Netflix Could Be Classified As a 'Cybersecurity Threat' Under New CISPA Rules
motherboard.vice.com
motherboard.vice.com
Here's the bill: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve...
It's actually called the "Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act", not the "Cybersecurity Information Protection Act" (the latter makes googling sufficiently hard). The definition in question states:
> (7) CYBERSECURITY THREAT - The term cybersecurity threat means an action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, on or through an information system that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system.
That is quite a far cry from "anything that makes information unavailable or less available".
The First Amendment qualifier itself offers extremely broad protections, since the only qualifying actions would be things which the government could already legally forbid (that is, any communication which would already be protected from censorship or government reprisal under the First Amendment would not qualify as a threat under this bill).
Do journalists even read these bills they're reporting on?
All that said, it's Feinstein, so it's a pretty good bet that she's serving a corporate interest with this bill and has absol-friggin-lutely no idea about the technology she's proposing to regulate.
All that said, can someone make a cogent (hah) argument as to why network engineers should not be able to benevolently police their networks to minimize the degradation of flow of information? That's the side of net neutrality that nobody ever really seems to talk about - we all want to keep business interests from extorting companies through traffic shaping (which is legitimate), but then we all want high-priority routing for all our latency-sensitive traffic, even if our neighbor is torrenting a copy of all the porn on the internet. Net neutrality is a two-edged sword, one which would prevent monopolistic abuses at the expense of exposing the network to failure by tragedy of the commons, and I constantly wonder why we fail to talk about the flipside of the dumb pipes coin.
For example with net neutrality an ISP shouldn't be able to slow down or block Skype while allowing its own VOIP service to work at full speed, but it should be able to give all VOIP packets higher priority than HTTP packets.
The recent squabbles about paid peering agreements aren't really a part of what was originally meant by net neutrality, they've been tacked and mostly serve to confuse the issue. They can be a problem, but they're a different problem.
The EFF says net neutrality is "the idea that Internet service providers (ISPs) should treat all data that travels over their networks equally" (https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality). That is, without regard to both source and protocol. They specifically list Comcast throttling the BitTorrent protocol as an example of a violation. The people leading the charge against net neutrality are very squarely opposed to the idea of QoS (malevolent and benevolent) at the ISP level.
I have very little issue with saying "thou shalt not different prioritize same-content traffic by originating IP" (provided said sources are actually not engaged in abusive behavior, ie, DDOS attacks or similar), but that's not what most people are talking about when they talk about net neutrality - they're literally talking about dumb pipes which carry and route every packet at the same priority as every other packet, and that's...just not how the internet works. Some packets are more latency-sensitive than others. You aren't really going to care if your BT or Netflix packets have 1k MS latency as long as the throughput is high, but you're really going to have an issue with your VOIP and online gaming packets when there's a 1-second delay on both ends of the pipe.
Surprisingly though, the primary source it tried to work from is quite good:
https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2014/06/CISA-Let...
The shorter story here is: the Senate is introducing a new version of CISPA, called CISA, and CISA is broader than CISPA. It also (ludicrously) introduces into federal law a privilege for private entities to conduct "countermeasures" against threats.
Communications from collaborative efforts to squelch regulation are often misleading, superficial, and hyperbolic. But after reading the new CISA bill, and having read both CISPA and its amendments 2 years ago, I find all the points here compelling (none of them are that CISA would class Netflix as a "threat").
It would be sad if all the deception used in the effort to kill CISPA created space for a much worse bill to pass instead.
The bill defines a "cybersecurity threat" as:
(7) CYBERSECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘‘cybersecurity threat’’
means an action, not protected
1 by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
2 United States, on or through an information system
3 that may result in an unauthorized effort to ad-
4 versely impact the security, availability, confiden-
5 tiality, or integrity of an information system or in-
6 formation that is stored on, processed by, or
7 transiting an information system.
Second, this bill doesn't create any new criminal statutes.I.e. DRM always increases security risks, so it always should be viewed as potential malware.
UPDATE: I guess some here like DRM? That's quite surprising.
No, any DRM deserves such treatment. It's not more nonsense than DRM treating all its users as potential criminals by default. It's a symmetrical response.
And, all sensible security experts agree that DRM never makes security better - on the contrary, it always makes it worse.
I dislike DRM, and clearly envision a day where it's no longer used. But your argument doesn't address the article, nor does it add any value to the DRM conversation as a whole. Again, cheerleading.
> It is nonsense, treating a user as a criminal is not a security threat. DRM is just encryption
Tell it to these folks: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_rootkit
Or to security experts: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/02/drm_in_window...
DRM is obviously a security threat because of its very nature.
Here it's put in easy to understand terms: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgFbqSYdNK4
Practice proves that point spectacularly, because DRM always has an overreaching unethical nature (since it's an overreaching preemptive policing which uses the logic of presumption of guilt). As the Sony exec voiced the core idea behind DRM:
> We will develop technology that transcends the individual user. We will firewall Napster at source - we will block it at your cable company. We will block it at your phone company. We will block it at your ISP. We will firewall it at your PC... These strategies are being aggressively pursued because there is simply too much at stake.
(See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_rootkit#Background ).
I.e. overreaching nature of DRM straight from the DRM proponents mouth. And it applies to all DRM by its very definition.
And what is a criteria of "adding to the conversation" in this context? I see downvotes here as a nervous reaction of those who are blind to DRM (a valid reason to view it as a threat), but suddenly feel offended when Netflix is pictured as a threat for invalid reasons.