Fallacies
nizkor.org
nizkor.org
Some training in logic -- reflecting on what make good reasons and justified conclusions -- does have value. It has the same sort of value that learning grammar does. It enables you to make certain things explicit, to put them under conscious scrutiny and control, when needed.
But I think this sort of enumeration of logical fallacies is of very limited value. In the abstract there are only a few ways that arguments fail, and informal fallacies are all iterations on an extremely similar theme.
Moreover, the kind of argument for which it is easiest to characterize fallacies is deductive, and many instances of reasoning that appear deductive are in fact statistical, inductive, inferences to the best explanation, or some combination thereof. Even for deductive arguments, what if any fallacies are being committed will depend upon how one interprets suppressed premises.
The best thing is to learn about different sorts of reasoning and how they work in good cases, and pick up a feel for some fallacies along the way. At the end of the day, reasoning is an art.
At the end of the day, reasoning is an art, and an art worth your learning. The question is rather, whether you be capable of learning it? [0]
I think the value of enumerations -- in addition to creating a vocabulary which is often useful in discussing problems with an argument, even if, as you correctly note, exactly which fallacy is most applicable is a subject of interpretation -- is that it helps recognize instances of potentially problematic arguments. Even if, on a certain level of abstraction, a lot of the named fallacies are just different views of a smaller number of real problems, understanding the different manifestations of those common problems helps to recognize them in practice.
If I understand correctly, such violent reactions to Roko's Basilisk only come from a minority of LW people, but a prominent minority...
1. Its distinctive brand of rationalism grew out of this huge long series of blog posts by Eliezer Yudkowsky, conventionally referred to on LW as "The Sequences". So: we have a group of people united by their adherence to a set of writings by a single person -- a mixture of generally uncontroversial principles and more unusual ideas. It's not a big surprise if this reminds some people of religious scriptures and the prophets who write them.
2. The LW culture takes seriously some ideas that (a) aren't commonly taken very seriously in the world at large, and (b) share some features with some cults' doctrines. Most notably, following Yudkowsky, a lot of LW people think it very likely that in the not too distant future the following will happen: someone will make an AI that's a little bit smarter than us and able to improve itself (or make new AIs); being smarter than us, it can make the next generation better still; this iteration may continue faster and faster as the AIs get smarter; and, perhaps on a timescale of days or less, this process will produce something as much smarter than us as we are smarter than bacteria, which will rapidly take over the world. If we are not careful and lucky, there are many ways in which this might wipe out humanity or replace us with something we would prefer not to be replaced by. -- So we have a near-omnipotent, incomprehensible-to-us Intelligence, not so far from the gods of various religions, and we have The End Of The World (at least as we know it), not so far from the doomsdays of various religions.
Oh, and LW is somewhat associated with Yudkowsky's outfit, MIRI (formerly the Singularity Institute), and Yudkowsky is on record as saying that the Right Thing to do is to give every cent one can afford to them in order to reduce the probability of a disastrous AI explosion. Again, kinda reminiscent of (e.g.) a televangelist telling you to send him all your money because God is going to wrap things up soon. On the other hand, I do not believe that's his current position.
For the avoidance of doubt, I do not myself think LW is very cult-like.
An explanation: http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Roko%27s_basilisk
Yudkowsky going gaga on reddit: http://www.reddit.com/r/LessWrong/comments/17y819/lw_uncenso...
> The fact that you disagree and think you understand the theory much better than I do and can confidently say the Babyfucker will not hurt any innocent bystanders, is not sufficient to exempt you from the polite requirement that potential information hazards shouldn't be posted without being wrapped up in warning envelopes that require a deliberate action to look through. Likewise, they shouldn't be referred-to if the reference is likely to cause some innocently curious bystander to look up the material without having seen any proper warning labels. Basically, the same obvious precautions you'd use if Lovecraft's Necronomicon was online and could be found using simple Google keywords - you wouldn't post anything which would cause anyone to enter those Google keywords, unless they'd been warned about the potential consequences. A comment containing such a reference would, of course, be deleted by moderators; people innocently reading a forum have a reasonable expectation that Googling a mysterious-sounding discussion will not suddenly expose them to an information hazard. You can act as if your personal confidence exempts you from this point of netiquette, and the moderator will continue not to live in your personal mental world and will go on deleting such comments.
Uh...
It probably does count as #2, but not #1. Roko's basilisk wasn't purged on account of being a fallacy.
