The Fed suckered IBM into a failing cloud strategy?
cringely.com
cringely.com
The joke around the office was that we'd replace one person locally with three people overseas, losing the output of two people, since the three overseas people were so clueless they'd need a local person holding their hands full-time. I was doing microprocessor design at the time, and the community is small enough that everyone know that Intel was getting good folks overseas. But even at the reduced wages outside the U.S., IBM was cutting corners and not hiring the best people.
Even locally, they try to reduce costs. A friend of mine who stuck around long enough to make it into management told me that they try to keep salaries at about the 40%-ile to save costs. On finding that out (as well as a few other gems), he left. Until I heard that, I couldn't figure why brilliant friends of mine often got raises that didn't even cover inflation. Don't they know that people are going to leave because of that? They know, and that's their strategy.
The thing about Bernanke comes out of left field. IBM didn't use low interest rates to invest therefore "the companies that were expected to spend us back to better economic health didn’t do so" therefore low interest rates didn't make the recession less severe than it otherwise would have been? No comment on whether or not those last two statements are actually true (I'm not an economist and haven't studied the issue), but Cringley certainly doesn't make a case for them.
When the financial gimmicks run out, IBM is absolutely screwed because they've been cannibalizing their most valuable asset for short term shareholder value.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Druckenmiller
When he speaks, he's probably worth listening to.
If productivity doesn't drop, why not telecommute 50%?
Investing in your own shares doesn't lead to growth like capital investment does, it's just more money at rest. Low interest rates improved the recession through improving the stock market - through 'trickle-down'. That's why the stock market can be raging while the larger economy is in the crapper.
So low interest rates can simultaneously make the recession less severe than it otherwise would have been, yet make the growth potential of the economy worse.
There are impacts to this policy. By borrowing to buy back equity, you are increasing the chance of distress. You don't increase your cash position, but you do increase the amount of interest payments you have to it. (Albeit less due to the low rate environment) This means it is more difficult to bet on anything that isn't a sure thing.
That said, perhaps this is the best way for shareholders to wind down a company that can no longer innovate. At some point, large companies can cease to be innovative, and cease to profitably handle acquisitions. Then what? Especially if you're too big to be bought out yourself.
There are two options... One - Split yourself up and sell the parts to the highest bidders. Two - Buy back the shares. Shrinking the outstanding shareholder base will increase the per-share value even if the total corporate value is flat. Rather than waste money on innovation (if you can't) or M&A (if you overpay and underintegrate) better to give it back to the shareholders and let them invest capital in companies that can grow.
Borrowing to buy back shares is just taking case #2 to the extreme, and ultimately passing the buck to the long term bond holders.
An oversimplified way to look at it... Let's say a company has 1 million share worth $100, $50 of which is sitting in cash, and wants to return half the value to the shareholders.
One way to do this is via a dividend. Each share is now worth $50, and each shareholder has $50 in cash. (No net gain or loss, but the shareholders can do what they want with the money - the capital is freed)
Alternatively, they can buy back 500,000 shares. Each of the remaining shares is worth the same amount, but $500K of new shares is released to new uses. Same net value as above. No new value is created or left behind, it's just the dividend gives a partial payment on each share, while the buyback gives a full payment on some of the shares.
What IBM does is borrow money rather than pay cash, because they can deduct the interest payments on the debt. (This violates one of the assumptions on the MM theorem)
[0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modigliani%E2%80%93Miller_theor...
It's a good piece, even if you don't share Stockman's view of the US economy and its impending doom http://seekingalpha.com/article/2324315-the-implosion-is-nea...
If other major companies are doing the same thing as IBM (seems likely), then it's the best explanation I've seen for the stock market boom over the last couple years. There has to be a way to incentivise these companies to create real, long-term value over short-term stock price manipulation.
In theory, some people need fixed income instruments (say insurance companies) so there is a market for it.
If the people with risk capital want to place it on smaller more innovative companies, why not?
But it overlooks a core problem that IBM faces. The cloud is a competitive platform for problems that previously required mainframes. They successfully defended (kinda) against Oracle/Sun in areas like running large banks and stock exchanges.
What happens to IBM when you can solve hard real-time transaction problems on 1000 loosely-coupled distributed computers instead of 1 large mainframe (made up of a 1000 processors with shared state)? That day is either here or close.
