The hack that saved the astronauts of the Apollo XIII
sploid.gizmodo.com
sploid.gizmodo.com
Though our problems aren't close to same order of magnitude - keeping calm under pressure is something I feel is rare and under-appreciated in technology.
More than once I've seen a person start shaking so bad they couldn't type or slot in a replacement module while working a serious outage.
Amusingly, I've also had a new manager flip-out and actually interfere with my triage efforts because I 'didn't look like I was taking the problem seriously' (read: calm).
I wonder what sort of techniques could be adapted from elsewhere to teach the tech engineers of the world how to hold it together?
>'The truth is that I honestly don't get emotionally invested in any of it. I'm emotionally invested in my career and love new technology, enjoy learning, etc.'
I think there's a lot of wisdom in those sentences. Basically, invest in internal (personal) goals and see the external (workplace) ones served as a natural extension of that.
It's easy to reverse that and find yourself hamstrung or run ragged by bullshit which you don't necessarily have any control over.
There is a difference. It is frustrating to manage people who don't see the value in communicating properly. (Or maybe you had a clueless manager.)
This is the same agency that accused me of doing freelance on the side because they saw me with a C# book and there was no reason for me to be learning another programming language if I wasn't doing work on the side in violation of my contract.
Additionally it's important for many other reasons. If you seem outwardly anxious or worried it will magnify the fears of those depending on you. If the expert is worried, then people who depend on the expert will be hysterical.
The way I think about it would be to ask (in my head) whether the boss/CxO/freaker-outer gets seriously agitated while they're constructing an Excel spreadsheet? They're freaking out because they are being prevented from working (or they are concerned as a matter of business continuity and service levels), while the sysadmin is now, finally, "working." I mean, the SA is always working, but moments like this is what they're there for, so to expect them to be freaking out because their job needs to be done is just silly. It's their job to fix this stuff, let them do it. Turnabout would be to ask a manager every 2 hours whether they have their next meeting planned out yet. "When is the budget going to be done?"
That said, I've also been in hands-shaking mode.
Beyond that, it's simply a great book.
Looking at the astronaut training, its procedures, procedures, knowledge of all the systems and practice on ground simulations.
Does anyone run simulations? You know a small network that simulates various disasters and lets your systems admin crew work through e.g. triage
I fully comprehend the tradeoff here though, particularly when it comes to tight deadlines and weight tolerances. The CO2 scrubber in the CSM didn't need to be as beefy as the one in the LEM, and the two air filtration systems were designed by different companies where coordination would have been a bitch.
It's the classic software engineering trade off, isn't it? Add more dependencies or DIY. I wonder how the ISS deals with this in the US vs Russian parts of the station?
Visiting Russian spacecraft can only dock on the Russian side and the Space Shuttle only on the US side, unless it brought an adapter.
I'm sure there were still many compatibility issues. For example the European ATV docks on the Russian side.
Totally fascinating subject. It wasn't clear to me if Dragon 2 is going to use the APAS-95 connector (what the Shuttle used), or the newer NDS connector.
It also made me think.. was there some kind of adapter used for Apollo missions after Apollo 13 for the CO2 scrubbers? Or was the hack the "official way" of getting around problem?
Pretty much the best possible "real world" exercise that focuses on limited materials, time, and most importantly, simplicity of design and manufacture.
Not to detract from the accomplishment; but I'm confident that the astronauts would have been able to figure this out by themselves if needed, and didn't do so because of the command/control nature of NASA missions.
The instructions could have been shortened to: Fit the Command Module scrubber filter to the Lunar Module's filter hole. Use tape and plastic to seal the rig for proper airflow.
Not to mention they had a limited amount of equipment on-board, so they basically had ONE CHANCE to get it right; no room for trial-and-error. There was a surplus of equipment on the ground, so they had more of a chance to make mistakes and get it right before directing the crew on-board.
So yes, they would have been able to figure it out if needed, but I think there are other reasons besides NASA's (infamous) bureaucracy.
That isn't necessarily so, but it is definitely prudent to optimize the use of their limited supplies. To be fair, I agree it's better that they had more people looking at the problem, and I agree that it was the right thing way to do it; but it isn't as though astronauts are chimps, or even that mere mortals are always unable to improvise non-standard solutions.
It is a extremely well defined goal, under strict constraints (but a lot of liberty otherwise - for example, using the flight plan cover) and under a lot of pressure.
You can have immense bursts of productivity this way, but it also wears you out a lot.
http://www.therpf.com/showthread.php?t=105500&s=b4fc00db6d1b...
I skimmed the thread and it looks like at least two people made their own replicas. The most surprising thing to me is that you can get used Apollo lithium-hydroxide canisters just like those pictured on ebay!
McGyver didn't lie.