If someone random had written this, I would have just dismissed this as yet another pseudoscientific idiot.
Now, since it is written by Schopenhaur, I feel it is in order to say that same thing, but with more words.
>Thus, for anything to be empirically real, it must be spatial, temporal, and causal.
I disagree with this. Entanglement, while not causing a breakdown in causuality, doesn't really obey it either. I would still consider it very real.
>Yet space, time, and causality cannot be proven to be empirically real themselves!
Well ok, with you definition of "real" they may not be. So?
>In the first case, there would have to be something 'outside' space, a metaspace, which is an absurd notion;
Ok, first I disagree that there would have to be something outside. And second I disagree that that would be an absurd notion. And third I disagree that it really matters at all. A scientist would switch viewpoint depending on which would be most convinient for the task at hand. Same as people use a coordinate system based that makes a problem the easiest to solve.
>but in the second case it could never be differentiated of anything and would therefore have no identity.
I'm not really sure what he is saying here, but I note that I could differentiate a metaspace from an apple. I don't really see why the lack of an identity (whatever that means) would be a significant problem.
>If time is finite, there would have to be something 'before' and 'after' it,
Eh, just no.
>but if it is infinite, it would take an eternity to arrive at the present moment, which therefore could never come about.
This is a little bit tricky. There are two different notions of infinity we need to distinguish. The first is two points in time with an infinity distance between them. The second is a backwards infinite ray.
Ordinary coordinate systems have the second kind of infinity and work just fine. This is the kind Schopenhaur is talking about. The first type of infinity is more uncommon, but there is nothing in principle saying we can't have that either.
>Finite causality would enhance an unimaginable 'first cause'
That says more about his imagination than the it does about the universe.