I was, of course, talking about the JavaScript DOM API: https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DOM
This could easily be changed/fixed in browsers without changing anything about js.
It'd be nice to be able to specify in a <script> tag if you want a new js execution context setup, and also what access you want to give that script to your own execution context.
For example, maybe:
<script src=http://widgetmaker.com/wm.js newContext=true permissions="modifyDom:false,readNamespace=false,passMessages=true">
<script src=http://hitcounter.com newContext=true permissions="NONE">
With such a scheme, everything is executing in completely separate contexts, with clear permissions about their interactions. Some script messes with the Object constructor? only affects its own execution context.
Saying a blanket "js must die" isn't really understanding the issues, as they are actually in browsers, not js.
It's like saying python/perl/etc is an insecure language and must die, because it usually shares the same filesystem between processes.
It's the browser that allows 20 scripts from different domains all come together in the same execution context each with full permission to do anything.
No, it's not, because well-formed, valid Javascript code is permitted to depend on this execution model.
The decision to combine 20 <script> sources into the same execution context is the BROWSERS decision. NOT javascripts.
It's the BROWSER that doesn't have any concept of allowing <script> fine grained permissions within the execution context, or specifying you'd prefer if the browser put that script in a separate execution context.
It's the BROWSER that needs fixing here, not js.
JavaScript in a browser runs in the global namespace of the WINDOW, which is defined by the DOM API. Remember that JavaScript, on its own, is a headless language, with no I/O of any kind. It relies on the runtime environment to provide it with scope, context, and i/o, among other things.
Moreover, you can easily "fake" private members/functions/etc by using closures. (Yay!)
It also adds a layer of decision making on the part of a web designer. I believe it would be better to alter the language so that these global problems are eliminated at the language level. Because any decision making about the execution context are likely to cause problems themselves because people make all sorts of mistakes and they would have to understand what it means.
I think this sums it up really. People make mistakes and make insecure software. Whatever language it is. I fail to see how swapping out js for anything else would solve anything. It's all pretty moot also, since it'd never happen.
The JSON attack again, isn't any inherent insecurity in the language, just in the way it is used within browsers.
Lets improve browser security rather than focusing on a language which has pretty much nothing to do with security issues. None of the examples you give had anything to do with the core javascript language. They were all about how it is used in the context of browsers.
Just to get this straight, one of your arguments is that since some browsers apparently execute the javascript inside css "url('javascript:...", the solution is to change javascript for some other language? Do you understand how ridiculous that seems?
Fine. You seem to have something odd and bizarre against the language. Good luck to you and your quest.
You also don't seem to realize that swapping out js for some other language would mean exactly the same security issues, unless you actually fixed those security issues where they are - in the BROWSER.
If you would like to learn about the language, I'd recommend "O'Reilly Definitive Javascript". Also checkout Rhino.
It's not "odd and bizarre" - it's a belief that the language is fundamentally unsuitable for the things that people insist upon using it for, and reasonably well supported by my own experiences of the language, as well as the reported experiences of others.
> You also don't seem to realize that swapping out js for some other language would mean exactly the same security issues, unless you actually fixed those security issues where they are - in the BROWSER.
I take it you didn't read my reasonably concrete proposals for the use of proof carrying code? It becomes a largely mechanical process to verify that the browser and the language implement "security" in a sensible way at that point.
> If you would like to learn about the language, I'd recommend "O'Reilly Definitive Javascript". Also checkout Rhino.
Thanks. If you would like to learn about Horse and Pony care, I recommend "BHS Complete Horse and Pony Care".
Change browsers to use separate execution contexts for each <script> tag, and specify permissions about what they can and can't do to the containing context.
<script> tags are not part of the js language.
It's outside of the scope of javascript. It's the Browser security model that needs toughening up.
<script>
var a = "hello, world";
</script>
<script>
doSomething(a);
</script>
Once again, I (recursively) refer you to this comment:
You're well aware we're talking about <script> tags when used to load external source from other domains, so your example above is pretty irrelevant.
Good luck on your quest to rid the world of javascript!
Really, I don't understand the hostility here. Surely this is a worthwhile discussion to have? Either we can establish that it's not a problem that needs fixing, or we can establish that something needs fixing, and identify where it is.
Implying that I'm on some kind of vendetta just because I disagree with you about the source and nature of the flaws in javascript seems a little bit juvenile. These are genuinely-held opinions, and I'd appreciate it if you would not assume that I'm being disingenuous just because I disagree with you.
I, for one, remain totally unimpressed by these accusations of insecurity. They don't seem like a big deal at all.
Lazy and/or incompetent programmers will always find a way to write insecure code.
Why? Just have them in a separate execution context, and give them specific permissions... eg you can mess with the DOM, but only within this specific element, you can pass me messages, you can't access my execution context etc etc.
Such fine grained permissions would allow everything that goes on already, and disallow things you don't want to happen.
I agree though, the 'brokenness' is being vastly overplayed here. js isn't "broken", browsers aren't "broken", they just need improving, which is happening.