https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_dependent_surveillan...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_Communications_Addres...
These systems were manually disabled.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_dependent_surveillan...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_Communications_Addres...
These systems were manually disabled.
it isn't a type of the system i was talking about as ability, in flight, to disable a system excludes the system from the "security" category. Just for the sake of example, placing a battery powered device like always-connected satellite phone into unreachable in flight part of the plane (end of wing for example) would be like something alone the lines of "a security satellite system"
my mistake, meant the CVR [edited above to conform]
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/world/asia/series-of-error...
Li AAs... without a means of isolating them from the circuitry?
How many aircraft are you prepared to lose through in-flight fires for this 'benefit'? Reference: Ethiopian Airlines 787 fire at Heathrow originating from lithium cells in the ELT.
Who is going to check the battery status at regular intervals?
Who is going to certify and sign-off those checks?
Who is going to be qualified to change those cells?
What interfaces will there be with the aircraft avionics to relay data such as call sign and flight code? How do we protect those connections from overload? There's a reason every single electrical circuit on an airliner can be isolated.
$100 is, frankly, a laughable estimate.
The larger point is that any "real situation" that would need the transponder turned off (power/fire/corruption) would have almost no bearing on the operability of such a simple system.
FYI the imarsat pings are not all that different, are they? Its just a simple ping with some data that including headers is going to be very minimal payload...like SMS text type level of data.