Targeting Huawei: NSA Spied on Chinese Government and Networking Firm
spiegel.de
spiegel.de
Besides, the facts that non-Chinese employees cannot own shares in Huawei; [3, p. 23] that the Communist Party appoints an anonymous "Party Committee" within Huawei; [3, p. 30] and that Huawei was involved in selling US network-monitoring equipment to Iran [4] -- makes them a legitimate target for NSA, in my opinion.
[1] Cisco's motion for preliminary injunction http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/Cisco_Mot_for_PI.pdf
[2] http://blogs.cisco.com/news/huawei-and-ciscos-source-code-co...
[3] Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/f...
[4] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/us-cisco-zte-iran-...
Also, "IPR skirmishing" is actually worse I would think. Military/strategic intelligence-gathering is as old as Caeser (and for that matter, Sun Tzu...) and is well-recognized as legitimate (if distasteful).
However even that doesn't directly affect the economy of either party. With "IPR skirmishing" it's possible to go almost straight to the acquisition phase of a particular tech without having to do the R&D, which can have substantial effect to the groups who actually did have to pay for that R&D.
The first paragraph is essentially gloating. Not necessarily commendable, but understandable.
However, he's not using the "they did it too" as justification, which is what tu quoque is all about. He outlines reasons beyond "taste of their own medicine" for why this would be justified.
[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1...
Didn't Fujitsu Automated Computers (Facom) copy IBM's MVS source code in the 1980's? Will the US deal with both offences in the same way?
You're assuming they did it first.
Hypocrisy seems to be the name of the game here: spying on attorney-client communications, pwning sysadmins to get access to infrastructure and rifling through trade secrets of companies. The last two of which the U.S. has put on their outrage face and publically shamed the Chinese for doing.
Regardless, the Snowden cache was bulk, and was given to Greenwald, Poitras, and Gellman. Snowden isn't giving marching orders in the background, he left it up to journalists to decide what gets published. While they probably still collaborate, Poitras is in Berlin and is most likely one of the primary journalists behind this story and not Greenwald.
Before Snowden changed things, it was readily apparent that everyone was ready to believe the US and nobody was ready to believe China. So the accusations were a rational thing to do.
The US isn't the only country that does this, obviously, and people are divided over whether or not it is the 'right' way to conduct international relations.
Another possible is that several groups within the US government aren't on the same page. Elements of the State Dept might work to end torture in S. America, while the CIA secretly trains S. American governments in torture.
This sort of, hack everyone/steal everything isn't in the long term interests of the US government because the US has the most to lose in terms of IP/infrastructure, but engaging in this damaging behavior may allow some agencies to "get the job done" in the short term. Makes sense that groups tasked with grand-strategy would oppose this behavior, whereas groups tasked with short-term results would ignore the long game. A predictable result of a failure of oversight (left hand plays against the strategy of the right hand).
1) using stolen Cisco source code to gain a competitive market advantage by not having to spend money on R&D. So far, no one has shown evidence that the US government has given any stolen Huawei code to private companies.
2) Huawei was owned by people with close ties to the Chinese government and military. Members of Congress raised concern that if they were allowed to provide equipment for large portions of the US telecommunications infrastructure, it would give ample opportunity for the Chinese intelligence services/ military to put backdoors in.
We need to open-source everything (soft/hard/firmware) and modify these business models.