US Sought Permission to Change Historical Record of a Public Court Proceeding
eff.org
eff.org
> IN FACT, THE SUPREME COURT DELINEATED PRECISELY HOW
> THE PROGRAM OPERATES. AND IT IS A TARGETED PROGRAM. IT IS A
> PROGRAM THAT IS TARGETED AT SPECIFIC SELECTORS, THAT IS PHONE
> NUMBERS OR EMAIL ACCOUNTS.
This person doesn't have an understanding of how selectors work. He doesn't realize that you can't decide if something is a phone number or an email account until you have already taken a look at it. This is the level on which they argue. They trick people into thinking that you can put a bunch of selectors in one bag and have only matching communications magically appear in a second one, circumventing the obvious constutional issue of collecting everything. But gravity is still in effect, so anyone with a basic understanding realizes that you can't get to (2) without having taken step (1).
> IT IS NOT BULK META DATA COLLECTION.
> IT'S A TARGETED COMMUNICATION SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
> AGAINST NON U.S. PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.
You're not sure if he is just ignorant or feigning ignorance. And the problem is that it might just work. It brings back memories to the Java APIs case where the career lawyer argued a trivial three line Java code Google copied verbatim constituted copyright infringement. He didn't know, of course, what he was talking about. There was no mental framework for him to realize the sheer stupidity on display.
And yes, it is a very entertaining read:
> WE'VE SAID THIS FROM THE BEGINNING, YOUR HONOR. > IT'S A SOMEWHAT AWKWARD POSITION FOR US TO BE STANDING > HERE TRYING TO ARGUE THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO KEEP > INFORMATION WE DIDN'T THINK THEY SHOULD COLLECT IN THE > FIRST PLACE.
... yet another $25 donation just went out your way, EFF. Keep it up ;)
edit: > THE COURT: MY VACUUM THEORY THAT NATURE AND LAWYERS HATE A VACUUM WHEN GIVEN A CHANCE TO -- > MS. COHN: IT'S TRUE. MY CAT HATES THE VACUUM, TOO.
If the gov't had a guy at the post office collecting specific people's mail, would the fact that he's looking at the address on all the mail be considered a search?
Even if on a technical level at one point all traffic is on RAM on some machine of the NSA, if they're not actually keeping it or looking at it in any real sense (beyond specific meta-data stuff that isn't stored), then I find it hard to consider that equivalent to actually storing the trafic.
The argument that they could easily switch it to do wholesale collection is pretty irrelevant in the courts.
I don't know if its being stored, I agree that it shouldn't be.
But so many people in this thread seem to imply it is impossible to filter a stream of information without storing the entire stream. This is very disingenuous, and is about as true as saying that it's impossible to have cops camping out for a guy with a specific license plate because they'll have to look at every car, and so they'll have to memorise all of them.
This obviously depends on the selectors, but we're talking about online filtering here, guys. Its possible to imagine a situation where not every single piece of data is stored.
EDIT: Note that the purported benefits of these collections programs (according to many of the slides) is that the selectors can be determined after the fact. So they must be keeping data somewhere.
Which, interestingly enough, the process of recording and storing license plate numbers for various uses is already in play. Both by private and public agencies.
(1) We do not know what the NSA is doing (2) We cannot trust what they say they are doing, because they are perfectly willing to lie about it.
This is where Congress is supposed to kick in (and Congress does spend a lot of time creating legislation when the judicial system doesn't have the tools to do what's "right"), either through FOIA-style legislation or legislating a restructuring of the NSA or whatever.
And this sort of "well we can't trust the gov't to follow any of the rules anyways" discussion is pointless, counterproductive, and false. Courts have countlessly told the "government" (which is really just the executive) to do things it didn't want to do. The system is working, and this is part of the process.
It is true that in some cases the courts do, in fact, tell the government they can or cannot do this or that. But I think the problem being referred to is when the "government" does things within a veil of secrecy so that the courts aren't even aware of the problem. Never mind the fact that the government creates a "court" to validate their procedures that itself is kept secret as part of the overall secrecy. In those cases I wouldn't say the discussion is pointless, counterproductive, and false.
I can't find his talk online, so I'll just attempt to summarize one of his points. Basically, he said that in 2000-2001, he had developed SIGINT algorithms for selectively monitoring communications of the "bad guys", within some low n-degrees of separation. He also put in protections to make sure that the identities of all targets were encrypted, until proper legal process allowed the NSA to decrypt them (I was unclear who held the keys). He said that his superiors happily implemented his solution, but stripped it of all selective monitoring logic and identity encryption. That was the event that caused him to decide to become a whistleblower.
(He also ridiculed the NSA's defense that it's too hard to separate domestic communications from foreign ones, since, after all, the IP addresses and phone numbers can be disambiguated by simply looking at the first couple digits.)
So, in short, according to William Binney, the NSA is absolutely engaging in non-targeted, bulk data collection.
I think they understand they are just pushing an alternate view of reality (and interpretation of surveillance, search and so on terms). The idea they run with is unless a human looks at the data, it is not a search or seizure so Constitutional protections don't take effect.
The agency(ies) / DOJ developed a strategy to explain away the Constitutional protections. They can even store the data! and they do that, and it still doesn't count as "anti-Constitutional".
