But Bitcoin participants do not have to act on "trust" because they can inspect the protocol and open source code to verify equal treatment. In Naval's system, if the premise for participation (eg equal treatment) is equally verifiable by inspection of the protocol and open source code, is there any material difference between the two? It is true that there is nothing to "stop the network from invalidating the pre-mined amount at will", but participants will only participate in the network if it is easily verifiable that the network gives effect to the premise for participation.
> I just don't see how you can add a founder-controlled, for-profit startup to the other players in a crypto currency ecosystem (the miners, the non-profit developer foundation and the coin owners) and get something that works.
I think I agree with that statement, but only because of the words "founder-controlled". If a network like this is to succeed, the founders must forfeit control to the network. Given that it is the founders who write the protocol, they should be happy to do that, and then set it free. I don't think it would work if the founders made some attempt in the protocol to reserve to themselves a power to intervene in the operation of the network.
Can I offer another interesting hypothetical:
Is it possible for a network to incorporate some kind of mechanism for democratically amending its own protocol according to some objective characteristic (or subjective vote) of the participants? If participants are mining 'shares' in the 'company', should they have the power to act as 'shareholders' and to exercise control accordingly?
(Assume that some aspect of the protocol means that the controlling majority is always held by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, which I think is meant to be the case with Bitcoin.)