For instance, if the exchange had been regulated as a Designated Contract Maker (DCM) by the US CFTC [1] (which by the way will most likely never happen), it would had been subject to very specific and strict disclosure/auditing, price discovery, capital, risk and monitoring requirements --including for instance strict limits on account aggregation, hard position limits for very large accounts, 'surprise' audits and automated 'alerts' to regulators [2].
Furthermore, if people's complaints or whistleblowers were to persuade CFTC they had a case, they would had had the authority to investigate them, prosecute them, pre-emptively close them down and freeze their assets, and even piercing the corporate veil (eg target Karpeles' individual assets, or even criminal liability) under their broad anti-market manipulation authority [3,4]. At the very least the prospect of harsh prosecution --as opposed to simply wash your hands by declaring bankruptcy and moving on-- should have affected his cost-benefit calculus.
Again this is not to say of course the regulations would have precluded any form of massive fraud or market manipulation (which happens all the time regardless; cf the recent Libor scandal), but definitely it would have made this particular scheme essentially unfeasible.
[1] http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/D...
[2] http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=7ccb37730775...
[3] http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/D...
[4] http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/fi...