The "Selinux is too hard for mortals" thing is a relic from the early days of its inclusion into linux, and turning around this attitude is important.
I don't recall the last time I had to do a full relabel on a production system. Not saying it hasn't happened, but I can't recall an instance.
Overall, I spend less time managing SELinux (and that includes the custom policies I maintain) than I do managing IPTables. It's really not the nightmare it's made out to be.
Whereas on Android, people expect the barrier, and developers don't expect to be able to disable it.
I'm really worried that Linux has become a liability. The lax security practices of the culture its part of are obvious. What now? Do we migrate to OpenBSD? I've been considering this at work. It just seems that the culture surrounding OpenBSD just takes security more seriously.
The idea that we can just put a application on the internet sounds dangerous to me. If its isn't hardened by something like apparmor/selinux and also behind some kind of application-level firewall (or at least snort), then we're just asking for trouble. Something has to change. The status quo is now failing us. How many high-priority patches have there been in the FOSS world this year?
Sadly, I worry more about my linux machines than my windows machines.
Ubuntu has Mandatory Access Control in the form of AppArmor (https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AppArmor). It's switched on with a set of policies on the desktop (do sudo apparmor_status to see) and on the server.
On the mobile side a lot of work has been done to confine individual applications in a manner similar to Android. That's future work that could go into mainstream Linux eventually.
On the traditional server side both RedHat and SUSE have MAC on by default - for them SELinux I believe.