My take is that they can't ignore the cloud but they can't win it either. Tough place to be.
You can scale up to a huge extent just with average x86 servers now and these are competing with what used to be done on a mainframe. So even many companies who don't or can't use distributed systems don't need to use IBM any more.
Consider Hadoop. I know of at two major DB2 customer who are investing in Hadoop rather than expanding their DB2 capabilities to handle problems IBM would love to solve with their solutions.
This mainframe strategy for IBM will keep many of their legacy customers, but as Cringley and others point out, it fails to capture new growth.
Further, a big chunk of IBM's server business is running its own Unix. That market is also in decline, and easier to switch away from. See http://www.itjungle.com/tfh/tfh030314-story06.html
So, I don't know about the last few years, but I think IBM can ride the mainframe money train for years to come. My point was simply that it's not going to drive any growth.
IBM used to be able to charge $1 million just to install its top-level mainframe OS (before rental charges) and C cost $1,500 a day. I expect those days have gone ;-)
- move on to cloud technology or other newer technologies to stay relavent
- don't want to move back to mainframe since they see less jobs for them
- there are almost no junior level candidates for mainframe roles. Most candidates will have 10-20+ years of experience. It's extremely rare to find anyone less than 5.
It is true that legacy systems aren't going anywhere anytime soon. But as time goes on there's a high cost in finding people that can maintain those systems.
One way Google kicked the ass of their competition was to radically their cost of computing through smart use of commodity hardware. It seemed like a small thing, but it gave them a lasting advantage, because nobody could afford to deliver the same search features.
Given IBM's deep pockets and deep experience with hardware, I'd think there must be some strategy there that would let them create cloud computing infrastructure with radically lower cost than the competition. We regular people are stuck with off-the-shelf colocation setups, off-the-shelf hardware, off-the-shelf processors, and off-the-shelf software. IBM can afford to change any of that from scratch. Any of it.
I just can't believe that, less than 10 years into the cloud computing era, we have already happened upon the optimum approach.
IBM has been the high-cost supplier for almost 100 years, so the idea that it will out-innovate and undercut Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the cloud is an interesting one. Especially as both Microsoft and Google have much deeper pockets and are approaching IBM in annual turnover. (IBM used to have 70% of the IT business. Fairly soon, it won't even be in the top 5.)
That's not the same as doing removing every other light bulb in the building (which is what Lucent did at Bell-Labs!)
Fed policy affects things by changing the aggregates. But stock ownership can never change in the aggregate. If you have extra money and you buy some stock, for every dollar you spent buying stocks, someone else now a has a dollar from selling you the stocks. A common myth is that money can go "into" an asset class. It cannot. It's impossible for extra money to end up invested in stocks in aggregate, because for every buyer there must be a seller. Individually, you may have less money, but that's balanced by someone else having even more money now. Stock sales will never change the aggregate money supply nor aggregate investment nor total stock ownership. So what is cringely saying here?
I'd appreciate if anyone could explain the logic. I don't want to pre-judge, but my suspicion is that monetary policy is a subtle issue and that blaming the Fed is fun, both of which lead to mistakes such as this one.
(In fairness, perhaps the author means to say that specifically IBM used low interest rates to buy stock and not that businesses generally did this. That is a charitable interpretation that makes more sense and deviates only a little from what was actually written.)
"It's impossible for extra money to end up invested in stocks in aggregate, because for every buyer there must be a seller."
If I buy a share for $1, and then a year later sell it for $10, then the new buyer is putting $9 extra dollars into that asset class.
A year later, if person A sells a share for $10, then another person must buy a share for $10.
At all times, someone is always holding the money created by the Fed. The money never "went in" to stocks. Sure, the valuation of the stocks changed, but the aggregate money supply and the aggregate stock ownership never changed.
In 2008 when everyone started selling their stocks, the Fed had to create massive amounts of money to match the appreciation of the stocks that were being sold. Thus, because the money supply grew in that situation, people said money was "coming out of" stocks. In reality it was value coming out of stocks, and the money was being created by the Fed. So think of it as shorthand for what's really happening.
