Why Arabs Lose Wars (1999)

meforum.org

8 points·simonsarris··4 comments

Fascinating, but I wondered what makes irregular Arab groups (such as ISIS) as well as non-Arab groups (such as the Kurds) relatively effective. For instance, are the "face" and trust issues between officers and their subordinates not present, or not relevant?

From the article:

> In contrast to the usual manner of European warfare which he terms "face to face," Keegan depicts the early Arab armies in the Islamic era as masters of evasion, delay, and indirection.12 Examining Arab warfare in this century leads to the conclusion that Arabs remain more successful in insurgent, or political warfare13—what T. E. Lawrence termed "winning wars without battles."14 Even the much-lauded Egyptian crossing of the Suez in 1973 at its core entailed a masterful deception plan. It may well be that these seemingly permanent attributes result from a culture that engenders subtlety, indirection, and dissimulation in personal relationships.

In other words, Arab guerrillas are effective but Arab armies are not. Which explains why Arab guerrillas (Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS) wield so much power in the region--there are no organized military forces that can effectively oppose them.

ISIS controls and actively governs large areas with large populations. It controls cities and employs tanks. It has invited muslims from the world over to move to its territory. None of these are guerilla tactics.

But they are no worse than the established governments of Iraq and Syria at running a regular army, while also employing guerrilla tactics.

Guerrilla warfare isn't enough, by itself, to win a protracted conflict. You need some regular forces too. I remember reading that very conclusion in Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare", actually.

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