Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
cia.gov
cia.gov
"Throughout this chapter and the next, 'The Harm of Surveillance,' Greenwald emphasizes the coincidence of his judgments and values with those of Snowden. He also links Snowden’s upbringing and checkered employment history as justification for his decision to proceed as he did rather than follow official whistle-blower procedures."
Snowden's stated reasons for not going through official channels, and Greenwald's reporting of this, were based upon the NSA's prior treatment of whistleblowers, specifically William Benney and Thomas Drake[1]. The surveillance agencies believe that all information collection is desirable, justified and, because of the public's ignorance of the threats posed, necessarily secret. Like most organizations, insiders who push for changes are met with varying degrees of resistance.
[1] http://www.npr.org/2014/07/22/333741495/before-snowden-the-w...
It's to their benefit to form their propaganda in a very dry "factual" sounding way such that it can more easily dodge the perception of bias. Of course, it's merely a biased presentation of some facts and twisting/fabrication of others in a way that favors the agency.
http://www.amazon.com/Craft-Intelligence-Legendary-Fundament...
It was written by the first CIA director in the 1950s and is part memoir and part look into the structure of the early intelligence world.
I find looking back at the beginning of something is necessary to understand the current state and this book lays a good foundation for understanding how the CIA grew and evolved. It's particularly interesting how even back then it started out of paranoia and suspicion of all ideas that were an affront to the American Dream. More than just out of simply the need for a national defense mechanism.
Famous operations sound quite different from the perspective of the leaders who ran them. Than what you might find in the media or documentaries.
For more of the nuts and bolts of modern operations, I suggest 'Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy' by Mark Lowenthal.
http://www.amazon.com/Intelligence-Secrets-Policy-Mark-Lowen...
I also appreciate the foundations and history, but this is a great introduction to the tasking, training, mindset, and goals of modern intelligence operations. He's updated for post-9/11 and post DHS splintering of the IC as well.
Each of these books about the Snowden affair covers the
basics of Snowden’s broken family life, his half-finished
education, his political beliefs, and his devotion to the
Internet.You have to understand that he didn't leave them much to manipulate external and internal biases with. So they went with his lack of education.
Otherwise, he's held some incredibly top level positions in the NSA and CIA up until 2012. Had he not gone "rogue", I'm pretty sure he'd still be climbing the ladder and be one of the more respected people within the intelligence community. This guy was headed to some very high, well paid positions within the NSA.
Kind of hard to discount his career up to that point.
And Kim Dotcom was an elite hacker. Don't let reality get in the way of a good myth.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden#Career
According to Greenwald, while there Snowden was "considered the top technical and cybersecurity expert" in that country and "was hand-picked by the CIA to support the president at the 2008 NATO summit in Romania."[73]
or
In 2011 he returned to Maryland, where he spent a year as lead technologist on Dell's CIA account. In that capacity, he was consulted by the chiefs of the CIA's technical branches, including the agency's chief information officer and its chief technology officer.[39]
Pretty sure if you're being consulted by the CIA's CTO, you're not exactly some low level contractor doing sys admin work.
But they lost track of Snowden, panicked, and cancelled his passport. Leaving him stuck in Russia of all places (which is actually worse for the US than either a South American country OR HK, as they have zero political capital there).
[1] http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-source-nsa-leaker-snowdens...
[2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/ecuador-rafael-...
http://www.amazon.com/Inside-Company-Diary-Philip-Agee/dp/08...
His See No Evil goes into a lot of detail about the training and day to day work of a CIA case officer:
However, I suspect that Baer may be out of touch with US post-cold-war national security issues.
"The final section of the memoir deals with Baer's experience with oil politics in Washington, and the extended reach granted to oil's agenda by the politically fixated and strategically oblivious American government. At one point, Baer is stunned at being asked to approve the sale of a sophisticated American defense weapon to a former Soviet-bloc country as an incentive for participating in an oil deal, while that same country had recently obstructed the investigation of the murder of an American diplomat on their soil."
http://www.amazon.com/Sleeping-Devil-Washington-Saudi-Crude/...
I grew up in Saudi, and got my undergraduate degree in intelligence studies. From my perspective, Baer was quite in touch with modern politics. A bit bombastic, but always a seemingly strong understanding of the political landscape.
Of course, the assassination was a complete fiction - but the CIA made it clear that they were hanging him out to dry.
http://www.amazon.com/Pot-Shards-Fragments-Lived-Koreas/dp/0...
Interesting comments from the other angle. As they are just waiting for prosecution.
But this is probably not the official list for agents. I would love to see the official list.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intellig...
The Human Factor (Jones): http://www.amazon.com/Human-Factor-Dysfunctional-Intelligenc...
Loose Lips (Berlinski): http://www.amazon.com/Loose-Lips-Novel-Claire-Berlinski-eboo...
Rift Zone (Hillhouse): http://www.amazon.com/Rift-Zone-Raelynn-Hillhouse-ebook/dp/B...
I think it was this one: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/01/us-military-blo...
It is also completely true. As you might expect, .mil unclassified public networks are still strictly controlled and monitored, with all the invasive filters and MitM certificates you could ask for. I recall seeing mass-distribution e-mails "reminding" cleared personnel that they should not even be visiting WikiLeaks or Guardian.co.uk using their own equipment when they return home from work.
They actually expected people who saw classified material distributed from the web on their home computers to call and report it, so that the "spillage" experts could examine every bit of their privately owned hardware and permanently delete the classified material. It sounds ridiculous, but they were completely serious.
I cannot even imagine the sort of brain damage that would allow a person to have such an expectation.
This was a big issue when WikiLeaks started leaking info. There were regular memos circulated in DoD and DoE environments reminding people they weren't to be reading classified documents.