(For the avoidance of doubt, I am not defending the purging, which I think was a really stupid move.)
It also helps one realize and appreciate just how difficult it is to construct a correct argument, when you can quickly spot the fallacies in your own assertions. As a result, on a personal level, this has caused me to tend to read, listen, and question more, and assert less.
A previous comment of mine
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5835453
from a thread recommended in another comment on this thread goes into more detail about why logical fallacies are not the only problems to look for when evaluating claims for truth or falsehood.
Do you have good suggestions for learning about different sorts of reasoning?
It's easy as a nerd to fell into that trap, but real life has much more nuances than those fallacy lists capture.
Case in point: "the no true scotchman fallacy". In real life groups CAN be argued to have certain characteristics to recongnise members from non-members, hypocritical members, non-practicing members, posers and "fakes". So the "no true scotchman" fallacy breaks down when you're dealing with such nuances.
Or take "appeal to tradition": 1) X is old or traditional 2) Therefore X is correct or better.
Well, it depends on how you define correct or better. If you value tradition and see conformance to it as the most important metric, then X is indeed better for you.
Who is to say what metric you should use for "correct", in issues like ethical ones, that are not clear cut and measurable as things are in the hard sciences and mathematics?
Man, now I just don't know about everything else you've written there.
(kidding)
But in doing so, they are More Wrong (TM). Both situations involve missed social cues. Correcting a minor point is another way of saying you place a higher priority on correctness for its own sake - even if doing so prevents you from reaching higher goals - than you do on understanding.
These things can make it hard to for non-hackers to converse with hackers, and vice versa.
That being said, an audience member pointing this out to someone on stage is a net negative. But I'm not convinced that I should ignore irrelevant errors altogether, especially for errors that people use as signal levels of education or intelligence (nuclear and nucular, you're and your, etc.).
So, we must carefully consider what really signals intelligence.
Linguistic errors pale in comparison to errors of understanding like missing the point.
Discussion should be about connecting and learning, not one-upping.
This distinction is why the Internet 'communities' almost never are. Nerds love to be pedantic while not realizing it doesn't add anything to the discussion. Actually, it potentially poisons the discussion, steering it towards who is more right, rather than actually, y'know discussing things.
"But, someone was WRONG!" It doesn't matter, and nobody cares.
Being pedantic is akin to writing beautiful code that never gets used.
Simplicity is seductive, especially when you're convinced that the minor factoid you're harping on is something you're absolutely sure is correct. If you take a situation and reduce it down to the abstract axiom that you know is true, you can assure yourself that your interpretation of the situation is correct regardless of any nuances in the reality. Because "facts".
This is the definition of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is named from the effort to get the fundamentals right. In doing so, they completely isolated and cut themselves off from reality.
But I quibble on calling it a logical fallacy. It is emphatically not a logical fallacy. That's the whole point you're trying to make - which is that logic itself is limited in its ability to capture the totality of human experience.
Other philosophers call this the limits of Reason (capital R) or the failure of the Enlightenment. But calling it 'Logical Fallacy #1' undermines the very lesson you are trying to impart.
But maybe not: Consider this. Many, many formal systems describe behavior and not some underlying truth. The question of whether reality can even be reduced to a formal system is still open.
From the above axioms, we can reasonably conclude that what formal systems prove is provably true only insofar as the axioms reflect underlying reality exactly.
In 'social' formal systems like the one that describes logical fallacies, it is clear that context is inherently lacking, that the axioms are approximations, and that the system cannot be expected to accurately describe reality.
Thus, we can formally conclude that logical fallacies are, well, approximations.
It seems worth noting, however, that there is, and there should be, a distinction between formal logical fallacies and informal logical fallacies. The latter are what I have in mind when you use the term "social formal systems".
Mistaking ad hominem, or argument from authority, etc., for a formal fallacy is a huge mistake - the one OP seems to be referring to.
All I'm trying to say here to you is that there is no need to resort to formal systems theory, because the taxonomy of informal fallacies never was meant to be considered illogical in the same way that Affirming the Consequent (a formal fallacy)is.
> Well, it depends on how you define correct or better. If you value tradition and see conformance to it as the most important metric, then X is indeed better for you.
