Yes, CC companies can do a better job of mitigating risk, but it's hardly a case to blame "only" them for this.
Yes, CC companies can do a better job of mitigating risk, but it's hardly a case to blame "only" them for this.
Then, when the fraud inevitably occurs--the crime as old as money itself--the credit card provider disclaims responsibility and places the onus upon the merchant.
The banking industry should arguably be a larger employer of top-tier cryptographers and cryptanalysts than the espionage and counter-espionage industry, but instead we get half-assed schemes from them like "How about we just print a secret code on the back of the card and don't write it to the magnetic strip?" Well, your helpful waiter then just swipes the card with his skimmer and photographs both sides before selling the info down the chain of fraud.
This is why new tech like digital blockchain currencies are coming into existence. The banks simply are not providing the level of service commensurate with the fees charged, and people are latching on to any available alternative, no matter how much it stinks, just because it is an alternative. Paypal, hawala, eGold, Bitcoin, Rixty, or whatever. People simply don't want to be vulnerable to a replay attack on their bank accounts. The market for credit card numbers and associated personal data would not exist if the issuers had a truly secure means of validating identity and authorizing payments instead of the hand-wavey pretend-secure system they already have in place on thousands of point-of-sale terminals.