The incredible stock-picking ability of SEC employees
washingtonpost.com
washingtonpost.com
Can I use this fact to detect upcoming potential investigations or enforcement actions which may not be public knowledge, and use that to my advantage?
[Edit:] This also seems to have the unfair effect that SEC employees get an "out" from previous investments in companies that the SEC is about to investigate. Isn't that ultimately another form of trading on insider knowledge, even if it's mandatory?
On the other hand, if SEC employees are not forced to sell, then their holdings may diminish their impartiality. It seems like the only fair and neutral approach is to require SEC employees to hold no individual stocks at all during their employment - or any type of financial instrument issued by organizations they might potentially investigate.
(Is this perhaps what the SEC means, that employees are forced to sell because they've just joined the SEC? If they're forced to sell an individual instrument only at the beginning of a specific investigation into a single organization who issued the instrument, then that seems like a loophole.)
The solution is blind trusts, with the additional cost picked up as part of their compensation package. The way to guarantee impartiality is to remove any chance of impropriety.
I would also settle for extremely common ETFs like the SPDR S&P 500.
It makes sense that any new investments made during one's time at the SEC should be made into index funds or accounts managed at the independent discretion of a non-SEC manager. But banning all SEC employees from holding any individual stocks during their employment is a deterrent to recruiting.
To incentivise against insider trading: anonymous public disclosure of all un-forced stock sales by SEC employees. This would expose suspicious trades ex post facto. In the event of prosecution or investor lawsuits (a) the name of the employee would be unsealed during discovery and (b) the SEC, the employee, and the supervisor and compliance officer who approved the trade(s) would jointly share civil and criminal liability.
That would suggest a blind trust approach for those within the industry as well: if you're engaged in trading on behalf of others, positions you hold personally represent a distinct conflict of interest and moral hazard.
I don't know about anybody else, but this seems pretty plausible to me.
An alternative would be to instead provide pensions. I don't really see how that happening given the "no handouts at any cost" attitude of the majority party in the House.
But then that might pose due process issues for the companies.
Maybe all SEC employees should be required to have stocks in blind trusts while working there?
I would chalk this up to a quirk of statistics rather than any deliberate malfeasance. (Although, I'd note that the SEC policy that employees sell any stocks of a company that they will be investigating is good for the employees, because those companies are disproportionately likely to suffer a stock price penalty in the near future. Basically, the policy is a way of turning material non-public information into a market advantage without requiring that any individual employee act on that. But this situation exists in a lot of other cases, eg. stock option grants should systematically beat the market because companies that are financially healthy are more likely to hire people, and that financial health usually translates into hiring before it translates into profits.)
Moreover, it's not clear if any other policy would better serve the public interest. Requiring or allowing them to not to sell that stock is an even worse conflict of interest; it would incentivize them to never find a company guilty, because then their own holdings would drop. Requiring that they never own stocks would be a prohibitive restriction that would turn away many people who are most qualified for the job. The blind trust idea might work, but adds a lot of overhead for employees, and also requires another level of enforcement to make sure employees are not leaking information to the trustee.
A lot of people are really uncomfortable with the idea that someone might have an unfair advantage in financial markets, but oftentimes this is quite unavoidable. It's also pretty small-potatoes compared to the advantages that professional financiers get by being primary dealers for the Fed, or market makers, or having relationships with Wall Street policy makers, or hobnobbing with company CEOs on the golf course.
How about not allowing staff to hold stock in companies they might have to deal with?
"No staff member may own stock or have any other financial interest in a company, enterprise or industry that figures or is likely to figure in coverage that he or she provides, edits, packages or supervises regularly. A book editor, for example, may not invest in a publishing house, a health writer in a pharmaceutical company or a Pentagon reporter in a mutual fund specializing in defense stocks. For this purpose an industry is defined broadly; for example, a reporter responsible for any segment of media coverage may not own any media stock. “Stock” should be read to include futures, options, rights, and speculative debt, as well as “sector” mutual funds (those focused on one industry)."
(1) Congress's insider trading exemption - Until recently legislators and their staff were completely exempt from insider trading laws while they were often privy to insider information[1]. It's no wonder they do so well in the market. Too bad some minor restrictions recently were enacted - but no worries they just got rid of them as soon as the noise died down[2].
(2) Tax-free portfolio rebalancing - Big shots like the Secretary of Treasury often sell billions in stock without paying any capital gains tax. This allows them to fully take advantage of the free step up in basis when they die. So they can never pay anything on the fortune they made at Goldman Sachs[3].
Fuck these assholes!
[1] http://www.thewire.com/politics/2011/11/hustle-defuse-60-min...
[2] http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130416/08344222725/congre...
[3] http://www.celebritynetworth.com/articles/entertainment-arti...
In my view everyone should be able to do this under the ancient English law principle of like-kind exchange. But in the US today it is "special people" only.
To recap: Why are you taxed for something? Because they can tax you. There are no principals just opportunity. Much like why did your car get broken in to. Because they can.
However it does appear to be a good indication that something is coming down the line if SEC people sell...
This policy is forcing them to act on non-public information, which is very illegal for everyone outside of the SEC.
Option A: Blind trust with some capital gains incentives?
Option B: Ability to manage your own portfolio, but can't act on SEC+company news until x hours after publicly disclosed?
My two cents,
D: Some sort of anonymized peer review of transactions? Maybe even automated.
Selling stocks in which you're conducting an investigation discharges the conflict in pursuing the investigation, but likely accrues a gain consequent to it.
Even, say, requiring a public disclosure of investigation, then* allowing SEC staff to sell stocks, would create a conflict to the extent that the decision to conduct an investigation would have a likely known negative influence on stock holdings.
Congress has been known to have above average returns on stock investments, making the congressional salary increases we quibble over look like chump change, if they are using their unique knowledge of policy direction to the fullest.
For extra points, require everyone who gets a Federal salary to participate, including Congress-folk and their staff.
Operate the fund so that when the US economy is doing well, and unemployment is low, and other reasonable and measurable national economic goals are met, all the participants benefit.
An incentive like that might attract to Washington more cluefull and qualified people who are willing to cooperate so that the people of the country benefit.
This is amusing, but false. This is similar reasoning to why CEO's should make 10-20million dollars a year, rather than say...$10MM/yr. There is actually no shortage of people to be the CEO of any company (or the top rank in any hierarchy) and truth be told, Boards of Directors could not tell the difference for 9/10 candidates. As the saying goes, "graveyards are filled with the people thought previously indispensible". And empirical examples abound. Just imagine Apple without Steve Jobs, or Yahoo without whoever the guy was before Marissa Mayer. The only thing keeping quality applicants out of the SEC is power, presitige, and respect. There are many jobs that people work for low pay (eg Academia) provided that their social status is secure.
Ironically, Steve Jobs is the best counterexample, IMHO. He took a failing company and propelled it to market leader, launching several great products (the iPod, iPhone, iPad; disclaimer: I'm not a particular Apple fan and don't own any of these devices, but I have to give credit where it's due). We'll see where Apple is going from now on, but my bet is they're never going to have huge hits like the iPhone again; instead, they'll just keep doing incremental updates of their current products.
Another good example is Bill Gates. Regardless of the man's moral qualities (or lack thereof), he was great at running Microsoft. After Gates left, Ballmer has only been dropping the ball on everything except consoles. Apple and Google are slowly but surely taking Microsoft down (how many people own Windows Phones, versus Android or iPhones?).
It may seem easy to keep a profitable company going as usual, but it's really hard to take a failing one or a startup and make it succeed.
Specifically, is the SEC's turnaround time to Freedom of Information Act requests fast enough that you could make a viable trading strategy out of "ask for the last week's worth of trades and rebalance appropriately"?
The argument for has two levels:
1) The trade is a victimless crime. Given the way markets worse, the naïve party would have bought or sold the asset anyway from someone else. Think about how you buy stocks: you just call your broker and ask to buy at the market price. If you do that and end up buying from an insider, you are no worse off.
2) Insiders actually move the price in favor of the naïve party they trade with. If a stock is being sold on the market $29 and the insider knows its true value is $20, they must sell below the other offers (e.g., $28.99) to make the trade. This is in favor of the buying party relative to the outcome without the insider: the buyer will lose $.01 less per share. At large trading volumes, insiders will actually move the market strongly in the direction of the fair price, making all trades of that asset more fair.
Unfair though it may be, society at large does not benefit banning insider trading, and allowing it would make stock market prices more accurate which is actually probably a fairly strong benefit to society.
The SEC isn't intended to protect individual investors, it's intended to protect the market as a whole. That's why they don't care when individual people get screwed, only when people get screwed to an extent that they won't invest in the market. People change their behavior based on what other people do; without full public information, the result of that tendency is to tend towards zero liquidity.
You can order a TV off Amazon and have it shipped to your doorstep tomorrow. That TV was probably assembled in Taiwan from parts made in China and Vietnam, shipped across the Pacific, loaded onto a trailer, sent to an Amazon warehouse, FedEx'd in a jet plane and driven to your house. The majority of firms in that value chain are public companies; what they do is capital intensive. Without functioning capital markets that money would've been used to buy up city real estate and drive up rents.
Like punching someone in the dark!
If I have inside information, and there is a market with 1000 people, and I make $100 by doing insider trading, that money must come from the pockets of those 1000 people. This follows from the fact that the stock market is (for these purposes) a zero sum game.
The error in your argument is that (1) is false. You say "you just call your broker and ask to buy at the market price". But if every market participant was like that, then the order books wouldn't match and the market would break down. There must be some participants who are price elastic. And these are precisely the people whose decisions are effected on the margin, that is, the people who you cause to buy/sell when you engage in insider trading.
So when I buy shares with inside information (say I know the price will rise), I cause the price to rise by a tiny amount, and induce some people to sell who wouldn't have. Since these people wouldn't otherwise have sold, they lose money from my actions.
It is true that insider trading provides information to the market place, and so it is beneficial in that sense. However, it also creates asymmetric information and so harms liquidity. While there is always asymmetric information (I own stocks through my 401k, but I have no idea what MSFT should be worth), insider information is an especially extreme kind, and therefore especially harmful to liquidity.
On (i): SEC employees are required to divest of their holdings in a company before working on an issue relating to it. The findings thus demonstrates an alignment of ethics and private interests.
On (ii): there is potential for abuse. When an insider sells stock, the sale must be reported electronically to the SEC via Forms 3, 4, and 5. When an insider sells restricted stock it is reported via Form 144. Form 144, unlike Forms 3, 4, or 5, may be filed electronically or by paper - over 90% of Form 144s are filed by paper. These paper filings are only available through third-party data providers, e.g. Bloomberg, and even then at a delay from filing.
[1] http://www.darden.virginia.edu/web/uploadedFiles/RajgopalSEC...
They could literally just punch in the 10 numbers (buys and sells for each of the five events) into http://studentsttest.com/ and get a result.
We should really figure out some way to enable more science students to pursue journalism. What's the point of having thousands of brilliant scientists doing research if journalists are just going to mangle it every time? Distribution is just as important as production.
The wealthier our societies, the more numerous and lucrative the government positions, relative to the population median. At some point, the social fabric is likely to rip in awful ways.
Evidence?
Similar disparities in economic fate --between government employees and those they perceive as subjects-- are visible in most Western European countries I know well.
As our societies have gotten wealthier, governments have grown in disproportion -- and opportunities for steady income (including very early retirement) and indirect graft have increased.
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-1806
It's disgraceful that SEC employees seem to be engaged in insider trading, but to extrapolate there to "government employees and those they perceive as subjects" is quite literally insane.
If we look at recent OECD and local numbers for what one would more expansively consider the "public sector" the proportions are much higher in e.g. Sweden [1] and Greece [2]. Further, I would suggest that to measure the full impact of government on society, one should include the pension costs of retired public sector employees (one of the major driver in the PIGS crisis in recent years) as well as public works contractors (e.g. hundreds of millions of dollars for recently failed IT projects in the US). One could also argue that the cost of mass unemployment caused by government policies should be factored in as well (e.g. contrast Spain and Germany).
[1] http://www.oecd.org/gov/pem/OECD%20HRM%20Profile%20-%20Swede... [2] http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/seesox/pdf/IordanoglouPatronageandP...
It's probably quite reasonable to include pension costs. You also forgot to mention the salaries of government contractors (especially military). On the other hand, the numbers we have are already limited to people in the workforce so adjusting separately for unemployment would be double-counting. Nice try. When all reasonable adjustments are made, the results might show a slightly greater advantage for government workers, but still very far from your wild claims about government workers getting super-rich off the backs of the rest of us. Those remain utterly unfounded, and the burden is still on you to provide more than a few shreds of pseudo-evidence.
Historically, market index funds do as well as active portfolios (on average), unless brokerage commissions and tax implications are included in the assessment, in which case they do better (a fact proven by the now-famous WSJ dartboard contest). So SEC employees would have a more profitable portfolio than usual for the duration of their employment, and they would avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
How is it that this obvious solution hasn't been put in practice?
Now, place all holdings in a database table.
When a company is going to be investigated, select only sec employees who are not listed as having holdings in that company.
My solution is obviously incomplete, but maybe it could be the basis for a more robust system.
What stops a hedge fund manager from being extra nice to the boys that turn Bud Fox?
Sorry, I had to after reading all the bitcoin hate in other threads.