US risks national blackout from small-scale attack
online.wsj.com
online.wsj.com
The article focuses on solutions involving physical security. Perhaps it would be more cost-effective to bolster deterrents? For example, life in prison for anyone convicted of sabotaging a major facility of any kind (in the Metcalf case, this could include both the shooting and the cutting of telecom fiber beforehand).
There also seems to be less focus on improving the resilience of the system as a whole--given that the threats are being modeled to determine minimum amounts of sabotage required, why not emphasize increasing that minimum, rather than reinforcing the few critical points of failure? Computing has moved in the direction of resilient systems made of less reliable components, and so could the grid.
As an aside, a blackout in summertime can be pretty interesting. The one in 2003 brought people together in new ways--I experienced a sense of community which was quite unusual, "old fashioned" you might say.
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[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_the_United_...
Perhaps more critically, since the US grid seems to be operated by a number of competing companies, it may be less likely that the system itself will be made resilient, because there is limited cooperation.
If the people of the US decided to spend money on hardening power delivery, would the money come from tax dollars, or electricity bills?
Walls are not expensive. I don't think that anyone engaged in a systematic attack on the distribution network is going to be particularly deterred by the threat of prison, given the potential strategic payoff.
A large-scale blackout plus an attack on the only factory that makes those large transformers has the potential to cripple Us industrial capacity for weeks, if not months.
Or are these transformers so large that they basically have to be built on-site? Or so expensive that keeping ~10 spares would cost too much (say ~$200 million or more)?
Any electricity experts want to chime in?
We in Joplin, MO lost a substation of perhaps this class in the 2011 EF5 tornado, and my father saw them delivering the replacement not too long ago, it was big. (Note the delay was due to the fact that there was no need to supply lots of power to an area that was wiped off the face of the earth prior to enough rebuilding.)
IEEE (or the manufacturers?) have commissioning procedures. Typically the larger transformers are manufactured elsewhere, then reassembled on-site and commissioned (figure a week to a month).
Your ballpark estimate on the cost is close enough.
One point to remember is that 'if it bleeds it leads', news stories are often sensationalized to achieve more viewers/readers. Typically for power applications, the sizing of equipment is based on peak demand such that the equipment is only fully utilized in a short time period (people get upset when power isn't available or a fire is started). While this report is probably correct in essence, without knowing the exact scenario that was modeled it is difficult to determine a solution.
This link works http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230402010...
or
http://lmgtfy.com/?q=U.S.+Risks+National+Blackout+From+Small...
should work though :D
And these grids aren't like you probably envision, a good description I came across is that they're a number of ponds with small streams between them. So it would take some cleverness to affect more than one "pond", it all depends on how the grid, or a subset of it is set up. E.g. taking out a lot of California, since at least as I gather it imports so much power, would be easier than many other areas.
Or take San Francisco (please! :-). I remember after one nasty blackout then Mayor Willie Brown, who's a bit more grounded, you might say ^_^, than many area politicians, saying, well, maybe we shouldn't shut down the last power plant in the city....
There's a British version too. Probably worth watching one or the other, if only to prompt you to make some basic disaster preparations.