It would be very difficult for the US to back out of or alter the very treaty we pressured most of the world into signing not that long ago.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Convention_on_Narcotic_D...
That said, the SCND dates back to 1961 which was 53 years ago, and those countries which have openly stepped back from full compliance with it such as Portugal and Uruguay don't seem to have incurred any disadvantage or sanctions worth talking about, though you might argue that they had little or no political capital to lose in the first place. I do think there's a global shift towards looking at drug abuse and addiction as public health issues rather than moral vices, so while there's pressure form some quarters to maintain or strengthen anti-drug enforcement there's also pressure to adopt more utilitarian policies focused on harm minimization and demand management.
I think the convention will not be explicitly derogated any time soon, but will rather be allowed to become a dead letter through diminished contributions of fiscal and political capital for enforcement, while being nominally and loudly upheld by more authoritarian regimes as both a blunt instrument in trade negotiations and as a proxy for the rule of law.
I mean, imagine if the votes of US senators on individual issues were governed by the outcome of votes in state legislatures - you'd have a more responsive democracy on the face of things but in practice legislative work would slow to an utter crawl and you'd have even more procedural maneuvering than we do now.
I'm personally hoping the incoming congress gives the President fast-track authority to negotiate both the TPP and TTIP, which would be a shrewd political tactic; while I don't much like that it might benefit the GOP, that's outweighed by my support of free trade and my low opinion of economic populism and national sovereignty (just to be up=front about my political biases).
He doesn't need congressional approval -- that's exactly how the TPP has been getting negotiated this entire time -- and is exactly why it's so outstandingly bad.
Back room deals regarding IP rights (pushed hard by the MPAA, RIAA and other lobbying organizations) among many other blanketed things that the public has no knowledge of nor any say in but will ultimately be as effective as law here in the country. (so much for the legislative branch)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_track_(trade)
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33743.pdf <<CRS is the Congressional Research Service, a useful resource for anyone interested in policy matters
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/195858-white-hous...
(so much for the legislative branch)
I could say the same thing about the executive branch, which persons like yourself seem to think should merely administrate the legislative will. Our constitutional design institutionalizes tension between these two branches of government, and very explicitly grants the President power to make treaties, subject to a 2/3 approval from the Senate for ratification.
Trade agreements are not exactly the same as treaties, but there is ample precedent for Congress pre-emptively authorizing the President to negotiate them. The consitutional basis for this is discussed in some detail near the start of the CRS paper linked above.
[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014...
[2] http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2014/05/teen-dead-after...
[3] http://reason.com/blog/2014/02/15/yet-another-example-of-why...
As a matter of domestic law, that's not the case. Treaties are on the same level as federal legislation and the last in time controls. There are a series of court cases that disfavor implied abrogragation under comity principles, but if a later-in-time statute is in clear and unavoidable conflict with an earlier treaty, the statute controls.
In either case, there is zero domestic legal consequence to deciding to ignore the treaty provisions. Technically a decision by the executive branch to violate treaty provisions is a violation of federal law, but there are no consequences. Obviously, if the US decides to violate a treaty agreement there may well be international consequences, including other nations' decisions to back out of the treaty, to refuse to trust the US in other negotiations or treaties, etc. All of that, of course, is exactly the same regardless of whether or not there is a formal process of derogation.
[0] There's a third form of treaty, "sole executive". That form is applicable when the treaty obligations are entirely within the scope of presidential power, such as Status Of Forces Agreements which the president executes in his role as Commander-In-Chief. Those, of course, have no legal standing at all except as lawful orders from the president to his employees.
The US ignores various agreements it's signed all the time, and international conventions, etc.
So I'd say, you're right, but only because it's convenient for them to adhere to it.
1) The US often does not abide by things the way most other countries are expected to. If we want to back out, nobody can stop us, there will be no negative consequences, nobody is going to embargo or sanction the US over the matter. Is that fair? Of course not, but that's one of the 'perks' of being the lone superpower.
2) Everybody else will celebrate. Most people realize at this point that prohibition does not work very well in most of the world (countries like Japan being the freak outlier due to culture; but I'd argue even they would benefit from liberalized drug policies).
3) The rest of the world wants to tear down the failed war on drugs that the US initiated. They will be eager to welcome a shift in attitude from the US Government. Now that the people of the US want to tear down the failed war on drugs, that is exactly what will happen, slowly but surely. Nothing can stop it now, there has been a fundamental culture shift in the US over the last 20 years, and once that goes a direction, there is nothing that can stop it (see: gay marriage, women's suffrage, civil rights).
Furthermore, the drug policy boat in particular is very big. A lot of this policy, and the institutions implementing it, was developed in the 1980's and 1990's. In 1991, the consensus in favor of making marijuana illegal was an overwhelming 78-17. Being anti-drug was a political winner, something both sides of the aisle could get behind. Almost everyone old enough to have substantial leadership within the drug enforcement organizations grew up in an intensely anti-drug culture. It will take quite some time for those folks to age out of the system.
I am not an expert (anyone want to chime in?), however it seems right now, the industry does not seem to have any real monopolies and that individual dispensaries (which also have farms?) are making most of the money, rather than any corporations.