This is a common response when people first hear/read about "appeals to tradition." So common that that linked web page deals with this response:
Obviously, age does have a bearing in some contexts. For example, if a person concluded that aged wine would be better than brand new wine, he would not be committing an Appeal to Tradition. This is because, in such cases the age of the thing is relevant to its quality. Thus, the fallacy is committed only when the age is not, in and of itself, relevant to the claim.
Just for completeness, the following is from rationalwiki has the following to say about your beloved "scotchman":
"Broadly speaking, the fallacy does not apply if there is a clear and well understood definition of what membership in a group requires and it is that definition which is broken (e.g., "no honest man would lie like that!", "no Christian would worship Satan!" and so on). "[1]
People reason (and discuss) in several modes, which are ordinarily mixed freely. Deductive, a.k.a. logical (in the proper sense) reasoning is one, and the fallacy-or-not analysis is strictly applicable.
Another mode is that of empirical science, which is basically inductive. You can't prove logically that, for example, substance X causes condition C, but you can establish a good probability by isolating the case, ruling out other factors, showing that the relation is reliably reproducible, etc..
A third mode is humanistic or intuitive. It is an error to suppose that this is unreliable or categorically invalid. Say you have thefts at a workplace, and question employees, and most answer straightforwardly, but one is evasive, furtive, avoids eye contact, can't explain simple events - despite the inapplicability of the logical or scientific modes, this is a rational basis for directing suspicion.
Errors of a meta variety enter when one mode is evaluated by the standards for another. E.g., this writer depicts "slippery slope" as a fallacy of logic by inserting "inevitably" in his interpretation of claims - attributing to the argument-maker the claim that A inevitably leads to B. But in fact "slippery slope" belongs to the third mode, and as such it can be valid - censors do tend to expand their categories, and the actual claim may be, not that the progression is inevitable, but instead that it's unacceptable to go further in that direction - and on this kind of interpretataion there may be no fallacy at all.
It's a good list of logic fallacies, but we just have ot make sure we don't try to apply the refutations in the context of other modes of reasoning.
Why not? I'm not sold that it is an error to disagree with another's (often unconscious) criteria for making a conclusion.
E.g., you can cast doubt on a scientific hypothesis of "A causes B" by pointing out a previously overlooked possible common cause. Or e.g., the polygraph is fairly bogus, not because of the mere logical possibility of false positives and false negatives, but rather because of their relative magnitudes and the poor support of the premises (about physiological correlates of lying or truth-telling). The flaws are strictly defined in one mode, approximate or probabilistic in another.
"Toulmin's practical argument is intended to focus on the justificatory function of argumentation, as opposed to the inferential function of theoretical arguments. Whereas theoretical arguments make inferences based on a set of principles to arrive at a claim, practical arguments first find a claim of interest, and then provide justification for it. Toulmin believed that reasoning is less an activity of inference, involving the discovering of new ideas, and more a process of testing and sifting already existing ideas—an act achievable through the process of justification."
However, not all arguments are meant to be or can be solved with pure logic. Otherwise we'd all be Kantians. People will intentionally argue using Appeal to Emotion or Slippery Slope and, within certain contexts, this can be perfectly fine. Just throwing around "That's a logical fallacy, therefore your argument is invalid" is the perfect example of Fallacy Fallacy.
Even worse, just relying on having a codex of fallacies to throw around into any context reduces most arguments into petty squabbles and making it too easy to dismiss your opposition. But for discussions of the second and third mode you need to engage the person and get to the root of their ideas and argue using the proper rules and context.
My personal revelation of all of this came from reading this piece titled "You Baloney Detection Kit Sucks": http://plover.net/~bonds/bdksucks.html
See this talk[1] by Sam Harris for an argument as to why that is an illusion. In essence he argues that we make axiomatic claims all the time in areas for which there aren't specifically quantifiable goals. In terms of morality the metric is the well-being of conscious creatures. If you argue that there's something else that's more important than the well being of conscious creatures then you probably don't know what you mean.
Likewise with the idea of 'health'. 'Health' is a squishy idea. But if you were to argue that "My idea of health is involuntarily vomiting 6 times a day" we'd have nothing to discuss.
[1]http://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_...
http://plover.net/~bonds/bdksucks.html
Which was discussed on HN under the title "Logical Fallacies Are Usually Irrelevant or Cited Incorrectly":
Such as 'no vegan eats meat' 'what if they had fries at mcdonalds with secret meat in the oil' 'okay no vegan purposefully eats meat' 'ha! you narrowed the group! no true scotsman! you lose!'
