Why not?
EDIT: Serious question. If I save two lives that is twice as good as saving one, right? Why is this situation different?
Why not?
EDIT: Serious question. If I save two lives that is twice as good as saving one, right? Why is this situation different?
Most people measure goodness and badness by how they feel about it, and for anyone who feels a significant amount of badness (grief, anger, whatever) at the death of a single person, it is physiologically impossible for them to feel a million times worse about the death of a million people. It's intuitively obvious to most people, therefore, that suffering, annoyance, life-saving, and so on, are not additive: they just have to check how they feel about the situation to know that.
In order to suggest that they are additive, and that N "people annoyed" can outweigh M "people suffering", you have to first convince someone that how their own internal measurement of goodness (how they feel about it) is not as accurate as some external measurement.
Which is true. But requires a willingness to counter one's own intuition when encountering contradictory evidence. Unfortunately the type of person that does that is uncommon.
"The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate, without further ado, to see who is right." -Leibniz
Unfortunately we retain some ignorance on the correct nature of utility functions (finite? time-preference adjusted? etc.), and terminal values for humans are demonstrably arbitrary.
I think these are the two points that those skeptical of utilitarianism have trouble with: it's exactly that it doesn't seem to match experience that started this thread. Additionally, it doesn't actually seem to work well in practice: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2014/07/the_argument_fr_...
... then LW ends up with Roko's Basilisk.
Really, you're using that as your answer to "I don't disagree with what you actually said, but your choice of analogy suggests that you believe that questions of morality are settled and have obvious, objective answers." You can prove anything if you first make it an axiom.
You can't seriously claim that utilitarianism accurately captures human moral intuitions. Variations on the Repugnant Conclusion occur immediately to anyone told about utilitarianism, and are discussed in first-year philosophy right there when utilitarianism is introduced.
LessWrong routinely has discussion articles showing some ridiculous or horrible consequence of utilitarianism. The usual failure mode is to go "look, this circumstance leads to a weird conclusion and that's very important!" and not "gosh, perhaps naive utilitarianism taken to an extreme misses something important."
Each individual has a tolerance of what they can comfortably cope with. If 3^^^3 people were all experiencing a pain that is below that tolerance, nobody would be prevented from happiness. However in the other situation, the tortured individual clearly would be.
Empathic "strangers" help others, in many contexts, often at personal risk.
That's what separates humans from singularitarian quantum computing devices.
First day, let a speck of dust enter your eye, at noon. Before sleeping, write down how you feel about that event.
Next day, rip your balls off at noon. Before sleeping, write down how you feel about that.