Comment by csandreasen | Hacker News Reader

Comment by csandreasen | Hacker News Reader

Parent Full thread

Thanks for the link to the video.

I think his argument makes sense (just speaking with regards to encryption - they brought up a couple of things in the discussion), but you have to keep in mind that he's arguing from a completely different perspective than most of the folks posting to HN. Whereas it's usually in the best interest for a private citizen to have all of the data on his/her device encrypted and only decryptable by him/her, it's not the same case for corporate or government data, which is a huge portion of the market.

Baker is arguing from the point of view that a large organization needs to be able to monitor what its employees are doing because they're legally responsible for anything that those employees may do. Imagine having to secure a network where you couldn't look at the logs due to privacy concerns; or figuring out which disgruntled employee is siphoning data off to a competitor; or responding to warrant/subpoena when one of your employees is suspected of committing a crime. You're not in a very good position if the only one who can decrypt the data is the end user.

Not to mention that there are also situations, particularly in government, where it's in the best interest of the public to be able to investigate a government official for wrongdoing. If their IT department can't get to their e-mails when the Inspector General comes knocking, what's to stop that official from just saying "Whoops, I forgot my password." ?

Why would these use cases need end to end encryption?

I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. I wasn't meaning to limit my argument to data in transit - I was also including data at rest.

To answer your question though, end-to-end encryption of data in transit will obviously interfere with an employer's ability to log transactions.

I think Mr. Baker's arguments were more directed at the recent ubiquitous iPhone encryption controversy (in fact, after doing a quick search, he made almost the exact same argument in the NY Times directed explicitly towards Apple[1], although I think his wording could be toned down slightly). Since the decryption mechanism on the iPhone is tied to chip inside it, it limits a company's ability to hand you a corporate iPhone and still be able to monitor what you're doing with it, hand it over to the cops, etc.

Baker makes the further argument that while Apple can encrypt everyone's data to the chagrin of the FBI and the federal government is unlikely to enact any laws preventing it or hindering sales, Apple will have a much harder time doing the same in certain foreign markets. A country like China will likely have much more political will to push Apple out of the market if their cops can't decrypt people's phones. Maybe that will ultimately be a good thing, but by trying to send a message to the US government they might be opening up a much larger can of worms overseas.

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/30/apple-vs-the...

Apple could just sell backdoored phones in China and encrypted phones in America.

Unless that data is at rest somewhere outside an organization's control, that still does not require end to end Enron with key escrow/recovery.

I think I misunderstood your initial question - the I (well, really, Stewart Baker) was trying to make was that selling devices which are automatically encrypted with keys that can't be escrowed by the owning company (like the new iPhones) isn't going to be very welcome in a corporate environment.

> end to end Enron

I think you meant "end to end encryption". I'm guessing you're typing that on iPhone :)

That was Android's auto-incorrect. Evidently Google doesn't think I need end to end encryption either!

I understand your point, but key escrow and most corporate use cases don't overlap. You are better off not managing user keys, with or without key escrow, and, instead, securing your links back to your infrastructure with a VPN and encrypting your storage to secure data at rest. Key escrow gives you no more protection, or access. It's just more complicated.

Key escrow, therefore, is only useful for spying on individuals' interpersonal communication, and Baker knows this very well.

Reply on news.ycombinator.com