Yes. I don't think I'm misrepresenting it. Revising an original claim to handle a counterexample is something that is essential in actual conversations. It can just mean you forgot an important distinction in your original claim.
>Under this revelation, the arguer's original claim is not an actual claim about what men from Scotland do, but rather a proposed definition for the term "true Scotsman."
That's beside the point. In real life conversations, we often use the term X to mean the essense of X (the true X) and not just the bare notion of X. That is, there's nothing fallacious about the following exchange:
- A metal fan would never listen to Bieber.
- Well, I'm a metal fan and I listen to Bieber.
- Well, you're not a true metal fan then.
On the other hand, where this most frequently pops up^, there is frequently no authoritative definition of what constitutes membership. Where there is, there is frequently no authoritative interpretation of the definition.
^ Any internet argument involving religion. The best you can typically manage is membership of particular sects which happen to have an agreed upon defining body. If the Pope says that you are not a Roman Catholic, you are pretty much by definition not a Roman Catholic. However if I define "Christian" in clear unambiguous terms, then point to my definition when asserting that somebody who claims to be a Christians is not a true Christian, then really I have said little of interest. That person may very well be a Christian by a definition other than my own (for instance, according to their definition), and I have justification for asserting that my definition is the true definition and theirs is false.
The issue here is not quite that there is a true Scotsman fallacy going on. Rather it is a failure to agree to the definition of terms before engaging in the discussion.
RE: "No True Scotsman" -- you missed the point a bit. The point is that it is a shell game. "No hackers news reader would EVER do X" ... I link to a hackers news reader doing EXACTLY X ... "Well, no REAL hackers news reader" -- it is a informal fallacy about goal moving basically. You can't add "no REAL abc" to excuse counterpoints, because it means that ANYTHING I say / prove / point out, you will always claim "no TRUE hacker news reader would do that", making the argument pointless.
Re: Appeal to tradition. The point is that tradition has no inherent value, and doesn't relate to correctness. If my mother thought 2+2=17... and she taught that to me, and I taught that to my children, that would be a tradition in our family. The point is that just cause something is traditional doesn't mean it is correct.
To me, a better source for internet debate is the Federal Rules of Evidence: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre. Particularly the modern statistical approach to evaluating the relevancy of evidence based on Bayes' rule: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence_under_Bayes_theorem.
So, no, the distinction between the valid use of attack against credential to rebut expert opinion, and the fallacious, ad hominem, nature of such an attack when used to “rebut” evidence that happens to have been previously presented by an alleged expert is not, at all, irrelevant to internet debate.
I completely disagree with this common attempt to debunk the ad hominem fallacy. I truly believe that the arguer is completely separate from the argument. It's true that we shouldn't trust unsubstantiated claims from biased chemical companies. But the key is that we shouldn't trust unsubstantiated claims from unbiased sources either, even historically reliable unbiased sources.
It goes something like: 1. Established product A has traits X,Y and Z and is a billion dollar business 2. Our new Product B also has traits X,Y and Z and so it will be a billion dollar business
Example I saw the other week from "Why Bitcoin Matters"
> A mysterious new technology emerges, seemingly out of nowhere, but actually the result of two decades of intense research and development by nearly anonymous researchers. Political idealists project visions of liberation and revolution onto it; establishment elites heap contempt and scorn on it. On the other hand, technologists – nerds – are transfixed by it. They see within it enormous potential and spend their nights and weekends tinkering with it. What technology am I talking about? Personal computers in 1975, the Internet in 1993, and – I believe – Bitcoin in 2014.
Please note, I'm not knocking bitcoin here. I'm just wondering if this is indeed a fallacy and has a name.
The business has traits X, Y, Z and successful, so we conclude that the traits X, Y, Z causes it to be successful.
They aren't even making any specific statement about bitcoin beyond it being controversial and interesting to nerds; both of which are already true.
all A are X
this B is X
therefore this B is A
then: for A: successful business. for X: has certain traits. for B: our new product.
I think the most relevant fallacy here is "post hoc ergo propter hoc", which says that if A came before B, then A must have caused B.
I.e., this business had traits A, and then they went on to become successful, so it must have been these traits, since they were there first.
But there is likely a plausible explanation why some property of the product improves its sales. And indeed, that property may really be necessary for a product's success. But it may be an insufficient cause.
e.g. facebook started among college kids so my product focused college kids will success.
