This is absolutely terrible. Your network should be secure, even if you tell everyone how it's done, and reluctance to do so makes it very likely it's not secure.
Here's Steve Bellovin's thoughts on this:
'The subject of security through obscurity comes up frequently. I think a lot of the debate happens because people misunderstand the issue. It helps, I think, to go back to Kerckhoffs's second principle, translated as "The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble," Kerckhoff said neither "publish everything" nor "keep everything secret"; rather, he said that the system should still be secure even if the enemy has a copy.
In other words – design your system assuming that your opponents know it in detail. (A former official at NSA's National Computer Security Center told me that the standard assumption there was that serial number 1 of any new device was delivered to the Kremlin.) After that, though, there's nothing wrong with trying to keep it secret – it's another hurdle factor the enemy has to overcome. (One obstacle the British ran into when attacking the German Enigma system was simple: they didn't know the unkeyed mapping between keyboard keys and the input to the rotor array.) But – don't rely on secrecy.'
On the other hand, if it is my information you are securing and if I don't have good reasons to trust you, I want to know how it is being done, even if that means attackers also know. If everyone is your client (for example, if you provide public services), then everyone must know, so they can independently audit the system.
Obscurity can be a layer of security in one system, made ,managed and audited by trusted entities, but, generally speaking, it is a weak layer for a attacker with a great enough motivation.
On the other hand, obscurity is detrimental to a collective of systems made, managed and audited (or not) by a great variety of entities. Sure, on the real world we place trust on companies to handle their security well, but that has ended badly in the past. The knee jerk reaction to security through obscurity we have is beneficial because it is a symptom of security issues in the system.
In conclusion, regarding obscurity, the beneficial effect of an extra security layer is only greater than the potential malefic effect of hiding security problems if the entities behind it, including the auditor, are competent and trustworthy. As a rule of thumb it should be avoided or have its bad side mitigated by independent security audits.
Interviewee: "sigh. There are multiple layers of blah-blah, with foobar authentication schemes. That's all the detail I'm prepared to go into."
<Reporter writes down, "tight-lipped about security">
AT&T and Tata don't owe you an explanation just because you think that's the way the world should work. Such an explanation takes time away from doing other things, all so only a tiny fraction of a percentage of the world population can actually understand what was said.
That's not how things work
But this is F1, everything is a secret. F1 teams go to crazy lengths to keep anything that could be an advantage to themselves (ex: Mercedes mass-damper, Red Bull double-diffuser). I would suspect that there is a very strict NDA as part of supplying the communications to each team.
there's a difference between relying on obscurity, and publishing all of your designs of a private system.
the underlying design principle being promoted is to assume that your design specification has been compromised - not to compromise it yourself.
Remember: disagreement should not lead to downvotes, it should lead to a reasoned reply. The reason for a downvote is when a comment detracts from the discussion, and I can't imagine how the parent post could be viewed that way.