The Case for N. Korea’s Role in Sony Hack
krebsonsecurity.com
krebsonsecurity.com
My own analysis was that this malware is entirely unspectacular and is easily within the reach of a single, relatively-unskilled, lone VXer or a small criminal group (which would fit better with the extortion for money that started this - I've never seen a nation-state do that, but plenty of criminals). It's built with other people's code. It's kinda lame.
(Edit) In particular: who at McAfee looked at this? The coding style looks quite different between Shamoon and the Sony Wiper malware to me, which indicates probably different authors. (Different VXers could be working for the same people, but that's assuming they're working for anybody at all.) The only thing in common is a JPEG in a broadly similar retro "90s GeoCities h4x0r" style and a (publicly-available!) raw disk driver - which many others have used for many other, including legitimate, purposes.
Of course, that means any nation-state could do it too - maybe that is North Korea's "cyber-army"'s style - in which case, why is anyone so worried? You have to do security as bad as Sony to get nailed by that.
It is, of course, worrying in itself that there's an open question about whether an extortionist attack via malicious software on a huge company has been conducted by a nation-state, an organised crime group, or a bored teenager.
The script-kiddie nature of the attack doesn't seem like a good argument against DPRK attribution. Only a select few are even allowed on the internet in that technological backwater, so I wouldn't expect mind-blowing 0-days.
So, the 'request' was...? Nothing mentions The Interview until after the media did.
Being fair, I am not a geopolitical expert but do admit that if a nation-state were to extort companies for bagfuls of dollar cash money, DPRK (and its awful, cash-only external trade economy?) might be a good fit. But I've never seen it before. I doubt DPRK (or their trade partners) accept bitcoin; and the pickup is the riskiest part of an extortion op.
The movie will be release at the original date, how convenient.
(They may however reasonably be trying to make lemons out of lemonade now. What else could they do - try to unleak it? - oh wait, they're trying that too.)
Why do you think that about information you aren't privy to?
…if 'happy' is the right word to use about nation-states of any size sabre-rattling with malware, and I'm not sure that it is! But it's clear whoever did this probably isn't a highly technically competent threat (or, at least, are pretending not to be).
People that run in more technical or security-related fields might be privy to more tools in the analytical toolbox.
It's probably also quite likely that trust in US defense intel is not at an all-time high, exacerbating said skepticism.
The US lied about that and started a war. Why shouldn't they lie about North Korea?
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleea...
All of this is mentioned in the linked article.
If they have HUMINT they're risking their source with any public statement of attribution at all: it's obviously not worth burning a source just over making this public.
Useful SIGINT will primarily be historic metadata lookups of contact with relevant proxies - which unfortunately has a huge false positive rate, useful really only for tentatively ruling actors out. Ignore that and you could point the finger at just about anyone.
To start with, film is something of a national treasure in NK. Official documents show KJI as being connected with the production of over 11,000 films. That is almost certainly an exaggeration, but enough of his stuff has leaked that you can take a class on it at a film school, so it's not a 'whole-cloth' invention. NK has taken bizarre steps to secure its film heritage, including organized abduction of actors and directors from foreign countries to bolster the regime's cast list.
Meanwhile, the personality cult is strong, in a way not seen even under Stalin. For example, the whole country stopped and celebrated [0] because a random citizen put out a fire near a portrait of one of the leaders. You'll find Western media outlets speculating that of course what really happened is she thwarted an assassination attempt, because the truth is absurd to Western sensibilities.
These two things combine to form a powerful motive. The last time a film depicted a NK leader, they made serious efforts to have it banned in their allied countries, although they were not at all successful. Meanwhile, successfully hacking a US company is of major propaganda value for the regime. The two targets that they have "hacked"--SK and US--are the ones they complain most loudly about internationally. So launching some kind of attack would be very consistent with their political rhetoric.
Since that time, they've developed a much more sophisticated hacking ring. There was a time when they relaxed some of the normal rules so that you could outsource your software projects to NK software developers, and, from what I understand, some large companies did. That was one of the ways they built skills. While they're pretty incompetent by nation-state standards, they seem to have improved a lot in recent years, and of course they're better-funded and better-organized than any common criminal hacking ring. It would be completely within NK's wheelhouse to devote 10% of GDP to this project even while their people starve.
Meanwhile, of course, Sony has a very poor track record on security--between the rootkits, GeoHot, Linux, etc., I don't know a lot of qualified security researchers who would feel good about working there. This has created a bit of a security vacuum and of course they have been hit by common criminals, several times in the last few years. So it's very believable that hitting them is within NK's reach.