Maybe later you do something suspicious, like participate in some protest -- then you are labeled a terrorist, i.e. person of interest. They get a warrant even (to be legit and all) and do a search for everything you ever did online since, well forever. Maybe you watched some bomb making video on youtube when you were in college. Aha so there you go, "terrorist with interests in building weapons of mass destruction". Congratulations, you've leveled up in the terrorist watch list. And so on. You get the idea.
Notice this:
> AND THAT THE FIRST STEP JUST DOESN'T MATTER OR DOESN'T COUNT OR SHOULDN'T HAVE ANY STANDING.
Government lawyers are not stupid. They know exactly what they are doing. They are deliberately talking past the others' point. They don't want the other side to focus on what "shouldn't be focused on" -- the idea that bulk collection constitutes search. If it is, then billions of dollars of training, equipment, promotions, programs, etc etc disappear in a cloud of smoke. Bulk surveillance and sucking up of information (and definitely storage) must persist unchallenged at all costs -- that is their position.
I think there's also the fact that realising something is a phone number of an email account might not be considered a search, in the "expectation of privacy" sense.
If you send postal mail, you expect the contents not to be looked at by the mailman, but do you expect the fact that you sent a letter to be private?
Now, "common sense" might dictate otherwise, but Smith Vs. Maryland is the precedent, and the Courts don't think the fact that you're calling someone (and even who you're calling) to be private. So looking at whether its a phone number or email might also not be expected to be "private" information, even if the contents are.
>Maybe later you do something suspicious, like participate in some protest -- then you are labeled a terrorist, i.e. person of interest. They get a warrant even (to be legit and all) and do a search for everything you ever did online since, well forever.
That's not how evidence works. The gov't isn't authorised to collect everyone's info, so even if they have it on hand (a point the gov't disputes in this case), they don't necessarily have the write to use it.
One of the points of the gov't in the case is that the EFF is arguing that the filtering is a two step process : collect all data, then filter it. But the EFF doesn't know that's actually how things are happening, and it might not be. So the lawyers are actually refuting the plantiff's main line of reasoning.
This case is not about the core of the law, it's about implementation details. Ones that we do not know.
EFF directly points to (multiple times) that the NSA had a specific redefinition of the word 'collect', did you miss it?
Evidence? My concern isn't using said data for evidence if you are accused of a crime. My concern is the use of this data in a non-legal manner for purposes beyond my control. These uses range from mundane stupid crap all the way to the worst paranoia of the biggest conspiracy theorists. Doesn't matter at what level it is, any level beyond the current publicly available law that we have been allowed to know about is too far to me.
Plus, all it takes is some national emergency for the government to give itself permission to waive that whole warrant thing. You know, to save us all from something.
But the contents of it are being copied and stored. That's the danger. They claim that because no human is looking at it, it's still OK, but of course a human could look at it in the future if you're suspected of something.
So if you become a political activist or an enemy of someone with access to the data, they can get dirt on you. They can even manufacture dirt on you by taking things you say out of context.
Reminder to donate to the EFF: https://supporters.eff.org/donate
when it was over, the government secretly, and surprisingly sought permission to “remove” classified information from the transcript, and even indicated that it wanted to do so secretly, so the public could never even know that they had done so.
So if this has ever been done in the past, there is of course no record of it.
Of course, the very nature of such a change renders it undiscoverable. Who knows how many records have been changed and records of that change been expunged.
Curious: we have laws against "attempted murder", are there any laws against "attempted illegal redaction of court proceedings" that can be applied here? My concern is that there is no deterrent to this being attempted again, perhaps in a context that is less visible, and less ably defended, than in this case.
I don't think that's correct.
It's inevitable that juries can effectively decide law, but it is not their purpose or role.
"Change," he called it.
[0]: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21610332-election-satir...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6fnfVJzZT4 http://www.cnet.com/news/obama-no-warrantless-wiretaps-if-yo...
When I look back at US History, the really big changes in society/law required a significant uprising of the people.
There might be a political price to pay for changing it, but President Obama has absolute authority to end programs like this. He chooses not to. Unlike most of hn, I don't really mind, but you shouldn't let him off the hook so easily. The executive powers of the President are substantial, and they're one of the things you should think about when choosing someone to fill the office.
There is a famous story about activists meeting with Franklin Roosevelt. He listened to them and then said "I agree with you. I want to do it. But you must make me do it."
What he meant is that serious political change must come from the bottom up. It must arise from the obvious wishes of the population in order to carry enough legitimacy to make it through the democratic system.
The fact is that not everyone in the U.S. feels the way we do about the NSA's activities and the Snowden leaks that revealed them. In fact, it's a near even split, although sentiment seems to be moving our way.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/15/nsa-coverage...
>The government's attempt to change this history was unprecedented.
How does the EFF know this was unprecedented? If there had been a precedent, wouldn't it be hidden?
I would expect the EFF to avoid statements that seem naive, even while I appreciate what they do.
[1] http://www.dailydot.com/news/twitter-tracks-supreme-court-ch...
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/final-word-on-us-law-is...
Given the exorbitant fees the PACER system charges, I doubt anyone, even the EFF, could afford to find such a case out of all the federal court cases.
-- George Orwell, 1984, Part 1, Chapter 7
You know, like git rebase and amending history.
DO NOT REBASE COMMITS THAT YOU HAVE PUSHED TO A PUBLIC REPOSITORY.
-- Pro Git, 3.6 - Rebasing