Dot-Com IPO Insanity Returns With Coupons.com
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Coupons.com has been around for a long time (1998), and if it hasn't figured out a way to be profitable in 15 years I don't think a cash infusion is going to help. I don't see any evidence of a new product or service or a new revenue stream. In fact I'd bet against coupons.com growing as users become weary (for the non-technical) and wary (places like HN) of additional browser addons.
COUP aside, sometimes it's wise to ignore profits in an IPO. Emerging markets, new technologies, and early-stage high-growth startups are good examples.
For example, Tesla lost over 55 million the year before its IPO.[1] Some said the shares were too high, but it paid off[2] for those who saw the potential. Musk pointed this out himself:
"A lot of people were puzzled about why we were going public without profits,” Musk told reporters outside the Nasdaq building in Times Square. “The reason we are not profitable today is because we are in the midst of expanding with the Model S."
New product, new market, growing company. Check. Proven management team with realistic expectations and a strong proof-of-concept? Check.
In Tesla's case it makes sense to ignore past losses and bet on the long play. While coupons.com could become profitable, I'll be shocked if the premium paid on this IPO pays off.
[1] http://www.wired.com/autopia/2010/06/tesla-ipo-raises-226-1-... [2] https://www.google.com/finance?q=tesla
Edit: Just noticed you said COUP aside. I agree with you – the comparisons from tech or unprofitable IPOs don't add up.
Looking at COUP's S1 I can say a couple of nice things about them. They are showing good topline growth. Their gross margins are expanding. Their net margins (while negative) are improving very fast. From 2012 to 2013 they grew their revenues by almost 50% while they actually reduced their operating expenses. But most importantly, their revenue growth is accelerating.
If they continue posting higher and higher revenue growth and expanding growth margins, they may start gushing money in a couple of years.
As I said they are not for me. I am not sure they can continue high revenue growth for long because they do not seem to have a good lasting competitive advantage. But I can see how someone may be convinced to buy them.
That said, I'm feeling like there are more and more people in the bay area at least for the wrong reasons. And I for one, having lived through the first bubble, have been milking it rather than going all in (bought some FB when it got down to $18 and sold it once it crossed $36. bought some Tesla, sold it when it doubled) took the money out and put it in more diversified things (like index funds). Its boring, you don't make the 'big score' but when the music stops, and the music always stops, this time it won't all evaporate. At least that is what I keep telling myself :-)
Funny, the saddest part for me, both in the late 90s and today, are the "Tech Stars" who are living high on the hog on other people's money, with some pipe dream of getting bought out and no plan to run a real, viable, sustainable business. Their businesses implode, they get "rich" (through money and contacts) and move on to the next project.
Laugh all you want at the MBAs, but I can assure you that they, at the very least, understand that the purpose of a business is to create value for customers and generate a return for stakeholders. I think "Silicon Valley" could have used a bit more of that sort of thinking then, as perhaps more so today.
That said, I find it is also easy for me to fall into the trap of looking primarily at the excesses and sillyness and overlooking the cool things that get built. One of my long time friends is working at Intuitive Surgical and they are doing some really innovative and cool stuff that is not at all frivolous.
My impression is that Groupon made up their own mumbo jumbo financial metrics, but that adjusted EBITDA is a pretty standard financial metric.
No... EBITDA is already "adjusted earnings". Adjusted EBITDA is "Adjusted, Adjusted" earnings. Or more correctedly <opportunistically> Adjusted Earnings.
I understand the argument though. EBITDA is somewhat closer to $income - $cost. Whereas actual earnings involve tax, tax loopholes, exchange rates, and loads of other crap.
[0]http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1115128/0001193125140...
I've always wondered why folks don't use earnings-to-price ratio instead, which goes smoothly through zero instead of behaving, well, hyperbolically.
Coupons.com http://www.wellreadinvestor.com/companies/63241
edit-- Here is a link to their S-1: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1115128/0001193125140...
The question is, which one is a bigger stinker, coupons.com or retailmenot? Both make a significant portion of their revenue ranking organically on Google for other big companies' name. What happens when this traffic shrinks or is lost?
As an investor I am very concerned when a company publicly publishes that they make tens of millions or hundreds of millions of dollars off of a free stream of traffic from Google. Companies can establish a brand from that position, but its ultimately their financials which determine their long term survival. Zynga offers an alternative example, grew very fast due to a never to be repeated level of free visibility on Facebook's news feeds. Multi-billion dollar mobile gaming companies are in very similar positions today.
I'm not saying these companies or websites are worthless, but the valuations are insane for the risk they entail. High valuations make companies spend more and borrow more than they should.
Does a company own their user base? That is a pretty good indicator of long term viability. Ironically, Microsoft of the 90s looks like a fairly friendly neighbor in comparison to the "platforms" software businesses are built upon today.
Coupon.com's business model is to be the online distributor of manufacturer and store coupons. I'd have to think Coupon.com's revenue comes more from manufactures and stores licensing / paying for inclusion on the Coupon.com website than from affiliate marketing.
Retailmenot is getting 73% of its total traffic from search and Coupons.com is less than half of that at 35%.
I think Coupons.com also has a more engaged audien than Retailmenot and a large network of coupon bloggers promoting the product and participating as affiliates.
RetailMeNot serves digital coupon codes and focuses on SEO to get traffic to their site.
Coupons.com serves manufacturer grocery coupons distributed via printable means (browser plugin) and digital via retailer loyalty card integration. They have relationships with manufacturers & retailers to discount products through retail chains. Furthermore, Coupons.com also has a digital coupon codes side of the business which competes with RetailMeNot, Affiliate program called Brandcaster which many bloggers use and few other smaller channels.
I hope this brings some clarity to the discussions in this thread and folks can see that Coupons.com is not just a website.