes sure to be successful at around 2^128 operations: e.g. it makes progress unlike normal "guess and check" brute force.
I just mention it because this fact means that the sufficiency of ECC security by itself doesn't mean that 2^-128 is "sufficient" against random chance.
But, course, 2^-128 is unfathomably low probability, and it's generally sufficient against 'chance'. Though chance is usually the wrong way to think about attack. For example: If I create software which takes a 256 bit input and does a "if (input == 8675309) exec_shell();" and expose it to the Internet what is the probability of that input? ... probably 1. :)