German government cancels Verizon contract in wake of U.S. spying row
reuters.com
reuters.com
Except that it would happen in a secret FISA court, and it's likely Verizon wouldn't be allowed to reveal the status or outcome of that trial.
Vodafone uses Amdocs in many of their national operations... see discussion in other threads beneath this post. In short, Amdocs stuff is assumed to be always-on metadata access rather than by-request content level.
The only one suffering here is Verizon.
Probably if all U.S. based companies suffer enough, they'll start lobbying for change in U.S. but that would have to be some massive wave of upset businesses.
And guess how companies "protest" policies in the U.S. - they pay politicians to lobby for changes. So yeah, the shittier the govt does its job, the more lobbyist money politicians get, funny how it works right?
The more likely situation is the govt keeps not giving a damn, and companies suffer.
I'll also point out a lot of people expect the US would be able to compromise a system if they were actively targeting it even if it was reasonably hardened and in house. They also didn't expect (even if they should of) that the bulk collection was so widespread that it meant common practice implementations were compromised even without serious targeting. So the ROI for in house didn't look as good as it does today.
On another note, do the Israelis still eavesdrop on the White House phones?
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/06/us/israeli-spy-inquiry-finds-nothing-officials-say.htmlFrom my understanding, as an outsourced billing provider, they mostly handle metadata related to communications rather than communications themselves.
The number of mobile networks they have embedded themselves in globally is absolutely shocking: most of the developed world.
Partial client lists are available on their website.
Anyway, whatever provider they go with, they should encrypt point-to-point, and thus provider isn't really important. One can't argue though with the God-given right of the national telecom to exploit the hysteria to kick foreign competitor off the fat government contracts :)
The wave of partitioning and protectionism happening in the Internet and other global networks (like Russia trying to build their own VISA style pay system and national/government supported search engine) starts to remind about global trade partitioning leading to and through the Great Depression.
Once it was made apparent just what the capabilities were, and how strongly the NSA was utilizing those capabilities, minds started to change.
To my knowledge, 20 years ago Russian security agencies were trying to inspect in depth any foreign computer hardware (as there is no other computer hardware existed back then or even today in Russia) that they were buying. Not that one is able to seriously inspect beyond the level of the plastic body of a chip, yet they tried at least :)
Also the Russians are traditionally quite good at reverse engeneering ;-) and they _did_ have their own domestic chips 20 years ago.
No. Not back then, not now. There hasn't been a chip there able to run Word/Excel/email. The best "native" chips are the 30 year old ones, with some updates, in the anti-ICBM systems.
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=semiconductor+decapsulation
The fact that these techniques do work fairly well for semiconductor reverse engineering is a reason that recent research on "stealthy dopant-level hardware Trojans" was scary.
http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2013/presentations/CH...
Though maybe that's what your reference to the inability to "seriously" inspect chips refers to. :-)
This research produces optically indistinguishable ICs with different electrical properties, which hinders optical reverse engineering.
My impression is that there's still a semiconductor device reverse engineering technique which likely defeats this measure (FIB imaging)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focused_ion_beam
as well as some other microscopy techniques that might conceivably detect these differences, but that it's more difficult and expensive overall compared to optical imaging.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508
So maybe the dopants have to get even stealthier if they're to avoid expert semiconductor reverse engineers. :-)
They know that we know that they know. heh.
If you want to avoid balkaniztion, relying on trust will not work. Trust is dead.
That does nothing to prevent the leakage of metadata. Who talked to who, when, and how long. You can encrypt the call, but not the number. You can encrypt the email, but not the headers. You have to trust the system routing the requests.
Case in point, Germany doesn't like what U.S. does - boom, Verizon takes a shot.
U.S. and few other countries don't like the anti-gay laws of Uganda. Boom, poor Uganda citizens take a shot (aids get cut).
U.S. doesn't like North Korea's policy. Boom, poor citizens take one again.
Obviously there's no channel where said governments can express themselves, maybe we should have a social network for governments where they can rant and vent off, instead of having innocent third parties suffer?
As no agreement could be reached, an American company cannot offer the service required by the German government. Thus is it not reasonable for the contract to be cancelled?
This is not a shot at an innocent third party, this is the third party being constrained by American laws to the extent that it cannot offer a required service. Sure, it is unfortunate that a third party is adversely affected by this, but it cannot be portrayed as a deliberate act against them by the German government.