apparently these temp values are scrubbed by openssl. i would definitely verify because there could be some implementation bug that stops their scrubbing. so what nginx does is:

  handle_request:
    do_decryption
    scrub_temporaries
    write_to_client
  handle_another_request:
    ..

because nginx is single threaded there shouldn't be any requests handled between do_decryption and scrub_temporaries. but this is a problem on other servers.

  static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
               unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
          {
        ...

        if (ctx != NULL)
                {
                BN_CTX_end(ctx);
                BN_CTX_free(ctx);
                }
        if (buf != NULL)
                {
                OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
                OPENSSL_free(buf);
                }
        return(r);


  void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *ctx)
        {
        if (ctx == NULL)
                return;
  #ifdef BN_CTX_DEBUG
        {
        BN_POOL_ITEM *pool = ctx->pool.head;
        fprintf(stderr,"BN_CTX_free, stack-size=%d, pool-bignums=%d\n",
                ctx->stack.size, ctx->pool.size);
        fprintf(stderr,"dmaxs: ");
        while(pool) {
                unsigned loop = 0;
                while(loop < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE)
                        fprintf(stderr,"%02x ", pool->vals[loop++].dmax);
                pool = pool->next;
        }
        fprintf(stderr,"\n");
        }
  #endif
        BN_STACK_finish(&ctx->stack);
        BN_POOL_finish(&ctx->pool);
        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
        }


  static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *p)
          {
          while(p->head)
                  {
                  unsigned int loop = 0;
                  BIGNUM *bn = p->head->vals;
                  while(loop++ < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE)
                          {
                          if(bn->d) BN_clear_free(bn);
                          bn++;
                          }
                  p->current = p->head->next;
                  OPENSSL_free(p->head);
                  p->head = p->current;
                  }
          }


  void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a)
          {
          int i;

          if (a == NULL) return;
          bn_check_top(a);
          if (a->d != NULL)
                  {
                  OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d,a->dmax*sizeof(a->d[0]));
                  if (!(BN_get_flags(a,BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)))
                          OPENSSL_free(a->d);
                  }
          i=BN_get_flags(a,BN_FLG_MALLOCED);
          OPENSSL_cleanse(a,sizeof(BIGNUM));
          if (i)
                  OPENSSL_free(a);
          }

  void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
          {
          unsigned char *p = ptr;
          size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
          while(loop--)
                  {
                  *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
                  ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));
                  }
          p=memchr(ptr, (unsigned char)ctr, len);
          if(p)
                  ctr += (63 + (size_t)p);
          cleanse_ctr = (unsigned char)ctr;
          }

Very interesting. So, just with the private key given p/q and the modulus is really possible to extract the private key? I saw the RSATool (https://github.com/ius/rsatool), but it needs an "n" and "d" parameter. So, how to use the output from this modified hertbeet exploit with RSATool since it only prints "Using Modulus", "Got result:" and "Found Prime" and all are much larger in comparison with parameters for RSATOOL. Thanks.