Goldman says client data leaked, wants Google to delete email
reuters.com
reuters.com
http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/new-in-labs-undo-send....
(I realise in this case it was the receiver, not the sender, using GMail, but I'm sure a lot of people here send from GMail.)
Someone pasted in a bunch of confidential info into an email that was for discussion, with a few replies back and forth. After a hallway discussion with another colleague, I sat down to forward the latest email to him, but Outlook autocompleted the email address to an external vendor. Before I knew it, the email was away. I quickly sent the vendor rep asking him to delete the email I just sent, and he agreed. I assume he was professional about it.
What can be done? Confidential discussions via email is a must. Trying to get the entire company into a secure web/app-based platform only is a non-starter. You can't take away the ability to send email out. A custom "Internal Distribution Only" flag in Exchange might work, but I can already hear the complaints already of having to set/unset it with every email.
See SEJeff's comment below for more details and links.
They are not only requesting Google to delete this email, but also provide information to Goldman Sachs about who accessed that information. This violates the privacy of the person who received the email. What right does a company have to know how you accessed your own email, or who you shared it with, just because they accidentally sent you an email?
In any case, I don't trust Goldman Sachs. They lie [1] with no hint of limit or shame. Did they leak client information, or incriminating evidence?
Sure, it's conjecture, but the last thing I'd do is violate someone's privacy or hand over personal information on Goldman's word.
[1] http://m.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-people-vs-goldma...
* DDoS the gmail account in question with spam, particularly spam that looks like it contains confidential information.
* Create a clever job ad on reddit, advertising a GS position in IT Security division by tracking down an email user supposedly played by a GS confederate, and then provide the gmail account in the ad
* Blackmail the unintended recipient, perhaps by sending the sort of data it's illegal in the U.S. to even own
* Mock the "From" header for thousand of typical spam messages with the gmail account address, send them to destinations that are sure to pass through Spamhaus & co.'s filters
* Fill the user's inbox to capacity; e.g., sign up for Quora with the gmail address in question
Certainly on the gray hat side of things, but asking Google to delete an email isn't exactly kosher to begin with.
We would then receive an email with the password which we have to then inform to the original recipient (usually by forwarding the email... MITM? What does that mean).
And this is for a company that is nowhere near as regulated. How did GS let this happen?
It certainly worked but it was a total drag for normal users as we were constantly in communication with outside parties.
But then making us happy was not the goal of the software :D
It was a glitch.
A few ideas: https://www.verdasys.com/solutions/eip.html
http://www.symantec.com/data-loss-prevention
http://interguardsoftware.com/sp_dlp_lnd_v6.html
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj150527(v=exchg....
DLP software is what keeps sensitive software inside the confines of where it is supposed to stay. Funnily enough, DLP software like exactly the stuff in those links is what was not installed in the base Edward Snowden was at in Hawaii because it used too much bandwith.
The Federal Reserve uses Verdasys to prevent digital copies of the plates that print money from making it out (I know a guy who works in their tech department). It is scary to work at a place where they don't always trust even their administrators who have root/Administrator privs.
One of our infosec guys encoded some sensitive source code and played it through the speaker to his phone and reconstructed it. The DLP software detected that and it was in a dashboard buried amongst other things.
* Regarding testing internal changes - banks maintain vast test databases (admittedly full of customers called Ronald McDonald) covering almost every scenario. Testing goes far beyond unit testing and smoke testing, but dedicated teams of system integration and user acceptance testers. This 'test' was not a 'test' by any measure of internal policy.
* Contractors should not ordinarily have access to customer data. Regulators across jurisdictions make this clear. They can, but an excruciating approval process is necessary.
* Contractors having external email access to anything but whitelisted domains is unusual, and worth raising an eyebrow at.
* Why is the email address being typed in? I've never worked at Goldman but expect like almost every other bank in the world they use Exchange, which typically allows typing in [Lastname], [Firstname} with a list of people to then select (Jones, David1; Jones, David2; Jones, David3; etc).
* Why aren't attachments required to be encrypted, especially to external domains? This is an automated feature in Exchange.
I'm pretty familiar with all the duck tape that gets used in daily banking. So are regulators, who take a dim view of VBA being used as glue to tie together 1000s of internal systems, but often turn a blind eye. But this is not a case of duck tape, it is institutionalised failings at several levels. So the response is not surprising, Goldman have to show they take this seriously, despite so many internal failings, and shirk a bit off on 'external contractors' too.
Google should tell them to go get fucked and take some damned responsibility for their mistakes for once.
They definitely need to take responsibility at this point and contact all affected parties since there's no guarantee the data went unread.
Mind boggling, isn't it?
"By contrast, Google faces little more than the minor inconvenience of intercepting a single email - an email that was indisputably sent in error," it added.
"Emergency relief is necessary"
"We are a big powerful bank, we are going to ask you nicely to do us a favor. Our employees fucked up. Please help us hide the fact that our employees fucked up, so we don't get a reputation for having employees that fuck up." the bank said.
"What we are asking them to do is technically speaking very simple. Whether or not it would open them up to many more such requests, we don't really care(unless one of our employees fucks up again,) fuck you we're goldman sachs." it added.
Then A) why is that information on someone's laptop and B) how can their email systems not be protected about it C) particularly when a contractor can have the data
The email attachment has probably already been saved.
and... nobody cares.
Wait, wouldn't that be sharing their data with Dropbox? If data is so sensitive, I don't see why is Dropbox necessarily more trustworthy than a random stranger with a gmail account.
I if got a random email from GS with some brokerage account mumbo jumbo I would assume it is span and delete it. So would my mom and most friend and most people out there probably.
Presumably if this "stranger" is random, one can make an argument that data would be safer with them then with a big cloud data aggregator (as that would be a single targeted point of attack).
Ideally they should probably set up their own file sharing service with the ability to explicitly share some files externally (taking all the necessary security measures).
There is nothing to "track". GS screwed up... now wants Google to "save the day".
Given by the press around this, and the likelyhood the gmail account owner noticed the email, we can assume the data is already in the open... so retroactively deleting it accomplishes nothing. GS needs to start informing their customers about their data loss and possible outcomes.
>There is nothing to "track".
From the article: Goldman (GS.N) [...] wants Google's (GOOGL.O) help in tracking down who might have accessed the data.
>from a private user's account without their permission
I think you're focusing too much on technical details. An email sitting on the server unread is effectively still undelivered. GS wants to cancel delivery. I see that as fair and not intrusive.
>the likelyhood the gmail account owner noticed the email
It might not have even been an active account.
>we can assume the data is already in the open.
Why in the world should that be assumed instead of checked?
Because email is not encrypted and not secure... so any server or anybody in between GS and the google server that data wound up on, could have a copy or seen a copy.
Not to mention all the possible ways this data could be exposed. The receiver took a picture. Printed it. Saved to a file. Forwarded it and it was forwarded again. Not every device marks emails as "read" on the server. The point is, Google can't tell GS if this data is secure or not. Deleting the email is irrelevant at this point.
You are forced to assume it has been exposed because the data left your premise and your control.
Of course they wouldn't just check if the email was marked as read, but the server very likely knows if the email (or the attachment if it was one?) has been accessed at all.
Just since someone emails you something, does not mean they have granted you ownership over that information or permission to share it publicly. But that said, show me a corporate mail server which doesn't add 40 lines of disclaimer at the end of the email anyway.