Reverse-engineering censorship in China
sciencemag.org
sciencemag.org
A great example of this is cases where chat clients use client-side censorship lists; in this case you can extract the entire list and essentially have a rich source of words the Chinese government is concerned about. For example (following on some excellent work by CitizenLab [1]), I recently extracted the LINE IM client's list of banned words [2].
The entries there are fascinating to read through; you get the feeling that there's a whole story behind many of them that's waiting to be told. Take for example, "江蟾蜍", which Google Translate glosses as "river toad". It turns out that this refers to an incident where a large inflatable toad was placed in Beijing's Yuyuantan Park [3], which someone then realized looked like former president Jiang Zemin.
I'm hoping to do more research reverse engineering Chinese censorship lists, hopefully even finding ways to efficiently probe server-side lists as well.
[1] https://citizenlab.org/2013/11/asia-chats-investigating-regi...
[2] http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~brendan/line.txt
[3] http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/river-crabbed-toad-stor...
It discusses the topic of banned phrases like "river toad". In many cases what's happening is Chinese citizens find ways around the censors by searching for homonyms and other permutations of censored topics. Some of them are quite hilarious.
[1] http://www.amazon.com/Age-Ambition-Chasing-Fortune-Truth-ebo...
"Criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are routinely published, whereas posts with collective action potential are much more likely to be censored—regardless of whether they are for or against the state (two concepts not previously distinguished in the literature). Chinese people can write the most vitriolic blog posts about even the top Chinese leaders without fear of censorship, but if they write in support of or opposition to an ongoing protest—or even about a rally in favor of a popular policy or leader—they will be censored."
Yes, what a dictatorial regime most fears is concerted, fearless action, not just talk. Taiwan's largely peaceful transformation to free and fair elections, a free press, and general protection of civil rights came about only after there was an organized opposition (the 黨外 movement) counteracting decades of attempts by the former dictatorship to suppress the development of independent civil society organizations. The eventual transformation in China will most likely take the same form. The regime is trying to delay that transformation.
Reading on what demonstrations of popular support for specific figures within a notionally unified establishment became during the Cultural Revolution is helpful in understanding the present leadership's paranoia here.
That last bit of censorship they have there just helps to curb some protests; the USA version of that is to let people communicate about the protest, so it blows larger, but then bring in the National Guard.
I've personally seen social media posts with any mention of events like Tiananmen or political leaders blocked (often automatically by software), and a Chinese friend discovered she couldn't text the number '64' around June 4th (she was actually trying to send an address).
You can try it for yourself on a site like Renren (www.renren.com), just try posting something with the words 天安门 (Tiananmen), 习近平 (Xi Jinping, China's current President), or 周永康 (Zhou Yongkang, former PSC member).
The Chinese version of Skype (actually Skype, not a clone) even blocks words like 'fuck' (see: http://www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf)