“The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy” by Edward Luttwak
handleshaus.wordpress.com
handleshaus.wordpress.com
> Likewise, Luttwak contends that at the higher levels of Grand Strategy the logic of ‘get big or get stomped‘ reverses paradoxically.
I thought, "so many lessons of geo-politics I have learned by wasting time playing strategy board games". My comment is largely petty, but it does make one wonder about gaming in education: it's one thing to read about political strategy, and another thing to actually feel and remember its effects because of a game you've played. Perhaps carefully designed games would teach certain abstract concepts as well or better than simply describing those concepts.
Also, the guns to butter argument doesn't really make sense. You can't just spend lots of money to quickly buy up a fully-trained military. It takes years, even decades of operational experience to develop a competent fighting force, experience that simply cannot be purchased.
If you were to do this as an up-and-coming nation (i.e., you've got just a little butter), you'll meet strong resistance from your peers: they know they can counter you by putting your butter pile at risk.
But if you first pursue a strategy that gives you a mountain of butter reserves, your peers lose much of the leverage they can exact upon you, and you are free to devote massive resources toward military with minimal "worst-case" economic risk.
EDIT: I made another comment about how interesting it is to relate this stuff to strategy board games, and this is an example that converts pretty well: "don't start bludgeoning your neighbors into submission until you're pretty sure that you no longer depend upon them for basic resources." is the strategy. (The alternative strategy would be to constantly be frienemies: take a little, give a little, injure a little the whole game, rather than to have a phase of friendship followed by a phase of foeship).
The dilemma facing China was nicely summarized with: "China’s drive towards military aggrandisement will push other countries towards anti-China coalitions that reduce rather than enhance China’s diplomatic clout. And because China can effectively deter direct military action, nations seeking to counter its rise will be bound to choose “eco-strategic containment” strategies that slow, rather than enhance, the growth China needs so desperately to maintain."
Reviewing guy is Russian, so there may be some patriotism at play.
Basically some guy used the dubious "platform" of an Amazon book review to announce that he doesn't like the way the US government acts.
That he so easily dismisses the idea of Kissinger as "flattery" is dishonest. Let's not forget Kissinger is among the greatest statesmen in history and has had an enormous role in US and Chinese history. His strategy of using China to counter the USSR is what eventually lead to the disarmament agreements with the USSR. Kissinger also remade the face of Middle Eastern politics by moving Egypt into the US camp following the Yom Kippur War.
Edit: My problem with this article is that while long it is not nearly long enough to encompass the topic he's talking about. He gets around this by drawing conclusions for us. I wish he had taken a much smaller bite and talked in much more detail about the supporting ideas. For example, why does he dismiss Kissinger's idea on China? I would like to see what he thinks and see if I agree with those ideas. Painting Kissinger in broad strokes and in negative light seem to play a crucial role in this article.
>Kissinger has a track record of being quite successful
Luttwak's view is precisely that Kissinger engages in flattery to expand his own personal influence.
One important point, re: this article --
> If you pursue military agrandizement so monomaniacally and consistently with realpolitick that you start to seriously threaten your neighbors and competitors then, if they are smart enough and act in time, you will provoke them into forming an alliance of resistance dedicated to doing whatever is necessary short of nuclear war, but including crushing your economy, to prevent you from getting big enough to dominate.
That was a followed by a criticism of the realism perspective to international relations, but there's variants of realism --
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relation...
In particular, defensive realism seems the most sane and consistent with what actually happens in the world --
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defensive_realism
Which wouldn't advocate unlimited buildup of military resources. Compare offenseive realism, from Wikipedia --
"The emphasis offensive realism puts on hegemony as states’ end aim stands in sharp contrast to defensive realism’s belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive realist mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits."
So... that particular criticism of realism should perhaps be of offensive realism? As a sidenote, reading about realism on Wikipedia is certainly an interesting use of time.
The unfettered and self-unaware bias towards Western values of statesmanship by this so-called -- do they actually call themselves this? -- political _scientist_ is cringeworthy.
I now have some new ancient insults to add to my repertoire. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reply_of_the_Zaporozhian_Cossac...
> Future Historians will certainly try and look back and discover the sequence of events and decisions that led to China’s shift in behavior. Perhaps it was the financial crisis and the feeling that the moment of leapfrogging over a peaked and declining West was finally on the horizon. Perhaps it was an internal squabble amongst political elites or wealthy families. Perhaps leftist-nationalist popular fervor took over and the temptation towards aggressiveness could not be resisted, or that having been compelled by circumstance to issue guarantees now seemed more ‘humiliating’ than crafty. It will be interesting to read what those Historians uncover.
The Chinese were very concerned until 2008 that no-one boycotted the Beijing Olympics, which was a very symbolic event for its population regarding China's status in the world. Heck, they even practically dismantled the Great Firewall for a year to make sure there were no excuses for a boycott.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Sailer#Views_and_criticis...
When I read things like this:
"Luttwak is considered to be brutally honest, whereas Kissinger is recognized as a successful and charming but mendacious manipulator. Both are brilliant, and both are flawed in their own ways, but, in my view, Luttwak’s writing is more often reliable as giving you actually correct information (though selectively, with a slant towards his broader agenda of policy influence), whereas Kissinger is better at obtaining access and favor. They are kind of a real life Jewish immigrants versions of the ‘Once an Eagle‘ duo where Kissinger is Massengale and Luttwak is Damon."
I'm done with the article. Telling me pre-digested conclusions is not entirely honest. There is a lot of fudging going on there which he hides under a veneer of references.
The article really treats the reader like a complete novice to the area of grand strategy, foreign policy, and history.
2. You oppose pre-digested conclusions in articles? You don't want an author to have thought about an issue - and reached a conclusion - before writing about it? Sounds silly to me.
This seems to be precisely what the US succeeded in doing, with the unwitting help of Nazi Germany taking the fall as the heavy, giving the US the perfect "Good War" justification for a massive military buildup and establishment of a huge military-industrial complex. Then the Soviet Union succeeds in taking Germany's place, continuing the justification.
China's unspoken strategy may be to paint the US as current hegemon and current "heavy." If so, they do seem to be doing it wrong.
tl;rd: pseudo-intellectually tone deaf nonsense
It could use some copy editing, though.
Luttwak is nothing short of genius.