That in itself is the sole reason why I'm out. Put.io in general looks interesting however.
Oh well.
There's no reason to believe any of those assumptions are true – and once any of them fail, you've helpfully given the prosecutor a detailed, hard-to-deny log of your every transaction.
Other than that, there's really not that much to implement in the mixer.
Additionally, the break in security is disjunctive. It's not just the mixer that has to be compromised, its the entire chain - exchange, wallet, mixer; if any of them do not cooperate, your trail ends.
This is true in theory but the history of software is littered with obvious counterexamples where theoretically secure software was compromised by admins forgetting to disable debugging / logging, insecure temporary or backup files, etc. When you use a mixer you're trusting the admins to get all of that right even before you talk about malice.
I'm not saying it's trivial, merely that the bitcoin infrastructure was obviously not designed to counter state-level threats. The perfect identification of all past transactions is just too easy to get wrong and and a prosecutor only needs to show a convincing case, not absolute mathematical proof – I wouldn't bet against the simple timing of transactions being enough in many cases
> It not CamelCased either
Thanks.