Nazi-ism is a bit of a bad example, because it's a master plan that, once adopted, went mostly as planned. It was evil, very obviously, but if anything it speaks against the idea that High Modernism is always doomed to fail in implementing its abstract designs.
To your main point: I would go a step further, and say that governments and organizations "bite off more than they can chew" because it's fundamentally impossible for individual leadership to fully comprehend a larger system to enforce a policy on. Abstractions always obliterate local knowledge; worse off, it's usually impossible to even know the unknowns that are being blown away. Rumsfeld's unknown unknowns.
Hayek had it on the mark, but if anything he (and, to a larger extent, his loudest followers) didn't apply his observations thoroughly enough, and instead think you can blindly apply governmental regimentation through universalistic property rights that are somehow immune to the weaknesses of global rules. Smart, technical-minded people are especially prone to this fallacy: see the everlasting temptation to shove waterfall processes into Agile rhetoric.
I'm taking some time to digest this article, but I like it a lot, and I think it might fit in with some thoughts I've been trying to solidify for awhile. Going back to Rumsfeld, he had a trio of the known knowns, the known unknowns, and the unknown unknowns. I want to argue there's a forth category, however: the unknown knowns. In other words, institutions and networks of individuals may be isomorphic to real data and the algorithms that work on it, even though no individual needs to know about the data or algorithms actually being implemented, any more than a register would need to know what bits lies inside it. We thus embed knowledge into society: we've created an emergent social computation through unplanned collective activity. The parallels to Elinor Ostrom and James Scott should be easy to build to from there.