Finally, as far as nation-states having an extortion motive again that is very much within NK's wheelhouse. They are a poor country and they are engaged in all kinds of bizarre plots to raise money. Notably, they built up a counterfeiting ring for US currency so sophisticated that we ended up redesigning the bills [1]. NK also runs sort of an industrialized Breaking Bad operation, to the extent that a lot of the country is hooked on their own product [2]. Their MO at this point is very definitely to take common criminal operations and scale them up under the cloak of a nation-state to drive revenue. It's not a leap to electronic extortion. They're basically a super-mafia at this point, and this is a new department.
As far as their being no "DNA, smoking-gun" evidence--that's true. But I think the circumstantial identifying evidence, combined with motive, means, and opportunity, is pretty compelling. The communications from GOP are as bizarre and convoluted as anything the NK regime says, and not what you'd expect from a simple criminal enterprise. If it's not NK, it remains to be explained why the hackers went to some lengths to fool real security analysts at an actually first-class nation-state, but did so in such a bizarre and haphazard way as to target an especially weak US company that does not demonstrate any particular skill beyond what others have done before. That level of convolution demands a geopolitical explanation of some type that goes beyond simple extortion, but it's much more elaborate to explain who would want the US angrier at NK than we already are, and how these shadowy figures would benefit.
Finally, as far as the "inside job" theory--it is completely believable to me that NK would be willing to throw a few tens of thousands of dollars in bribes to get inside. They spent much more than that celebrating putting out the poster-fire. So that idea that Sony had angry employees to me actually strengthens the case for an NK-based theory, as it provides a simple and cheap way for them to get inside.
[0] http://newfocusintl.com/exclusive-why-north-korea-handed-a-b...
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdollar
[2] http://www.vice.com/read/north-korea-crystal-meth-drugs-dipl...
Even if one assumes that the vast majority of their whole cyberwarfare division is unskilled and incompetent, which could very well be true, you only need a core group of 5-10 good people to pull off attacks like these. It's also possible the people they're working with aren't of NK nationality or aren't living there.
I think you may be highballing a budget estimate on this particular attack. 5-10 good people could likely pull off something like this at a larger company with relatively competent security, but I reckon this could have been done by one or two moderately unskilled hackers over several months - Sony Pictures' security was just that awful, and the malware's style is remarkably amateurish - it isn't even packed, for heaven's sake.
Here you'll find no 0days, no factored signing keys, no memory-resident non-persistent "CRIT" agents - compare and contrast it with, say, the so-called "DarkHotel" malware (very probably from the Republic of Korea) and it's just night and day.
Literally anyone can afford that kind of budget: impoverished (or otherwise) nation-state; disgruntled employee; random hacker; or any combination thereof. I'd say many readers of this comment could feasibly have done it themselves, if they'd felt so inclined.
If you find that a bit concerning, so do I, because (as I'm sure you're well aware) Sony Pictures is far from the only company in the world with dreadful security practices, and they just make movies. Imagine if it was something actually important.
And a key similarity between the two, according to the article, is the graphics left behind by the hackers: lime-green type on black background, with pictures of skulls. In other words, similar to a ton of hacker sites.
A smokin' JPG is not a smoking gun.
jwz called from 1999, he wants his color scheme back.
There's no smoking gun revealed publicly, but the preponderance of available evidence points to the DPRK.
The Korean locale is in the (public) rawdisk driver.
So it used RSA that I can break on my TI-83? Is this a typo?
We have seen similar non-cyber evidence in order to gain public support for war, the Iraq Dossier springs to mind. Maybe we ate seeing a CIA/NSA experiment to see how far they can persuade public opinion into the viability of attacking NK.
If Facebook are able to run 'mood altering' tests on users, I bet the USG are interested in similar types of online propaganda campaigns and the kind of success rates that are possible.
Just me going off in left field...
Like Scotland and the unicorn? Not entirely sure where that one's going.
The only possibility that I see of DPRK involvement is that they initiated the hacking through the third party and that third party did a way better job than they expected.
LOL, just because SPE is chicken, suddenly the whole USA is chicken? Please.
LOL, asking for more evidence and you don't believe NK did it. So, finger a perpetrator or STFU. With data.
LOL, hysterical children are the loudest screamers on the internet. Most of us think and use common sense. Try to figure things out.