The Web is World-Wide, or who still needs RC4?
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sslscan r18---sn-nx57yn7r.googlevideo.com
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Version 1.8.0
http://www.titania.co.uk
Copyright Ian Ventura-Whiting 2009
Testing SSL server r18---sn-nx57yn7r.googlevideo.com on port 443
Supported Server Cipher(s):
Rejected N/A SSLv2 168 bits DES-CBC3-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv2 56 bits DES-CBC-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv2 40 bits EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv2 128 bits RC2-CBC-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv2 40 bits EXP-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv2 128 bits RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits ADH-SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 256 bits ADH-AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 256 bits DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 256 bits DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 256 bits AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits ADH-AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 168 bits ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 56 bits ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits ADH-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv3 168 bits EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 56 bits EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 168 bits EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 56 bits EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 168 bits DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 56 bits DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
Accepted SSLv3 128 bits RC4-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 128 bits RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv3 40 bits EXP-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A SSLv3 0 bits NULL-SHA
Rejected N/A SSLv3 0 bits NULL-MD5
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits ADH-SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits SEED-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 256 bits ADH-AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 256 bits DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 256 bits DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 256 bits AES256-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits ADH-AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits AES128-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 168 bits ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 56 bits ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits ADH-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A TLSv1 168 bits EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 56 bits EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 168 bits EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 56 bits EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 168 bits DES-CBC3-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 56 bits DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
Accepted TLSv1 128 bits RC4-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 128 bits RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A TLSv1 40 bits EXP-RC4-MD5
Rejected N/A TLSv1 0 bits NULL-SHA
Rejected N/A TLSv1 0 bits NULL-MD5
Prefered Server Cipher(s):
SSLv3 128 bits RC4-SHA
TLSv1 128 bits RC4-SHA
SSL Certificate:
Version: 2Im fine with legacy RC4 when you need to support 10 year old phones or wii, but its ridiculous when YT, or Occulus requires broken crypto. Occulus uses RC4 on their order page, meaning personal data and financial information.
https://developer.oculusvr.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=34&t=5...
support.oculusvr.com has all modern crypto enabled, its like they specifically crippled financial side of website.
Does NSA send national security letters demanding downgrade to RC4?
I'm curious to know what was the basis of this configuration decision. It seems like someone went out of their way to hamstring your encryption. Possibly someone benchmarked every combination and disabled all but the fastest. Wouldn't something like this go through a security review before hitting prod?
With AES-NI, AES128-GCM runs at roughly 1 cycle per byte. Without AES-NI, the recent Chacha-Poly1305 ciphersuite Google has been experimenting also runs at between 1 and 2 cycles per byte.
[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/rc4/as...
You can see why SSL proxies would prefer a lighter weight protocol, hijacking all that traffic is taxing! On the other hand, if you're in the middle for presumably legitimate reasons, you have a responsibility to protect those connections. On the other hand, a malicious man-in-the-middle would want to go undetected, and probably does a better job of passing along the same protocol the client is using. It's time to replace those ancient proxies, and perhaps consider not restricting your users freedoms. A win-win.
http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats... https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-12/Jarmoc/bh-eu-12-Jarmoc-S...
He described the risk of outsourcing cryptographic security to a proxy -- though he was more focused on the fact that the proxy might not be as cautious or as correct about validating certs as your client, rather than that the proxy might have a different ciphersuite policy than your client. But he does explicitly mention this risk, including the idea that the proxy may be using a weaker ciphersuite. (The example he gives is PFS, where your client and the server might both support PFS ciphersuites, but the proxy might not, so you don't actually get PFS.)
The signature algorithm in the certificate itself is sha1WithRSAEncryption (try exporting the cert and running "openssl x509 -in their_cert.pem -text -noout" for a summary of the content). I also don't see RC4 anywhere in the cert.
It is true that the web server is using RC4 to protect the TLS connections that it negotiates (probably inadvisedly!), and that MD5 is also used in its negotiated ciphersuite, but the use of these algorithms isn't specified, required, recommended, or assumed anywhere in the digital certificate that the server is presenting to authenticate the connection. Rather, the choice of RC4 (and MD5) is made dynamically during the ciphersuite negotiation between the client and server on each connection, presumably based on the (somewhat obsolete) server defaults that the bank has chosen.
I agree with the previous commenter that RC4 can't be specified (or used) in certificates, though MD5 can be used as part a signature method within the certificate, but happens not to be in your example.