I think what often links stock prices with demand for money is risk preferences. If stocks become more volatile (which they tend to do while falling), investors deleverage. This deleveraging reduces the velocity of money and thereby increases the demand for cash. If unchecked, this will cause deflation and requires the Fed to create more money in response.
Every seller is matched by a buyer at the same price!
I think you are making claims without thinking them all the way through. Let's go through an example:
Imagine there is a company with 1,000 shares. Alice buys a share from Bob for $100. This trade implicitly values the company at $100,000. Later, Carol buys a share from Dave for $50. This new trade implicitly values the company at $50,000.
The value of the company fluctuated by $50,000, but if you look at every trade, an equal number of dollars and shares were exchanged on each side. Alice lost $100 of money while Bob gained $100 of money. Carol lost $50 of money while Dave gained $50 of money.
No money "came out" of the stock.
The aggregate stock ownership stayed the same: 1,000 shares were owned both before and after.
The aggregate money supply stayed the same: $150 were in people's pockets both before and after.
The only thing that changed was the market consensus of the price of the company. The bottom line is that price changes of an asset class don't mean money is being soaked or released. Individual ownership can change, but aggregate ownership cannot.
Does that sound reasonable? I hope this conversation is helpful for people reading this comment thread.
Edit to add: My point is that the total value of the stock market fluctuates over time. If every sale is zero-sum, how are such fluctuations possible?
I see that the author needed some connective tissue between the bit about The Fed and IBM's cloud plans but any IBMer/ex-IBMer can tell you they're out of touch. The disagreement is about when they lost it.
Most, including this author, will point to whenever the domain they're experts in was mismanaged to hell. But IBM will keep on trucking right past their foray into "the cloud," constantly chasing the latest fads, and letting older divisions wither and die because nobody in charge understand the tech domain well enough to salvage them.
You could argue low rates force the hand of some firms - the stock buyback argument made sense in the article and had me following. How a strategic decision like "Cloud is where we're going as a company" can be traced to the Fed? That's where I lose the thread. What if they had decided on another investment area? Would you be writing the same article? Would one write an "The Fed suckered Amazon into a successful cloud strategy" article?
But I do think cheap money has let IBM coast a little. Our business culture has a theory, one I think mainly dumb, that if we tie executive rewards to stock prices, they'll do good things for their companies. In this case, cheap money lets them get paid without doing anything useful.
What I do know is that IBM seems to be the #2 advertiser on TV and in magazines after that stupid gecko.
It is trying more and more to be like those Indian outsourcers like Wipro and Infosys, but the difference is that Wipro and Infosys pay the CEO at Indian rates and spend customer money on solving customer problems rather than sponsoring tennis and golf tournaments.
I work for an enterprise doing WebSphere & I'm scared to see it go one day actually -- will be cool if it cheapens to the point where it is equivalent to an open source tech but I think its the proprietary nature that got it to where it is. Pretty big learning curve but it is rock-solid and would be quite an upgrade from a lot of the scripting lang stacks if it were to hit the world at large.
Coming from RoR it feels like moving from a toy plane to a Harrier jet.
Obviously it is a bit opinionated & works best when you code specifically for the APIs/standards it is currently attempting to embrace, but the all the open source scripting tools I've used are way more opinionated. I like WAS's take because I often find that it's exposing services that I don't even know about until I eventually need them. And it's not a lot of bloaty junk, it's essential JavaEE interfaces/protocols.
I'll admit it took a while to grow on me and we have fantastic hardware...
I'm sure a comparable stack can be made from open source components though and there are other companies who do the pre-packaged stack approach, I know. But WebSphere is kinda convenient and nicely integrated is all I mean. After spending a ton of time chasing down gem dependency conflict/upgrade issues using package managers in Ruby, I'm kindof impressed with the prescription full-stack. It's just like having a corp do all the dependency/interop checks so you don't have to. Limiting in a way but reduces a lot of friction.
1. http://www.amazon.com/IBM-Holocaust-Strategic-Alliance-Corpo...
(As in, I really don't understand why he keeps getting posted on HN, not just some throwaway insult)
(And yes, I'm doing the same thing with this very comment)
The people buying IBM x86 servers were people who were already snookered into buying POWER or Mainframe systems.
Earnings per share should be a natural byproduct of excelling in your market.