So I'm thinking it's a flavor of over generalization or selection bias and I opine that you can most easily show how ridiculous that kind of reasoning is with the "A is X, B is X therefore B is A" fallacy.
"In the South Seas there is a cargo cult of people. During the war they saw airplanes land with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So they've arranged to imitate things like runways, to put fires along the sides of the runways, to make a wooden hut for a man to sit in, with two wooden pieces on his head like headphones and bars of bamboo sticking out like antennas--he's the controller--and they wait for the airplanes to land. They're doing everything right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things cargo cult science, because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential, because the planes don't land." [1]
Believing you're building a billion dollar business because you're nationally doing the same things as someone who has built a billion dollar business before you is all too common.
Ones to really watch out for IMO are Appeal to Emotion and Ad Hominem. These two are the most used fallacies in internet debates IMO. The more you familiarize yourself with these, the better you may become in recognizing a poor argument.
Personally, I think cognitive dissonance is a major problem. People in general have opinion set A at any given moment, and when a direct contradiction to one opinion in set A occurs, they either fight it, or flee.
There's a lot of science behind the idea that most people use their reptilian brain in arguments, emotionally defend their already engrained views, and then try to logically defend it after the fact.
The real challenge is while defending your own views, to try and attempt at discerning whether or not you are simply emotionally responding to a cognitive dissonance, or whether you are rationally defending a built up worldview with foundations in knowledge and insight.
I'd like to say I do the latter, but I'm sure everybody would like to agree with that...
And if you're going to call someone out on a fallacy, don't throw it down like a trump card. SHOW how their argument is fallacious.
1. If [argument is sound], then [conclusion is true].
2. [argument] is not sound.
3. Therefore, [conclusion] is not true.
Similar to: 1. If it has rained, then the street is wet.
2. It hasn't rained.
3. Therefore, the street isn't wet.Relevant previous discussion on "YOUR BALONEY DETECTION KIT SUCKS": https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5832320
Of course, "too much" and "too little" already implies a negative. "Too much" of anything is bad, that's why it's called "too much".
In the "Appeal to Pity" fallacy the example given is:
Jill: "He'd be a terrible coach for the team." Bill: "He had his heart set on the job, and it would break if he didn't get it." Jill: "I guess he'll do an adequate job."
The argument that Bill cares immensely about the job IS evidence that he would likely do it well. A coach who cares is more likely to work hard, be more invested in the outcomes of games, etc.
But the real problem, as you mention, is that people don't argue to logically prove something. People argue to convince someone else (often not even the person they're arguing with). If you can convince people you won the argument, you won the argument. It doesn't matter whether you appealed to base human emotion or made a logically/factually empty argument.
The reason to trust scientists is their method, which gives a good approximation to truth. If you are capable of evaluating their results yourself, then you don't need to trust them, but if you aren't, you have a good reason to trust them, even if technically committing the fallacy, because what else are you gonna do?
For example: A stranger rolls up in a truck up to a kid on their walk from school and says "get in my truck, your parents were in an accident, and I need to drive you to hospital". Now all the person said could be true - but I would strongly advise from getting into the truck.
There's no fallacy with simply not bothering to listen to them in the first place, if they have a history of spouting bullshit.
In other words:
"You are wrong because of X, Y, and Z. You fucking idiot."
not: "You are wrong, because you are a fucking idiot."
The first will typically get cries of "ad hominem", but it isn't. The second sentence is not being used to logically support the assertion in the first sentence, it is just a tacked on plain-old insult.Sometimes you have to go with the most likely option to not get stuck in a quagmire. Being imprecise for the purposes of focus is not an error.
> This fallacy is committed when the person in question is not a legitimate authority on the subject. More formally, if person A is not qualified to make reliable claims in subject S, then the argument will be fallacious.
Such arguments are fallacious even when person A is a well informed individual who is sufficiently well qualified to understand the subject. Not recognising this misses the spirit of the fallacy - that all claims must be substantiated and that prior performance is /completely/ irrelevant as to whether any individual claim is valid - even when that experience makes it the case that person A is the foremost expert in the field.
Usually I just want to say "fallacy of not knowing mathematical logic."
Also, religion--logic does not come into play there.
Also, death and the afterlife--logic is precluded there as well.
Homo sapiens is evolved to use logic in certain limited areas only.