The most aspects of TC were never publicly audited. People were using it on blind faith only: betting that if somebody had cared to audit he'd publish his findings too.
You can have the same assumption for BitLocker.
You can have the same assumption for BitLocker.
You wouldn't trust the drunk driver who's crashed his last few vehicles to borrow your car. The intelligence agencies own Microsoft, as far as users are concerned, and when cryptosystems have to be crippled for their priorities, we can't expect them to hold up to other attacks.
And for MS there is this story: http://www.geekwire.com/2013/report-microsoft-nsa/
This is of course no evidence for the (in)security of TC/Bitlocker, but I would call it indirect evidence, and certainly more than 'blind faith'.
So as far as I understand, it is possible to audit Microsoft's crypto code too. I can imagine the audit of crypto code wouldn't find anything. The real problem is:
http://regmedia.co.uk/2014/05/16/0955_peter_gutmann.pdf
"Crypto won't save you either"
"Crypto Summary:
Number of attacks that broke the crypto: 0
Number of attacks that bypassed the crypto: All the rest
- No matter how strong the crypto was, or how large the keys were, the attackers walked around it"