(b) Both blog posts somewhat understate the problem. The adversarial examples given in the original paper aren't just classified differently than their parent image -- they're created to receive a specific classification. In the figure 5 of the arxiv version, for example, they show clear images of a school bus, temple, praying mantis, dog, etc, which all received the label "ostrich, Struthio camelus".
(c) The blog post at [1] wonders whether humans have similar adversarial inputs. Of course it's possible that we might, but I suspect that we have an easier time than these networks in part because: (i) We often get labeled data on a stream of 'perturbed' related inputs by observing objects in time. If I see a white dog in real life, I don't get just a single image of it. I get a series of overlapping 'images' over a period of time, during which time it may move, I may move, the lighting may change, etc. So in a sense, human experience already includes the some of the perturbations that ML techniques have to introduce manually to become more robust. (ii) We also get to take actions to get more/better perceptual data. If you see something interesting or confusing or just novel, you choose to focus on it, or get a better view because of that interestingness or novelty. The original paper talks about the adversarial examples as being in pockets of low probability. If humans encounter these pockets only rarely, it's because when we see something weird, we want to examine it, after which that particular pocket has higher probability.
[1] http://www.i-programmer.info/news/105-artificial-intelligenc...
[2] http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199 or http://cs.nyu.edu/~zaremba/docs/understanding.pdf